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Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
(04-1144)
Ruling Below: (Planned Parenthood v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. N.H., 2004), cert granted 73
USLW 3531, 73 USLW 3681, 73 USLW 3684 (2005)).
In 2003, New Hampshire enacted a law requiring parental notification at least 48 hours before an
unemancipated minor could receive an abortion. Planned Parenthood, an abortion provider, sued
the state attorney general (currently Kelly Ayotte), alleging the statute was an unconstitutional
restriction on the right to have an abortion. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a
New Hampshire federal district judge's ruling that under the Supreme Court's decisions in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Stenberg v. Carhart, the Act was unconstitutional. The law
lacked sufficiently broad and explicit exceptions to protect pregnant minors' health and therefore
imposed an undue burden upon many pregnant minors. Also, inadequate confidentiality in the
law's judicial bypass process might impose an additional undue burden upon many eligible
pregnant minors.
Questions Presented: Whether the Act's judicial bypass mechanism sufficiently protects the
pregnant minor's health, and whether the "undue burden" standard is the correct judicial
standard.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD of Northern New England, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
V.
Peter HEED, Attorney General of the State of New Hampshire,
Defendant, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
Decided November 24, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge: ("RSA") § 132:24-28 (2003).
Defendant-appellant Attorney General of the I. Background
State of New Hampshire, Peter Heed, acting
in his official capacity ("Attorney General"), In June 2003, the New Hampshire
appeals the district court's order declaring legislature passed [the Act] . . . which states
unconstitutional and enjoining the that:
enforcement of the Parental Notification
Prior to Abortion Act (the "Act"), 2003 N.H. No abortion shall be performed
Laws 173, codified at N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. upon an unemancipated minor or
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upon a female for whom a
guardian or conservator has been
appointed . . . because of a
finding of incompetency, until at
least 48 hours after written notice
of the pending abortion has been
delivered. ... RSA 132:25, I.
The notice requirement is waived if
(a) The attending abortion
provider certifies in the pregnant
minor's medical record that the
abortion is necessary to prevent
the minor's death and there is ...
insufficient time to provide
required notice; or
(b) The person or persons
who are entitled to notice certify
in writing that they have been
notified. RSA 132:26, I.
If a minor does not want her parent or
guardian notified, she may request a state
judge, after a hearing, to "authorize an
abortion provider to perform the abortion if
said judge determines that the pregnant
minor is mature and capable of giving
informed consent to the proposed abortion,"
or if the judge determines that "the
performance of an abortion upon her without
notification of her parent, guardian, or
conservator would be in her best interests."
RSA 132:26, II. In these proceedings, the
pregnant minor may act on her own behalf
or be appointed a guardian ad litem, and she
must also be advised that she has a right to
request court-appointed counsel. RSA
132:26, 11(a). The court proceedings "shall
be confidential and shall be given such
precedence over other pending matters so
that the court may reach a decision promptly
and without delay so as to serve the best
interest of the pregnant minor." RSA
132:26, 11(b). Specifically, "in no case shall
the court fail to rule within 7 calendar days
from the time the petition is filed." Id.
If the minor's petition is denied, an
"expedited confidential appeal shall be
available," and the appellate court must rule
within seven calendar days of the docketing
of the appeal. Access to the trial and
appellate courts for the purposes of these
petitions "shall be afforded such a pregnant
minor 24 hours a day, 7 days a week." RSA
132:26, 11(c). Violation of the Act can result
in criminal penalties and civil liability. . . .
RSA 132:27.
The Act was to take effect on December 31,
2003. On November 17, 2003, plaintiffs-
appellees Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England ... filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Act is unconstitutional and
a preliminary injunction to prevent its
enforcement once it became effective. The
district court merged the preliminary and
permanent injunction proceedings and, on
December 29, 2003, issued an order holding
the Act unconstitutional and permanently
enjoining its enforcement.
The district court found unconstitutional
both (1) the lack of an explicit exception to
protect the health of the pregnant minor, and
(2) the narrowness of the Act's exception for
abortions necessary to prevent the minor's
death. Having found the Act fatally flawed
in these respects, the district court declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the Act's
failure to provide specific protections for the
confidentiality of a minor seeking a judicial
waiver.
The Attorney General, acting in his official
capacity, appeals.
II. Analysis
We review the district court's decision
regarding the constitutionality of a statute de
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novo. United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64,
67 (1st Cir. 2001).
The Attorney General argues that in
deciding whether the Act is facially invalid
we should apply the "no set of
circumstances" standard set forth in United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 95 L. Ed. 2d
697, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). This standard
requires plaintiffs challenging a state law as
facially invalid to show that "no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." Id. at 745. The Attorney
General's argument rests on the premise that
the Salerno standard is applicable to the Act
despite the agreement of a plurality of
Justices in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77, 120 L. Ed.
2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), that a law
which "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus"
places an unconstitutional "undue burden"
on the exercise of her right to choose
abortion. A majority of the Casey Court
applied that standard to determine that an
abortion regulation is facially invalid if "in a
large fraction of cases in which [the
regulation] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to
undergo an abortion," thus imposing an
"undue burden." Id. at 895.... The Court
has since confirmed that "'a law designed to
further the State's interest in fetal life which
imposes an undue burden on the woman's
decision before fetal viability' is
unconstitutional." Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 921, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743, 120 S. Ct.
2597 (2000)....
Despite the Supreme Court's clear
application of the undue burden standard in
Casey and Stenberg, it has never explicitly
addressed the standard's tension with
Salerno. In the instant case, while
recognizing that this court has yet to address
the issue, the district court followed the
majority of circuits that apply the Casey and
Stenberg standard to legislation regulating
abortion. The Attorney General notes that
the Supreme Court applied the Salerno
standard in the abortion context prior to
Casey, see, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514, 111 L.
Ed. 2d 405, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990), and
urges us to follow the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12,
14 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992), that Casey does not
displace Salerno's "no set of circumstances"
test for facial challenges to abortion
regulation.
[See also Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254,
268 n.4 (4th Cir. 1997) (arguing that a court
is bound to apply Salerno)]. . . . The
overwhelming majority of circuits to address
this issue, however, have disagreed with the
Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of Cent. N.J v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 142-
43 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding undue burden
standard, instead of Salerno standard,
applies in abortion context after Casey);
Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall,
180 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting inconsistency between Casey and
Salerno, and following "great weight of
circuit authority holding that Casey has
overruled Salerno in the context of facial
challenges to abortion statutes") [further
citations omitted]. . . . We agree with . . .
six circuit courts that the undue burden
standard-proposed as a standard "of
general application" by the Casey plurality,
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876, and twice applied to
abortion regulations by a majority of the
Court, id. at 895; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at
920-supersedes Salerno in the context of
abortion regulation.
Complementing the general undue burden
standard, the Supreme Court has also
identified a specific and independent
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constitutional requirement that an abortion
regulation must contain an exception for the
preservation of a pregnant woman's health.
See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929-30. . . . The
origin of the health requirement can be
traced to Roe, which held that "the State, in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of
human life, may . . . regulate . . . abortion
[after fetal viability] except where
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
164-65, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705
(1973) (emphasis added), reaffd Casey, 505
U.S. at 879 (plurality opinion). Later, the
majority in Casey observed that, had the
medical emergency exception to
Pennsylvania's abortion restrictions-among
them a parental consent requirement-
precluded "immediate abortion despite some
significant health risks," it would have been
unconstitutional since "the essential holding
of Roe forbids a State to interfere with a
woman's choice to undergo an abortion ...
if continuing her pregnancy would constitute
a threat to her health." Casey, 505 U.S. at
880. Finally, in Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930,
the Supreme Court clarified that "the law
requires a health exception in order to
validate even a postviability abortion
regulation, [and] it at a minimum requires
the same in respect to previability
regulations." Thus, a statute regulating
abortion must contain a health exception in
order to survive constitutional challenge.
Similarly, Roe requires that abortion
regulations contain an adequate death
exception to permit abortion when it is
necessary to save the life of a pregnant
woman. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
The instant case thus presents three
questions: whether New Hampshire's Act
contains an adequate health exception,
whether it contains an adequate death
exception, and whether it places an undue
burden on unemancipated minors who wish
to obtain an abortion. A state's decision to
require parental notification for minors
seeking an abortion is not constitutionally
infirm per se. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520
U.S. 292, 137 L. Ed. 2d 464, 117 S. Ct.
1169 (1997) (upholding parental notification
statute against constitutional challenge to
judicial bypass procedure). The district
court determined, however, that the New
Hampshire Act's lack of a health exception
and overly narrow death exception render it
unconstitutional. Appellees argue that the
Act also creates an undue burden by failing
to adequately ensure the confidentiality of
judicial bypass procedures.
A. Health Exception
The Attorney General and amici suggest that
parental notification laws are shielded from
the health exception requirement reiterated
in Stenberg on account of the interests they
aim to protect. Parental notification laws are
enacted not only in furtherance of the state's
"interest in the potentiality of human life,"
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164, but also in the interest
of protecting minors from undertaking the
risks of abortion without the advice and
support of a parent. In considering an
abortion regulation based on interests other
than the one identified in Roe, however, the
Supreme Court has determined that it
"cannot see how the interest-related
differences could make any difference to the
. . . application of the 'health' requirement."
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931; see also Casey,
505 U.S. at 877 ("[A] statute which, while
furthering the interest in potential life or
some other valid state interest, has the effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman's choice cannot be considered a
permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends."). . . . The Constitution requires a
health exception even when the State's
interest in regulation is "compelling." See
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Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; see also Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 931 ("[A] State may promote but not
endanger a woman's health when it regulates
the methods of abortion."). Thus, regardless
of the interests served by New Hampshire's
parental notice statute, it does not escape the
Constitution's requirement of a health
exception.
The Attorney General and amici also argue
that our decision should be controlled by
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 111 L.
Ed. 2d 344, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), in which
the Supreme Court upheld a parental
notification statute that contained no health
exception. However, as noted by the district
court, the Hodgson Court did not consider a
challenge to that statute's lack of a health
exception, and even if it had, the subsequent
decisions in Casey and Stenberg would
nevertheless require a health exception in
the instant case. The additional cases cited
by the Attorney General and amici as
examples of parental notification or consent
statutes upheld without a health exception
are all similarly distinguishable. Only three
times since Roe has the Supreme Court
addressed a clear challenge to an abortion
regulation's lack of a health exception. In all
three, the Court has indicated that an
exception must be provided when the
restriction would place a woman's health at
risk. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-38
(requiring health exception for "partial-birth
abortion" ban); Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-80
(reading medical emergency exception to
include threat to health); Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 768-71, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779, 106
S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (finding statute requiring
presence of second physician for post-
viability abortion facially invalid for lack of
medical emergency exception), overruled on
other grounds, Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
Since Stenberg, at least two circuit courts
have applied the health exception
requirement to parental notice or consent
laws. In Planned Parenthood of the Rocky
Mountains Services, Corp. v. Owens, 287
F.3d 910, 915-16 (10th Cir. 2002), the Tenth
Circuit held that, because circumstances
existed in which a pregnancy complication
could seriously threaten a pregnant minor's
health, a Colorado parental notification law
similar to the New Hampshire Act was
facially invalid for lack of a health
exception. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
recently struck down an Idaho parental
consent statute, finding that "[a] health
exception is as requisite in statutory or
regulatory provisions affecting only minors'
access to abortion as it is in regulations
concerning adult women." Planned
Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376
F.3d 908, 922-24 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
Idaho statute's health exception overly
narrow). We agree, and therefore affirm the
district court's holding that the New
Hampshire Act is constitutionally invalid in
the absence of a health exception.
Acknowledging that the Act contains no
explicit health exception, the Attorney
General argues that other provisions of New
Hampshire law provide a functional
equivalent. None of the proffered statutes,
however, is adequate. [The court explained
how none of the statutes protect medical
personnel from legal action arising under the
notice provision of the Act, and that a
"competing harms" defense was no barrier
to civil liability and might theoretically
result in criminal liability.]
Even if these statutes could be cobbled
together to preclude all civil and criminal
liability for medical personnel who violate
the Act's notice requirements in order to
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preserve a minor's health, we would not
view them as equivalent to the
constitutionally required health exception.
The basic canons of statutory construction in
New Hampshire require us to look first to a
statute's plain meaning, and when it is clear
and unambiguous, to apply the statute as
written. See, e.g., Appeal of Astro
Spectacular, Inc., 138 N.H. 298, 639 A.2d
249, 250 (N.H. 1996). The Act clearly
states that "no abortion shall be performed
upon an unemancipated minor . . . until at
least 48 hours after written notice" to a
parent. RSA 132:25. Three explicit
exceptions to this rule are provided: (1)
when abortion is necessary to prevent the
minor's death; (2) when a parent certifies in
writing that he or she has been notified; and
(3) when a court grants a judicial bypass.
RSA 132:26, I, II. The New Hampshire
legislature's intent that abortions not in
compliance with the Act's notification
provisions be prohibited in all but these
three circumstances is clear. The earlier-
enacted statutory provisions cited by the
Attorney General cannot be read to
supercede this intent.
Finally, the Attorney General argues that the
Act's judicial bypass mechanism allows
prompt authorization of a health-related
abortion without notice. The Act provides
that such proceedings "shall be given such
precedence over other pending matters so
that the court may reach a decision promptly
and without delay," provides minors 24-
hour, 7-day access to the courts, and
provides for expedited appeal. RSA 132:26,
II(b)-(c). However, the Act allows courts
seven calendar days in which to rule on
minors' petitions, and another seven
calendar days on appeal. Delays of up to
two weeks can therefore occur, during
which time a minor's health may be
adversely affected. Even when the courts
act as expeditiously as possible, those
minors who need an immediate abortion to
protect their health are at risk. Due to this
delay, the Act's bypass provision does not
stand in for the constitutionally required
health exception. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
at 768-71 (finding statute facially invalid for
failing to provide health exception to delay
caused by awaiting presence of second
physician).
The [Act] contains no explicit health
exception, and no health exception is
implied by other provisions of New
Hampshire law or by the Act's judicial
bypass procedure. Thus, the Act is facially
unconstitutional.
B. Death Exception
Just as it requires a health exception, the
Constitution also requires an exception to
abortion restrictions when the life of a
pregnant woman is in danger. Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 931 ("The governing standard
requires an exception 'where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment for the
preservation of the life or health of the
mother."' (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879)).
Accordingly, the New Hampshire Act
waives its parental notice requirement when
a physician can certify that abortion is
"necessary to prevent the minor's death and
there is insufficient time to provide the
required notice." RSA 132:26, I(a).
Appellees argue that this death exception is
unconstitutionally narrow because (1) it is
not possible for a physician to determine
with any certainty whether death will occur
before the notice provisions could be
complied with; (2) it does not allow for
circumstances in which abortion is the best,
but not the only, option for saving a minor's
life; and (3) it does not permit abortion
providers to rely on their own good faith
judgment about whether an abortion is
necessary. The Attorney General does not
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refute these charges, but responds that the
Act is sufficiently specific to give notice of
prohibited conduct, and that a scienter
requirement can be read into the Act from
New Hampshire law.
A minimum of forty-eight hours is necessary
for compliance with the Act's notification
requirement. RSA 132:25, I. Dr. Wayne
Goldner, a named plaintiff in this case,
provided unopposed testimony that
physicians cannot predict with adequate
precision what course medical complications
will take, and thus cannot always determine
whether death will occur within this time
window. Consequently, the time component
of the Act's death exception forces
physicians either to gamble with their
patients' lives in hopes of complying with
the notice requirement before a minor's
death becomes inevitable, or to risk criminal
and civil liability by providing an abortion
without parental notice. The threat of such
sanctions will have a "profound chilling
effect on the willingness of physicians to
perform abortions" when a minor's life is at
risk. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 396. Thus, the
Act's death exception is drawn too narrowly
to protect minors in need of a life-saving
abortion.
The Attorney General apparently concedes
that an abortion provider must be able to
rely on his or her good faith medical
judgment in determining whether her
patient's life is in danger. The Attorney
General argues that RSA 626:2, I, which
states that "[a] person is guilty of a . . .
misdemeanor only if he acts purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the
law may require, with respect to each
element of the offense," can be read together
with the Act to provide the necessary
scienter requirement. According to the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, "where a
specific mental state is not provided for the
offense," RSA 626:2, I(a) requires "proof of
a culpable mental state which is appropriate
in light of the nature of the offense and the
policy considerations for punishing the
conduct in question." State v. Bergen, 141
N.H. 61, 677 A.2d 145, 146 (N.H. 1996)...
. It is not clear, however, which of the four
scienter requirements would be imposed in
this circumstance. The definition of
negligence imposes an objective
reasonableness standard, see RSA 626:2, II
(d), thus, a physician who acts on a good
faith belief that abortion is necessary to save
a patient's life could nonetheless face
criminal or civil liability if a judge or jury
later found that the physician's assessment
was unreasonable. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d
at 205 ("In this area [of medical necessity]
where there is such disagreement, it is
unlikely that the prosecution could not find a
physician willing to testify that the physician
did not act reasonably.").
As the district court held, we cannot
construe the Act to preclude liability for
good faith judgments "unless such a
construction is reasonable and readily
apparent." Planned Parenthood of N. New
Eng. v. Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66-67
(quoting Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 944). The
Act gives no indication that the negligence
standard set out in RSA 626:2, I should not
be applied. Thus, a physician cannot know
whether his or her determination that a
minor's life is at risk will be judged
according to a standard (e.g., knowingly)
that respects her good-faith medical
assessment, or by an objective standard
(negligently) that would leave the
physician's judgment open to post hoc
second guessing. The resulting uncertainty
would, again, impermissibly chill
physicians' willingness and ability to
provide lifesaving abortions. See Voinovich,
130 F.3d at 205 (finding medical emergency
exception unconstitutionally vague "because
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physicians cannot know the standard under
which their conduct will ultimately be
judged"). As Dr. Goldner explained, "the
Act forces doctors to think about criminal
prosecution at a time when we need to be
concentrating on doing what is best for our
patients, thus creating unnecessary risk to
patients' health and lives." That risk
constitutes an undue burden for minors in
need of life-saving abortions.
Because its time requirement is drawn too
narrowly, and because it fails to safeguard a
physician's good-faith medical judgment
that a minor's life is at risk against criminal
and civil liability, the Act's death exception
is unconstitutional.
C. Confidentiality
The Act provides for judicial bypass of its
notice provisions if, after a hearing, a judge
"determines that the pregnant minor is
mature and capable of giving informed
consent to the proposed abortion," or, if she
is not capable of giving informed consent,
that "the performance of an abortion upon
her without notification of her parent,
guardian, or conservator would be in her
best interests." RSA 132:26, II; cf. Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 61 L. Ed. 2d
797, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) (requiring
parental consent laws to provide for judicial
bypass on same grounds). Appellees argue
that the Act does not adequately provide for
the confidentiality of these judicial bypass
procedures. The Act indicates that
"proceedings in the court . . . shall be
confidential," and "an expedited confidential
appeal shall be available." RSA 132:26,
II(b)-(c).
Inadequate confidentiality provisions "raise
the specter of public exposure and
harassment of women who choose to
exercise their personal, intensely private,
right, with their physician, to end a
pregnancy." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 767;
see also Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644, (finding
that judicial bypass proceeding "must assure
that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that follow, will be completed with
anonymity"). In the instant case, a lack of
confidentiality would also create a
significant risk that a minor's parents could
learn of her pregnancy and desire for an
abortion, resulting in the very harms sought
to be avoided by the bypass procedure.
Alternatively, a minor might be compelled
to delay or decline to seek an abortion out of
fear that her parents would find out. Thus,
for a large fraction of minors eligible for
judicial bypass, inadequate confidentiality
would impose an undue burden.
Confidentiality provisions must "take
reasonable steps to prevent the public from
learning of the minor's identity," but the
Supreme Court has "refused to base a
decision on the facial validity of a statute on
the mere possibility of unauthorized, illegal
disclosure by state employees." Akron Ctr.,
497 U.S. at 513. Considerable grey area is
left between these two standards. Because
we have already found the Act in its entirety
unconstitutional on other grounds, however,
we find it unnecessary to delve further into
an evaluation of its confidentiality
provisions,
Ill. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the
district court's order declaring the Act
unconstitutional and enjoining its
enforcement.
AFFIRMED..
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"Court to Tackle Abortion Again After 5 Years"
New York Times
May 24, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON, May 23-The Supreme
Court accepted its first abortion case in five
years on Monday, an unexpected
development that despite the rather technical
questions that the case presents is likely to
add even more heat to the already
superheated atmosphere surrounding the
court and its immediate future.
The new case is an appeal by the State of
New Hampshire of a federal appeals court
ruling that struck down a parental-
notification requirement for minors seeking
abortions.
The Supreme Court has dealt with parental-
notice statutes for many years and has
upheld those that contain safeguards for
minors, including the option of bypassing
the notice requirement by going before a
judge. This case does not require the court
to revisit those precedents.
Rather, it presents two questions that the
court has not previously addressed in the
context of parental-notice laws: provisions
for health concerns and what kind of
challenges should be allowed to abortion
laws that have not yet taken effect.
The court's answers could be important for
its consideration of future abortion cases,
including ones challenging the recent federal
law that prohibits the procedure that
abortion opponents call partial-birth
abortion. That law has been declared
unconstitutional in federal district courts
around the country, and appeals by the Bush
administration are now pending in three
federal appeals courts.
Those cases are likely to reach the Supreme
Court in its next term, increasing the
visibility and volatility of the abortion issue
in what may be a transitional time for the
court in view of the likely retirement of
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. He has,
however, been a consistent dissenter from
the court's decisions upholding the right to
abortion, so his replacement would not be
likely to shift the balance on the court.
One question facing the court in the current
case is whether parental-notice laws, or by
extension, any abortion regulations, must
explicitly provide exceptions for those
women whose continued pregnancy is a
threat to their health. Beginning with Roe v.
Wade in 1973, and including the court's
most recent decision, which invalidated
Nebraska's partial-birth abortion law in
2000, the court has held that the government
may not constitutionally ban an abortion
necessary to preserve a pregnant woman's
health.
The New Hampshire parental-notice law,
enacted in 2003, provides an exception for
minors whose pregnancy threatens their life,
but does not include a more general health
exception. It was in part on this basis that
the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, which sits in Boston, declared
the law unconstitutional last November.
The other question in the case is what
standard courts should use in evaluating a
judicial challenge to abortion laws that like
the New Hampshire law have not yet taken
effect. Typically, as in this case, abortion
rights advocates challenge restrictions by
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seeking injunctions as soon as a new law is
enacted.
In striking down the New Hampshire law,
the federal appeals court applied a standard
derived from the Supreme Court's 1992
decision that reaffirmed the right to
abortion.
That decision, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, struck down a Pennsylvania
requirement that married women notify their
husbands before obtaining an abortion. The
majority found that while many married
women do consult with their husbands, and
therefore would not be affected by the
requirement, the law did place an "undue
burden" on the category of married women
who were in abusive relationships or who
could not notify their husbands without
adverse consequences.
Even if that category represented only I
percent of all women seeking abortions, the
majority concluded, it still created a
substantial obstacle for a "large fraction" of
those women for whom the regulation was
directly relevant, and was therefore
unconstitutional.
The First Circuit applied that analysis in the
New Hampshire case to rule that even if
most pregnant teenagers do not have health
problems requiring a termination of
pregnancy, the law's requirements, which
include a 48-hour waiting period after
parental notice, pose an undue burden on a
large fraction of those who suffer from such
conditions as eclampsia or premature
membrane rupture. Consequently, the law
was unconstitutional, the appeals court
ruled.
In the state's appeal, Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, No.
04-1144, Attorney General Kelly A. Ayotte
is arguing that the court should have applied
a different test, under which courts are not to
issue injunctions against laws that have not
yet taken effect unless "no set of
circumstances exists under which the act
would be valid."
This standard is derived from a 1987
Supreme Court decision in a criminal case,
United States v. Salerno, which was not
related to abortion. The court's own
precedents are unclear on this standard's
continued application to abortion cases. The
First Circuit concluded that the court's 1992
Casey decision overruled the Salerno test.
Other federal appeals courts have found
otherwise.
On the health question, the state is arguing
that a teenager with a health problem can go
before a judge, who can take health into
account even though the statute itself does
not mention it. The First Circuit found this
argument inadequate, noting that the judicial
process, even expedited as the statute
requires, can take up to two weeks. Other
appeals courts have recently struck down
parental-notice laws in Colorado and Idaho
because the laws did not contain a health
exception,
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"Parental Notification Supporters Delighted"
Union Leader (New Hampshire)
May 24, 2005
Tom Fahey
CONCORD-Supporters of parental
notification in New Hampshire expressed
surprise and delight yesterday that the U.S.
Supreme Court will rule on constitutional
issues in the state's law.
"I am on cloud nine," Rep. Barbara Hagan,
R-Manchester, said. "This makes it a whole
new ballgame-this is a strong indication
that makes me very hopeful."
The 2003 law requires doctors to give notice
48 hours in advance to at least one parent of
any minor seeking an abortion. Notification
can be in person or by certified letter.
Doctors can act if a minor is at risk of death,
but two lower federal courts have nullified
the law, saying it does not provide enough
of an exception for medical emergencies.
The state's appeal is expected to be heard
during the court's fall session.
Through a spokesman, Gov. John Lynch
said he is disappointed with the court's
action.
"Gov. Lynch disagrees with the policy and
with the decision to use state resources to
appeal a bad law that two federal courts
have already found unconstitutional," press
secretary Pamela Walsh said.
Attorney General Kelly Ayotte filed an
appeal of the lower courts' rulings in
February, after Gov. Lynch took office.
Walsh said the independence of the state
Attorney General's Office left Lynch
without the option to block the appeal.
She said the governor would support a
repeal of the law if the court upholds it. The
law passed the New Hampshire Senate, 21-
11, and got through the House by six votes
before it was signed by former Gov. Craig
Benson.
Walsh said Lynch "believes families should
communicate about these matters, but you
can't legislate communication and there are
cases where it's not always possible."
Legislators who filed a "friend of the court"
brief supporting the appeal, Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood, were elated yesterday.
Hagan noted that the state's law is different
from others the court has considered in the
past, including Idaho and Pennsylvania.
New Hampshire's law requires notification
of parents, but not their consent.
"I'm incredibly excited, very thankful and
very positive," Rep. Phyllis Woods, R-
Dover, said. "The fact they picked it, when
the odds are so remote-that is incredibly
encouraging."
She said the language in the bill "was
specifically chosen so we knew it had the
very best chance of being upheld at the U.S.
Supreme Court."
Rep. Fran Wendelboe, R-New Durham, said
she expected the court to take on the case,
but gave credit to Benson and Ayotte.
Benson fought for the bill, and Ayotte
pursued the appeal knowing Lynch opposed
it, she said.
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Dawn Touzin, public affairs director for the
state's Planned Parenthood chapter, said she
is confident the court will uphold rulings at
the district and appeals courts levels.
"As parents, we all want to know what is
going on with our children, but we also
paramountly want them to be safe, and the
fact there is no health exception in this law
should be of concern to all parents," she
said.
Deputy Attorney General Daniel Mullen
said the state will prepare a full brief this
summer.
Part of the state's defense of the law hinges
on the fact it allows a minor to seek
permission from a court to proceed with an
abortion if she does not want to involve her
parents.
The appeal also cites the fact that other state
laws allow doctors to perform medical
procedures if they deem them necessary to
the life or long-term health of a patient.
Mullen said expense is not a major factor in
the appeal. "It certainly will not be in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's more a
matter of time and resources," he said. He
estimated it cost about $3,000 for the
petition asking the court to take the case.
Senate Majority Leader Robert Clegg, R-
Hudson, noted that the Supreme Court
recently ruled that minors don't have the
emotional maturity to make decisions that
warrant capital punishment. That ruling
may have prompted the court to take a new
look at the issue of minors and abortion
decisions.
Clegg said he doesn't care what the appeal
costs.
"You don't put a price tag on things like that.
There's a lot at stake," he said. "This is not a
frivolous case."
Roger Stenson, executive director of
Citizens for Life, said the New Hampshire
law is a reasonable attempt to involve
parents in important decisions about their
children's health.
"Our medical emergency provision says that
if the girl's life is in danger, notice is not
required. But if it's a matter of a health
complication, we're saying, 'Make the call.'
Get the parents involved," he said.
Both he and Touzin said the case shows how
important judicial appointments have
become.
Touzin said, "Upcoming federal and
Supreme Court appointments are absolutely
critical to protecting women's full
constitutional rights to privacy."
Stenson said President Bush's judicial
nominees, now the subject of a battle-and
possible compromise-in the U.S. Senate,
"have expressed respect of the integrity of
the family and the safety of minors."
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"Judge Puts Brakes on Abortion Law"
Union Leader (New Hampshire)
December 30, 2003
Garry Rayno
CONCORD-A new law requiring parents
be notified before a minor could have an
abortion was ruled unconstitutional
yesterday by a federal judge.
The law was to go into effect tomorrow, but
the ruling by U.S. District Judge Joseph
DiClerico prohibits that from happening
through a permanent injunction. The state
has 30 days to decide whether to appeal the
ruling,
The law would have been the first restriction
New Hampshire lawmakers placed on
abortion rights since the U.S. Supreme
Court's Roe v. Wade decision 30 years ago.
DiClerico sided with a number of women's
health care providers who filed suit last
month claiming the law was not
constitutional for three reasons: (1) It didn't
include an exception to protect a young
woman's health. (2) The exception when the
woman's life is in danger was too narrow.
(3) It was too vague concerning
confidentiality of court records.
Jennifer Frizzell, public affairs director for
Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England, the lead plaintiff in the case, said,
"We are delighted with the court's decision
to protect the young women of New
Hampshire. This law would have
endangered the health and lives of young
women seeking abortions in New
Hampshire."
"We are very gratified this court recognizes
the unbroken string of rulings dating back to
1973 that any limit on a woman's right to
choose must have an exception for her
health," said Claire Ebel of the New
Hampshire Civil Liberties Union, another
plaintiff.
Gov. Craig Benson, a strong advocate for
the legislation, said in a prepared statement,
"I am disillusioned by today's decision. I
believe it is the responsibility of parents, not
the government, to raise their children. I
will work with the Legislature to construct a
parental notification law that will withstand
judicial scrutiny."
Later, he said he hopes the state ultimately
decides to appeal the ruling, "but that said,
we need an alternative in the Legislature too,
so if we lose, we're not shut out."
Associate Attorney General Daniel Mullen
said the decision on whether to appeal
would be made with input from Benson and
legislative leaders.
One of the bill's sponsors, Rep. Kathleen
Souza, R-Manchester, said she is on the
board of New Hampshire Right to Life and
as an organization, "We will look to the
governor and attorney general to challenge
this in Boston."
Souza said the provisions of the parental
notification law may be added to one of the
abortion bills to be taken up this session.
Bill sponsors will discuss that this week, she
said.
"This is the same court that thought it was
fine for Planned Parenthood to come into a
residential neighborhood in Manchester last
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year and set up shop. I'm not shocked, but
this will not dampen the enthusiasm of pro-
lifers either," Souza said.
"New Hampshire has no real history of
being morally conservative. We know the
battle we are facing, and we are prepared to
keep going on," she said.
Roger Stenson, Citizens for Life executive
director, said, "Starting at the bottom line,
this language in this law has been upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court, which is supposed
to be arbitrator of what is constitutional and
what is not."
He wants to see the state appeal the ruling.
"The only responsible action at this point is
for the attorney general to appeal. Rewriting
the law would make it so weak, it would be
meaningless," he said
Sen. Lou D'Allesandro, D-Manchester, said
DiClerico's ruling "was expected. You
couldn't fulfill the requirements of the law."
D'Allesandro voted against the bill in the
Senate, where it passed on a 12-11 vote,
with Senate President Thomas Eaton
abstaining.
"I have two daughters. I spoke with them,
and I believe strongly that good parents
spend time with their children and if a
situation like this arose, the child would talk
to their parents. That's where this decision
belongs, it belongs with the family,"
D'Allesandro said.
Under the provisions of the law, parents of
young women under 18 must be notified if
their daughter wants to have an abortion. At
least one parent or guardian would have to
be notified in person or by certified mail 48
hours before an abortion is performed.
Teenagers not wishing to tell their parents
could go before a judge who would
determine if the girl is mature enough to
make the decision or if the abortion is in her
best interest.
No notification would be necessary if a
doctor determines a young women's life is in
danger.
In his ruling, DiClerico wrote, '. . . the act
does not comply with the constitutional
requirement that laws restricting a woman's
access to abortion must provide a health
exception."
The Attorney General's Office had argued
there were other provisions in state law that
protect the health of a pregnant young
woman, but DiClerico rejected that
argument.
DiClerico also agreed the exception when a
patient's life is in danger was too narrow. If
a young woman's life were in danger, her
doctor would have to assume if he acted in
good faith, he would not be prosecuted,
DiClerico wrote. "(That assumption) is
neither reasonable nor readily apparent from
the context," he said.
DiClerico declined to rule on the issue of
confidential protections for court records.
Besides Planned Parenthood and the ACLU,
the groups that filed the lawsuit are the
Concord Feminist Health Center, the
Feminist Health Center of Portsmouth and
Dr. Wayne Goldner, a Manchester
obstetrician and gynecologist.
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"Kids, Sex and the Law"
Union Leader
May
Shawne
Some New Hampshire teenagers say young
people might think twice about having sex if
they had to tell their parents before getting
an abortion,
The state Senate on Thursday will take up a
"parental notification" bill, already passed
by the House, that would require abortion
providers to notify her parent before
performing an abortion on a minor. The
measure was amended in committee last
week to replace the notification requirement
with mandated counseling for minors, but
some senators have vowed to bring a vote on
the original proposal instead.
That original version included a "judicial
bypass" option, allowing a girl who does not
want her parents notified to appear before a
judge to obtain a waiver instead. Courts
have ruled that such laws must have judicial
bypass to be held constitutional.
Proponents of parental notification contend
it will help teenagers, who they say need
their parents the most at such stressful times
as unwanted pregnancy. But opponents say
it will subject some youngsters to dangerous
situations: abusive homes, secret and unsafe
abortions, or having to travel out of state for
abortions.
High school students interviewed at the Mall
of New Hampshire Friday disagreed about
whether such a law is a good idea. But
nearly all said it might change youth
behavior and even lower teen pregnancy and
abortion rates.
Mariah McClay of Manchester, 16, believes
(New Hampshire)
18, 2003
K. Wickham
teens "would either have safer sex or not
have sex."
And Pat, 17, of Goffstown, who did not
want his last name used, suggested, "There
might be less abortions because people
might not want to deal with their parents."
"I don't think it would stop people from
having sex. I think it'd just make people
have safe sex more," he said. "More people
would be having sex with a condom or
going on birth control."
McClay said she wouldn't want to tell her
parents if she got pregnant. "I think I'd
probably want them to know, just for their
support. But I don't think I'd have the guts
to tell them-and I don't think they'd be very
happy with me at first."
Impact on behavior
Studies have conflicted on just how
"parental involvement" (which can mean
consent or notice) laws affect teen behavior.
A 1991 study published in the American
.Journal of Public Health found teen
abortion rates dropped in Minnesota,
Missouri and Indiana after those three states
adopted such laws. And Texas has seen
declines in both teen pregnancy and abortion
rates since it adopted parental notification in
2000.
Roger Stenson, executive director of
Citizens for Life, the New Hampshire
affiliate of the National Right to Life
Committee, said having fewer teens getting
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pregnant and having abortions is a goal
people on both sides of the abortion debate
should be able to embrace.
"Even Planned Parenthood says they want
abortions to go down," he said. "This is
something they can help us with, to get
abortions to go down, because kids who
know their parents are going to be involved
are going to think twice about the kind of
behavior they participate in."
"If the rate of pregnancy is going down, that
means that the girls are altering their sexual
behavior because they know their parents
are going to be involved. It has a very
positive epidemiological effect because we
want sexual activity to decrease as well, all
of us, and that's what happens as one of the
positive side benefits of parental notice
legislation."
Jennifer Frizzell, public affairs director for
Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England, said her organization does support
the overall goal of reducing teen pregnancy
and abortion-but not at any cost.
"For example, if the number of abortions in
New Hampshire is reduced because our
young women are feeling the only safe place
they can go is Vermont, and so it means they
have to travel further away to providers who
are less familiar with them, that's an
unacceptable way to reduce your abortion
rate," she said.
Indeed, some studies have questioned
whether those declines are true reflections of
teen behavioral changes.
The same 1991 study found that in Missouri,
out-of-state travel to obtain abortions
increased by 50 percent for minors after the
law took effect.
Massachusetts example
And one of the earliest studies on the issue,
published in the American Journal of Public
Health in 1986, looked at the impact of the
Massachusetts parental consent law during
the 20 months after it took effect, in April,
1981.
That study found that while the in-state
abortion rate declined by 43 percent during
that period, a total of 1,872 Massachusetts
minors went out of state for abortions.
It found 286 girls traveled to New
Hampshire in the last eight months of 1981.
The number of girls who traveled to New
Hampshire for abortions also went up in
1982-an average of 53 a month-and the
study's authors suggested that was because
Rhode Island adopted a parental consent law
that took effect in September of that year.
That led them to conclude, "It is clear that
the distribution of minor women in states
other than their home state is dramatically
and immediately affected by the presence of
a parental consent law."
Opponents of HB 763 say if the parental
notification law passes, New Hampshire
girls would be forced to travel to Maine or
Vermont to get abortions.
Reduction or shifting?
Frizzell cited the Massachusetts study as
evidence that parental involvement laws
don't lower teen abortion rates.
"I would question whether or not that's a
reasonable correlation . . . if trends in the
other parts of the country are similar to what
we know they are here in New England,
which is that a good number of women in
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states where there are parental notice laws
will travel across state lines in order to avoid
either parental notice laws or judicial bypass
requirements," she said.
Vermont has no parental involvement law;
Maine allows a minor to notify another adult
or health care professional instead and also
includes a counseling option similar to the
amended version of the measure proposed in
New Hampshire, Frizzell said.
She said if the proposed law passes, New
Hampshire girls who don't want to involve
their parents in their decision to terminate
pregnancy would have two options: "To go
to a judge or go to another state."
But Teresa Collett, a pro-life Texas law
professor who testified in support of the
New Hampshire measure, said her state has
not seen an increase in the number of girls
who leave the state for abortions. What they
have seen is a dramatic decrease in the teen
pregnancy and abortion rates, she said.
In Texas, teen pregnancies dropped by five
percent from 1999 to 2000, and another five
percent the following year. Teen abortions
dropped 20 percent the first year the law
took effect, and decreased slightly the year
after, Collett testified last week before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in Concord.
Collett is a member of an advisory
committee to the Texas Supreme Court that
is looking at how the judicial bypass aspect
of that state's parental notice law is working.
She is an ardent supporter of parental
involvement laws, and has served as an
expert witness or legal counsel in litigation
involving such laws in Alaska, Florida,
Oklahoma and Texas.
Collett said there is no evidence that Texas
teens have left the state to seek abortions
since the law was passed. She said
neighboring Oklahoma is involved in a court
challenge to its own law, which leaves it up
to abortion providers to decide parental
involvement-but which also makes those
providers liable for the cost of medical
complications if the parent is not involved.
Pending resolution of that case in the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals, she said, "The
Oklahoma abortion providers will not do
abortions now in Oklahoma under this law
because they don't want the liability."
And as a result, she said, "Oklahoma girls
are coming to Texas because there's no
bypass (in Oklahoma) and the providers
won't do it."
She said she called the New Mexico
Department of Health and was told Texas
girls are not going there for abortions. And
she said, "They're not going to Louisiana
because their law's stricter than ours."
Considering consequences
If New Hampshire passed a parental
notification law, Collett said the state would
see decreases in teen pregnancy and abortion
rates.
"When there are consequences that you
really want to avoid, like having to inform
your parents that you're sexually active, then
you're going to avoid the behavior that can
lead to those consequences," she said.
However, Frizzell predicts other, less
desirable consequences. She said a recent
study in the Journal of the American
Medical Association found that teenage girls
often mistakenly believe that parental
notification for abortion means they cannot
get any reproductive services without their
parents' knowledge or consent-and that
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could mean they forgo gynecological exams
or testing for sexually transmitted diseases.
She said after the parental notice bill passed
the House, her organization heard from two
New Hampshire physicians who said teen
clients had voiced concern that the proposed
law would mean they could no longer get
birth control or other reproductive health
care without their parents' permission.
Frizzell said most New Hampshire teens
already involve their parents in their
decisions about abortion.
She said the Planned Parenthood clinic in
West Lebanon, the only one of its eight
clinics that offers abortions, performed 46
abortions last year on girls under 18.
Twenty-six of those were 17 years old, 16
were 16 years old, and four were 15.
She said two-thirds of those girls had
involved their parents in their decisions.
What happens to the other third if the state
adopts a parental notification law? "Some
of them feel fearful to even come in for
health care at all, so they will delay or avoid
getting the earliest possible treatment and
diagnosis of an unintended pregnancy,"
Frizzell said.
Some teens said many of their peers talk
openly about having unprotected sex, and
many have had pregnancy scares. Others
rely on the so-called "morning-after pill" to
avoid pregnancy after unprotected sex, they
said.
And some believe the parental notification
law might change some of that behavior.
Ashly Dragotta of Weare, 16, said she
supports such a law. "I think it's totally
reasonable you should have to tell your
parents or go to court," she said. "If you're
not an adult, you shouldn't be sexually
active or get pregnant."
If she did get pregnant, she said, "I wouldn't
want to, but I would tell my mom, and it
would be in my best interest to tell her."
Her friend, Shauna Palhete of Hooksett, 18,
said the proposed judicial bypass is
appropriate for a teen with good reason to
fear telling a parent: "If you're mature
enough to get pregnant, you should be
mature enough to go before a judge."
And Briana Stevens of Kingston, 17, said
currently, "You're making it too easy for
girls to have sex. They're not thinking about
the consequences."
"If she had to tell her parents, she might not
have sex," she said.
It's easy now
Palhete said if the law passes, "They're just
not going to be able to go out and get an
abortion so easily. It will be a hard road.
It's definitely so easy right now."
Dragotta agreed; she knows one classmate
who has had numerous abortions. "It's like
buying milk at the store: You get pregnant,
terminate the baby and no one has to know
about it."
Pat, the 17-year-old from Goffstown, would
leave it up to a teen to decide whether to tell
her parents if she wanted an abortion. "I
think if someone is old enough and mature
enough to have an abortion, they're old
enough to talk to someone about it if they
want to." But he could "live with" a parental
notification law for minors under 16.
Britni Sanders of Raymond, 16, agreed with
that age limit. "At 16, you're mature enough
to drive and handle those situations. You
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should be mature enough to handle this," she
said.
But Greg Clauson of Raymond, 16, said he
supports the law for anyone under 17.
When his friends challenged him about how
he would feel if his girlfriend had to tell her
parents she was pregnant, he was resolute: "I
shouldn't have done anything in the first
place if I didn't want to accept the
responsibility."
144
"Parental Notification Sent to Benson"
Union Leader (New Hampshire)
May 30, 2003
Garry Rayno
CONCORD-For the first time since Roe
versus Wade, New Hampshire has approved
legislation that places restrictions on
abortions.
The House yesterday voted 197-176 to send
to Gov. Craig Benson legislation that would
require parents of girls under 18 to be
notified if their daughters want to have an
abortion. The bill contains exceptions.
It states, "written notice shall be addressed
to the parent at the usual place of abode of
the parent and delivered personally to the
parent by the physician or an agent."
Gov. Craig Benson said he would sign the
bill, having pushed for the legislation.
Opponents of the bill raised the possibility
of a legal challenge, noting it does not
provide an exemption for health issues.
They also said the state may not provide the
necessary resources for the judicial bypass
that allows a young women to go before a
judge if she does not want her parents
informed before she has an abortion.
Jennifer Frizzell of Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England said "the vote ends
three decades of libertarian heritage that
respected reproductive freedom and medical
privacy."
But supporters said the bill would restore
parental rights and involve them in one of
the most important decisions a girl could
make in her life.
Supporters of the bill praised Benson for his
work on the bill. After the vote, Benson
said, "This gives parents back their legal
rights."
Roger Stenson, executive director of
Citizens for Life, said: "This bill is a vital
element in abortion reform. Our young
daughters have just been given back to their
families where they can get the loving
counsel they deserve when they need it
most."
He said when teens know their parents will
be involved, their sexual activity is altered.
Last week, after nearly three hours of
debate, the Senate voted 12-11 to approve
the bill with Senate President Thomas
Eaton, R-Keene, abstaining.
The Senate changed the definition of
abortion by removing a section stating a
fetus is an individual human organism from
fertilization until birth.
Yesterday the House spent about a half-hour
debating the bill before voting 198-175 not
to table it and then concurred the Senate's
change in the bill. Last month, the House
passed HB 763 by six votes.
The bill would require that at least one
parent or guardian be notified in person or
by certified mail 48 hours before the
abortion is performed. Daughters not
wishing to tell their parents could go before
a judge who would determine if the girl was
mature enough to make the decision or if the
abortion was in her best interest.
No notification would be necessary if a
doctor determines the girl's life is in danger.
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Although New Hampshire has never put any
restrictions on abortion since the Roe versus
Wade decision, three statutes from the 1800s
prohibiting abortion and containing penalties
for performing such procedures remained on
the state's books until 1997. The statutes
were never enforced.
There have been numerous attempts to place
restrictions on abortions, especially for
minors, as well as prohibit late-term
abortions, but none have ever been approved
by the Legislature since the Supreme Court
decision until yesterday's vote.
After the vote, one of the bill's sponsors,
Rep. Phyllis Woods, R-Dover, said the bill
was based on the Minnesota law that has
withstood numerous legal challenges.
"There is nothing in this bill that has not
stood constitutional muster," she said.
During the House debate, House Judiciary
Committee chairman Henry Mock, R-
Jackson, urged lawmakers to take an up or
down vote on the bill and not stoop to
parliamentary maneuvers.
"Three years ago this House impeached the
chief justice of this state for conducting the
court's business behind closed doors. If we
do something like that, that would be
hypocritical," he said.
Rep. Edward "Ted" Leach, R-Hancock,
disagreed and noted the close vote in both
the House and Senate.
"The core issue here today is exactly what it
has been in this very chamber for the last
two decades. For almost 20 years, this
House has clearly recognized what is at the
center of today's debate, and that is the
unnecessary intrusion of government into
the basic family unit."
"This is a 'big brother' bill, and it should be
summarily rejected because this is just not
the New Hampshire way," he said.
Frizzell said "The passage of this bill signals
a first step in the erosion of all women's
access to reproductive health services here
in New Hampshire. We expect the
proponents of the parental notification bill to
pursue several additional anti-choice
measures next year."
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"Parental Consent or Notification for Abortion"
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/adolaborhtm
February 2004
L. Jeanne Kaufmann
Approximately 900,000 teenagers become
pregnant each year. Legislators deal with
issues involving minors who decide to seek
an abortion in various ways. These include
laws prohibiting anyone from performing an
abortion on an unemancipated minor unless
consent or notification of either the parent(s)
or the legal guardian is obtained. Judicial
bypass and exceptions may also be obtained.
Twenty-five states require a minor to obtain
at least one of her parents' consent before
receiving an abortion and 23 states require
parental notification. Ohio, Oklahoma,
Virginia and Wyoming all specify requiring
parental notification and/or knowledge and
consent.
There are six states-Connecticut, Hawaii,
New York, Oregon, Vermont and
Washington-that have no laws specifically
addressing parental consent or notification
for minors seeking abortions.
Parental consent generally means that at
least one of the minor's parent(s) or legal
guardian must give written or verbal
permission to the physician in order to
perform the minor's abortion.
Parental notification generally means that
the physician must send a letter within a
specific time period to the parent(s) or legal
guardian of the minor seeking an abortion to
notify them of her intent.
Forty states have judicial bypass procedures
allowing minors who cannot tell their
parent(s) about their decision to have an
abortion to seek court orders to waive
parental involvement. A judge will decide
whether to allow the abortion without
parental consent or notification.
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Garcetti v. Ceballos
(04-473)
Ruling Below: (Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
1395, 161 L.Ed. 2d 188, 73 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005)(No. 04-473)).
Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney, sued the district attorney and others, alleging that
retaliatory action was taken against him for engaging in speech protected by the First
Amendment. The dispute involved job-related speech, as Ceballos sought to expose what he
believed to be perjury by a law enforcement officer. The United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants,
finding they were protected by qualified immunity, and in favor of the county, finding it to be
protected by the Eleventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that, for the
purposes of summary judgment, plaintiffs speech was protected by the First Amendment and
that none of the immunities claimed by defendants were applicable.
Question Presented: Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly
pursuant to the duties of employment, be cloaked with First Amendment protection simply
because it touches on a matter of public concern, or should First Amendment protection also
require the speech to be engaged in "as a citizen," in accordance with this Court's holdings in
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983)?
Richard CEBALLOS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Gil GARCETTI; FRANK SUNDSTEDT; CAROL NAJERA;
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided March 22, 2004
[Excerpt: Some citations and footnotes omitted]
OPINION: REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Richard Ceballos filed this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending that he was
subjected to adverse employment actions by
his supervisors at the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office in retaliation for
engaging in speech protected by the First
Amendment. He also asserts that the county
fails to train, supervise, and discipline its
district attorneys regarding such unlawful
retaliation.
The district court granted a motion for
summary judgment in favor of the individual
defendants-the District Attorney (in his
individual capacity), the then-Head Deputy
District Attorney, and Ceballos's immediate
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supervisor-on the basis of qualified
immunity, and granted a separate motion for
summary adjudication in favor of the county
defendants-the county and the District
Attorney (in his official capacity)-on the
basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Given that the disputed facts must be
resolved in Ceballos's favor and that all
inferences that may reasonably be drawn
must also be drawn in his favor, we reverse
the district court's rulings. We hold that, for
purposes of summary judgment, qualified
immunity was not available to the individual
defendants because the law was clearly
established that Ceballos's speech addressed
a matter of public concern and that his
interest in the speech outweighed the public
employer's interest in avoiding inefficiency
and disruption. Because the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to political
subdivisions of the state, the county could
ordinarily not assert sovereign immunity,
although in this case it could do so if such
immunity applied to the District Attorney.
Whether the District Attorney, when acting
in his official capacity, is entitled to such
immunity depends on whether he was
performing a state or a county function
when he took the alleged actions with
respect to Ceballos. We hold that in most
respects he was acting in the latter capacity.
Thus, he is not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and neither is the
County.
BACKGROUND
Ceballos has been a deputy district attorney
since 1989. In 1997 or 1998 he was
assigned to the District Attorney's Office's
Pomona Branch and about a year later was
promoted to calendar deputy, with
supervisory responsibilities over two to
three deputy district attorneys. In late
February 2000, a defense attorney in People
v. Cusky, a case then being prosecuted by
the District Attorney's Office, told Ceballos
that he believed that one of the arresting
deputy sheriffs may have lied in a search
warrant affidavit. He asked Ceballos to
investigate. Ceballos was supervising the
deputy district attorney assigned to the case,
but he decided to investigate the allegations
himself. After reviewing the relevant
documents in the case and visiting the crime
scene, Ceballos determined that the affidavit
of the deputy sheriff had, at the least, grossly
misrepresented the facts.
Ceballos discussed the problems arising
from this investigation with others in the
Office, including his immediate supervisor,
Carol Najera and the then-Head Deputy
District Attorney, Frank Sundstedt.
Everyone agreed that the validity of the
warrant was questionable. On March 2,
2000, Ceballos sent Sundstedt a
memorandum discussing his determination
that the affidavit was falsified and
recommending that the case be dismissed,
Sundstedt instructed Ceballos to revise the
memorandum to make it less accusatory of
the deputy sheriff. Ceballos rewrote the
memorandum, and a meeting was held on
March 9 with representatives from the
Sheriffs Department, Sundstedt, Najera,
Ceballos, and another deputy district
attorney.
Following the meeting with the Sheriffs
Department, Sundstedt was not certain that
Cusky should be dismissed and decided to
proceed with the case pending the outcome
of a motion challenging the search warrant,
which had already been filed by the defense.
Ceballos informed defense counsel that he
believed the affidavit contained false
statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed
him to testify at the hearing. Ceballos told
Najera that pursuant to Brady v. Maryland
and other case law, he was obligated to turn
over to the defense the memoranda he had
prepared regarding his opinion of the
legality of the search warrant. Ceballos
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contends that Najera instructed him to edit
the memorandum to include statements by
only one detective and to limit his in-court
testimony. When Ceballos testified at the
hearing on the motion, the Cusky court
sustained the prosecution's objections to
several questions defense counsel asked
him. Ceballos maintains that, as a result, he
was unable to tell the court certain of his
conclusions (and the reasons therefore)
regarding the accuracy of the warrant. The
defendant's motion was denied, and the
prosecution proceeded. Having testified for
the defense, Ceballos was removed from the
Cusky prosecution team.
Ceballos alleges that Garcetti, Sundstedt,
and Najera retaliated against him for
submitting the memorandum regarding the
Cusky warrant, for otherwise reporting to or
discussing with other persons the allegations
of misconduct by the deputy sheriff, and for
testifying truthfully at the court hearing. He
alleges that the defendants took a number of
retaliatory actions against him: (1) they
demoted him from his position of calendar
deputy to that of trial deputy; (2) Najera
"threatened" him when he told her that he
would testify truthfully at the hearing; (3) at
the hearing itself Najera was "rude and
hostile" to him; (4) Sundstedt "gave [him]
the silent treatment"; (5) Najera informed
him that he could either transfer to the El
Monte Branch [described by Ceballos as an
act of "Freeway Therapy," a practice of
punishing deputy district attorneys by
assigning them to a branch requiring a long
commute to work], or, if he wanted to
remain in the Pomona Branch, he would be
re-assigned to filing misdemeanors, a
position usually assigned to junior deputy
district attorneys; (6) the one murder case he
was handling at the time was reassigned to a
deputy district attorney with no experience
trying murder cases; (7) he was barred from
handling any further murder cases; and (8)
he was denied a promotion.
Ceballos filed a complaint in the district
court pursuant to § 1983 against Najera,
Sundstedt, and then-District Attorney Gil
Garcetti in their individual capacities, as
well as against Garcetti in his official
capacity and the County of Los Angeles. He
sought lost wages and other compensatory
damages as well as injunctive relief. The
county defendants moved for summary
adjudication, which the district court granted
on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the action. Ceballos amended his
complaint, and the individual defendants
moved for summary judgment, which was
granted on the ground that they were
protected by qualified immunity. The
district court declined to exercise
jurisdiction over Ceballos's state law claim
for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Ceballos appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Individual Defendants
Immunity
and Qualified
Ceballos argues that the district court erred
in holding that the individual defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity. Public
officials are entitled to qualified immunity
for acts that do not violate "clearly
established . . . constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73
L. Ed 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982);
Rivero v. City & County of San Francisco,
316 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 2002). When
considering a defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the ground of
qualified immunity, we must first determine
whether, when the facts are taken in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and the
inferences are drawn in his favor as well,
these facts and inferences establish that the
official's conduct violated a constitutional
right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201,
150 L. Ed 2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
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If so, wc must next consider whether the
right was clearly established at the time of
the alleged improper act. Id. If the right
was clearly established, we ask finally
whether despite this fact, the official's
unconstitutional conduct constituted a
reasonable mistake of fact or law. Id. at
199. Then, unless the constitutional error is
excused on that ground, summary judgment
must be denied.
A. Ceballos's Speech Was Protected By the
First Amendment
Ceballos contends that he exercised his First
Amendment right to free speech in alleging
that a deputy sheriff included false
statements in the Cusky search warrant
affidavit. The parties appear to dispute to
whom Ceballos spoke about the alleged
misconduct. . . . For the reasons set forth
below, we hold that, for purposes of
summary judgment, Ceballos's allegations of
wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute
protected speech under the First
Amendment; accordingly, we need not
determine here whether similar protection
should be afforded to his other
communications. Those matters are best
explored at trial.
Although public employees do not
relinquish their right to free speech by virtue
of their employment, neither do they enjoy
absolute First Amendment rights. To
determine whether Ceballos's speech is
protected by the First Amendment, we apply
a two-step test that stems from the Supreme
Court's holdings in Connick v. Myers, 461
US. 138, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708, 103 S. Ct. 1684
(1983), and Pickering v. Bd of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811, 88 S. Ct. 1731
(1968): (1) we ask whether the speech
addresses a matter of public concern, and, if
it does, (2) we engage in an inquiry,
commonly known as the Pickering
balancing test, to determine whether
Ceballos's interest in expressing himself
outweighs the government's interests "in
promoting workplace efficiency and
avoiding workplace disruption." Rivero,
316 F 3d at 865 (quoting Hufford v.
McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir.
2001)).
1. Matter of Public Concern
Whether a public employee's speech
addresses a matter of public concern is a
question of law. Connick 461 U.S. at 148
n. 7....
A public employee addresses a matter of
public concern when his speech relates to an
issue of 'political, social, or other concern
to the community."' Brewster, 149 F.3d at
978 (quoting Connick, 461 US at 146); see
also Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F. 3d
420, 422 (9th Cir 1995). "Speech that
concerns issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members
of society to make informed decisions about
the operation of their government merits the
highest degree of first amendment
protection." Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973
(internal quotation marks omitted). In
contrast, "speech that deals with individual
personnel disputes and grievances and that
would be of no relevance to the public's
evaluation of the performance of
governmental agencies, is generally not of
public concern." Id.
In defining the scope of First Amendment
protection accorded to public employees'
speech, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between speech "as a citizen upon matters of
public concern" at one end and speech "as
an employee upon matters only of personal
interest" at the other. Connick, 461 U.S. at
147. ...
What is critical under Connick, as we
explained in Roth v. Veteran's Admin. of
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United States, is the "point of the speech in
question: was it the employee's point to
bring wrongdoing to light? Or to raise other
issues of public concern, because they are of
public concern? Or was the point to further
some purely private interest?" 856 F.2d
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, "it is only
'when it is clear that . . . the information
would be of no relevance to the public's
evaluation of the performance of
governmental agencies' that speech of
government employees receives no
protection under the First Amendment."
Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco,
308 F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Pool v. Vanrheen, 297 F.3d 899, 907 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
The individual defendants concede that
Ceballos's allegations that an arresting
deputy sheriff may have lied in a search
warrant affidavit constitutes whistleblowing.
. . . The defendants do not argue that
Ceballos's First Amendment interest is
diminished because his purpose was
primarily to further a personal personnel
dispute. Instead, they contend that
Ceballos's allegations of law enforcement
perjury should not be protected because he
included them in a memorandum to his
supervisors that he prepared in fulfillment of
an employment responsibility,
Under Connick, speech that is protected by
virtue of its content does not lose that
protection simply because the speech is
directed to other employees of that
governmental employer rather than to
members of the public. 461 US. at 147-49.
In particular, we have repeatedly held that
speech exposing official wrongdoing is no
less deserving of First Amendment
protection because the public employee
reported the misconduct to his supervisors
rather than to the news media.
Nor do our cases provide any support for the
defendants' contention that a public
employee's speech is deprived of First
Amendment protection whenever those
views are expressed, to government workers
or others, pursuant to an employment
responsibility. In Roth, the plaintiff was
fired from his position as "troubleshooter" at
the Veterans Administration after he
exposed corruption, mismanagement, and
other problems in written reports that were
prepared as part of his job responsibilities.
856 F.2d at 1406. Concluding that Roth's
comments were not to further personal
grievances, but rather "for the express
purpose of addressing . . . problems
besetting the VA, at the wish of the
defendants and for the good of the
institution, the Veterans it serves, and the
public," we held that Roth could not be
denied First Amendment protection simply
because his efforts to expose wrongdoing
were included in reports written pursuant to
his employment duties. Id.
Although our cases are clear, our specially
concurring colleague contends that we
should revisit en bane our holdings in Roth
and its progeny and establish a per se rule
that public employees are not protected by
the First Amendment when their speech is
uttered in the course of carrying out their
employment obligations. We disagree. The
right of public employees to speak freely on
matters of public concern is important to the
orderly functioning of the democratic
process, because public employees, by
virtue of their access to information and
experience regarding the operations,
conduct, and policies of government
agencies and officials, "are positioned
uniquely to contribute to the debate on
matters of public concern." Weeks v. Bayer,
246 F3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Gilbrook v. City of Westminster,
177 F.3d 839, 870 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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Stripping them of that right when they report
wrongdoing or other significant matters to
their supervisors would seriously undermine
our ability to maintain the integrity of our
governmental operations.
The proposed per se rule would be
particularly detrimental to whistleblowers,
such as Ceballos, who report official
misconduct up the chain of command,
because all public employees have a duty to
notify their supervisors about any wrongful
conduct of which they become aware. To
deprive public employees of constitutional
protection when they fulfill this employment
obligation, while affording them protection
if they bypass their supervisors and take
their tales, for profit or otherwise, directly to
a scandal sheet or to an internet political
smut purveyor defies sound reason.
Moreover, such a per se rule would violate
the principles established by Connick.
Subject to the Pickering balancing test, First
Amendment protections are available to
public employees who suffer retaliation for
whistleblowing, regardless of whether the
act of whistleblowing consists of informing
higher level public officials, Congressional
committees, or the media. The Supreme
Court in Connick made no distinction
between internal and external
whistleblowing when it noted that speech
that is "of public import in evaluating the
performance of the District Attorney" may
include efforts by an employee "to bring to
light actual or potential wrongdoing or
breach of public trust." Connick, 461 US.
at 148.
Other circuits have also rejected any per se
rule that a public employee does not receive
any First Amendment protection for speech
that occurs within the scope of his
employment duties.
To the extent that the defendants or our
colleague may be suggesting the adoption of
a narrower per se rule-a rule that would
deny First Amendment protection to speech
contained in routine reports or made in the
performance of routine job functions-we
strongly disagree. The mere fact that a
public employee exposes individual
wrongdoing or government misdeeds when
making a regular as opposed to a special
report does not, by itself, result in the denial
of First Amendment protection. Whether a
job duty is routine or non-routine is a far
less important factor for purposes of First
Amendment analysis than the content of the
public employee's speech. Regardless of the
form in which a government worker makes
charges of corruption, criminal misconduct,
or public waste, such charges raise serious
public concerns that merit careful
assessment and justify full application of the
Connick principles. Indeed, a report that
would ordinarily be considered routine by
virtue of its form may well become non-
routine by virtue of its content, such as when
it contains serious charges of official
wrongdoing. Finally, a per se rule stripping
all First Amendment protection from speech
uttered in the performance of routine, as
opposed to non-routine, job functions would
be inconsistent with the very nature of the
Connick test which contains a second step
that requires us to balance various factors,
including some of those that concern our
concurring colleague.
2. Balancing Test
Even though Ceballos's speech constituted a
matter of public concern, it is not protected
by the First Amendment unless the court
also finds that his interest in the speech out-
weighs the government's interests "in
promoting workplace efficiency and
avoiding workplace disruption." Rivero,
316 F.3d at 865; accord Pickering v. Bd of
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Educ., 391 US. 563, 571, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811,
88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968). The employer bears
the burden of proving that the balance of
interests weighs in its favor. Johnson, 48
F.3d at 426. The 'more tightly the First
Amendment embraces the speech the more
vigorous a showing of disruption must be
made.'' Id. (quoting Hyland v. Wonder, 972
F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 1992)).
The defendants contend that under our
holding in Brewster, the Pickering balancing
test favors them because Ceballos spoke to
other government employees and not to the
public or the media. While in Brewster we
stated that a "narrow, limited focus and a
limited audience weigh against a claim of
protected speech," 149 F.3d at 981 (internal
quotation marks omitted), we also
recognized that "the private nature of the
statement does not remove it from the realm
of 'public concern' altogether." Id. . . .
[T]he decisive question is whether the
employee spoke with the intention of
bringing wrongdoing to light, because we
have held that "in a good-faith
whistleblowing context, the breadth of one's
audience is irrelevant." Hufford, 249 F.3d
at 1150.
Assuming, for the purposes of our analysis,
that the speech at issue is only the
memorandum Ceballos sent to Sundstedt,
there can be no disputing the fact that he
included the material charging misconduct
on the part of a law enforcement officer "to
bring wrongdoing to light, not merely to
further some purely private interest."
Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (internal quotations
omitted). Even if Ceballos's audience was
limited, this factor would provide little
support to the individual defendants' claim
of disruption and inefficiency under
Pickering because the speech was uttered in
a "good-faith whistleblowing context."
Hufford, 249 F 3d at 1150.
The defendants next maintain that their
interests outweigh those of Ceballos because
his charges of misconduct by the deputy
sheriff were found to be erroneous by the
Cusky court. The falsity of a statement is a
factor to be considered in the Pickering
balance. Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d
839, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1998). We have
recognized, however, that in order to
encourage public employees to speak out on
matters of public concern, the First
Amendment will ordinarily be held to protect
even false statements, because
while false statements are not
deserving, in themselves, of
constitutional protection,
"erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and . .
. it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space' that
they 'need . . . to survive."'
Johnson, 48 F 3d at 424. In Johnson, we
considered the weight to be accorded in a
Pickering balancing to false statements
made with reckless disregard for the truth.
Johnson, 48 F.3d at 421-26. While noting
that recklessly false statements serve a "very
limited" First Amendment interest, id. at 426
(citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
162-63, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, 94 S. C. 1633
(1974)), we nonetheless held that even such
statements "are not per se unprotected by the
First Amendment when they substantially
relate to matters of public concern. Instead,
the recklessness of the employee and the
falseness of the statements should be
considered in light of the public employer's
showing of actual injury to its legitimate
interests, as part of the Pickering balancing
test." Id. at 424.
Unlike in Johnson, there is no evidence here
that Ceballos spoke recklessly, or that he
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acted in bad faith. At most, the evidence
suggests that his statements proved to be
erroneous. As the individual defendants
concede, prosecutors have a duty to disclose
information favorable to an accused,
including information relating to a witness's
veracity and integrity. Good-faith
statements made in pursuit of this
obligation, even if they may ultimately turn
out to be incorrect, do not warrant retaliatory
action. Accordingly, if Ceballos's
statements in the memorandum to his
supervisor are ultimately determined to be
erroneous, the erroneous nature of the
statements might lessen the weight of his
interests under the Pickering balancing test,
but that factor would in any event not be
sufficient by itself to deprive Ceballos of all
First Amendment protection.
Assuming arguendo that Ceballos's limited
audience and purportedly erroneous
statements diminish the weight of his First
Amendment interests, the individual
defendants do not meet their burden under
Pickering because they offer no explanation
as to how Ceballos's memorandum to his
supervisors resulted in inefficiency or office
disruption. Ceballos tried to address the
problem initially by reporting the matter to
his supervisors, obviously an appropriate
way of seeking a responsible solution. . . . It
is difficult to imagine how the performance
of one's duties in this manner could be
disruptive or inefficient much less how
any such "disruption" or "inefficiency"
could outweigh the public's interest in the
exposure of corrupt or unlawful practices in
the Sheriffs Department. In any event,
because the defendants have failed even to
suggest disruption or inefficiency in the
workings of the District Attorney's Office,
there is little for us to weigh in favor of the
individual defendants under Pickering.
In sum, Ceballos's speech addressed a matter
of public concern and his interest in the
speech outweighed the defendants'
administrative interests. Thus, we hold that,
for summary judgment purposes, his speech
was protected by the First Amendment.
* * *
[The court went on to note that the
defendants would be entitled to qualified
immunity if the constitutional right was not
clearly established at the time of the
violation or if a mistake as to the
requirements of the law was objectively
reasonable. The court held that the law was
clearly established and that, for purposes of
summary judgment, the allegedly retaliatory
motive indicated that defendants' actions
were not objectively reasonable.
The court also addressed the question of
sovereign immunity. It concluded that the
retaliatory actions taken against Ceballos
were part of the administrative function of
the District Attorney's Office (as opposed to
prosecutorial function) and were therefore
performed on behalf of the county rather
than the state. Counties, unlike states, do
not enjoy sovereign immunity.]
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
district court and remand for further
proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
CONCUR: O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I write separately because although I concur
in the court's opinion that Roth v. Veteran's
Administration of the United States, 856
F.2d 1401 (9th Cir 1988), controls the
result, I believe that Roth was wrongly
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decided and that it ought to be overruled,
perhaps even by our court's rehearing the
present case en banc.
II
. . . [l]n Roth, a three-judge panel of our
court held that when a public employee
speaks on matters of public importance, his
or her speech falls automatically within the
protective ambit of the First Amendment.
Yet in so holding, Roth minimized-indeed,
it entirely ignored-the significance of
Connick's distinction between speech
offered by a public employee acting as an
employee in carrying out his or her ordinary
employment duties and speech spoken by an
employee acting as a citizen expressing his
or her personal views on disputed matters of
public import. Instead, Roth asserted that
the relevant constitutional inquiry focuses
solely on the "point of the speech in
question: Was it the employee's point to
bring wrongdoing to light? Or to raise other
issues of public concern, because they are of
public concern? Or was the point to further
some purely private interest?" Roth, 856
F.2d at 1405 (quoting Callaway v. Hafeman,
832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010
(7th Cir. 1985). As the majority today
reiterates, Roth's formulation led inexorably
to the conclusion that "it is only when it is
clear that . . . the information would be of no
relevance to the public's evaluation of the
performance of governmental agencies that
speech of government employees receives
no protection under the First Amendment."
Maj. Op. at 3455 (quoting Ulrich v. City &
County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 978
(9th Cir. 2002)) (quotation omitted)
(emphasis in original).
That conclusion-that the First Amendment
encompasses any speech by a public
employee that touches upon matters of
public importance, notwithstanding what
might best be described as the "role" of its
speaker-is at odds with the Supreme
Court's instruction in Connick. Connick
teaches us that the relevant constitutional
distinction is not merely between speech
touching on matters of public significance
and speech that does not, but between
speech spoken "as a citizen upon matters of
public concern [and that offered] cis an
employee upon matters only of personal
interest." Id. at 147 (emphasis added); Roth
thus collapses a critical dimension of
Connicks two-pronged inquiry: By focusing
only on Connick's public concern/purely
personal interest axis, Roth improperly
quashes the controlling caselaw's
accompanying distinction between an
employee's viewpoint-laden personal speech
and his or her ordinary job-related speech.
III
In fairness to the Roth court, Connick did
not fully rationalize the distinction it drew
between speech offered by a public
employee acting as an employee carrying
out his or her ordinary job duties and that
spoken by an employee acting as a citizen
expressing his or her personal views on
disputed matters of public import. Nor, for
the most part, have the six other circuits
which-in contrast to this court-at various
points reiterated the importance of Connick's
citizen speech-employee speech distinction.
Notwithstanding the relative opacity of
Connick's explanation for its differentiation
between citizen and employee speech,
however, there is a strong First Amendment
basis for its having drawn such a distinction.
A
While it has rarely been stated explicitly by
the Supreme Court, the implicit premise
underlying the First Amendment's hostility
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toward viewpoint-driven rules abridging the
freedom of speech is that such constraints
impermissibly infringe upon individuals'
freedom of choice to express their personal
opinions or to otherwise express themselves.
As the Court put the point in Rutan v.
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75-76,
Ill L. Ed. 2d 52, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990)
(emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted):
There are deprivations less
harsh than dismissal that
nevertheless press state
employees and applicants to
conform their beliefs and
associations to some state-
selected orthodoxy. The First
Amendment is not a tenure
provision, protecting public
employees from actual or
constructive discharge. The
First Amendment prevents the
government . . . from wielding
its power to interfere with its
employees' freedom to believe
and associate, or to not believe
and not associate.
The problem is that when public employees
speak in the course of carrying out their
routine, required employment obligations,
they have no personal interest in the content
of that speech that gives rise to a First
Amendment right. Instead, their speech is, in
actuality, the State's. I do not dispute the
court's characterization of the relevant facts
of this case-which it presents, as it must, in
the light most favorable to Ceballos, see
Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F 3d 968,
973 (9th Cir. 2003)-but I believe that
actually quoting Ceballos's own statement of
the operative facts may be particularly
illustrative here. In his opposition to the
defendants' motion for summary judgment
below, Ceballos described as follows the
basis for the speech that he now claims to
fall within the protections of the First
Amendment:
Pursuant to his duties as a
prosecutor, [Ceballos] wrote a
memo expressing his concerns
about the veracity of the
officers in [People v. Cuskey].
He then informed his
supervisors he intended to
comply with his duties under
Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S.
83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct.
1194 (1963)], which required
him to turn his memo over to
defense counsel.
Plaintiffs Statement in Opposition to
Defendants' Separate Statement of
Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of
Law at 4. Counsel for plaintiff reiterated that
description of the facts at oral argument[.]
As these statements indicate, Ceballos had
no personal stake (other than in doing his
job well), and no cognizable First
Amendment interest, in the speech for which
he now seeks protection-his performance
of the basic communicative duty Brady
imposes on "the prosecution." See Brady,
373 U.S. at 87. Indeed, as the Supreme
Court has explained, "the prosecutor's office
is an entity and as such it is the spokesman
for the Government. A [statement] made by
one attorney must be attributed, for these
purposes, to the Government." Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 31 L. Ed
2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972) (citing
Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 272). Of
course, "the Government" has no First
Amendment rights. Only individuals do.
B
Roth's extension of First Amendment
protections to such routine, required job-
related activity effectively has-no less than
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an extension of such safeguards to the
personnel grievances at issue in Connick
would have-"planted the seed of a
constitutional case" in every task that every
public employee ever performs, every time
that any public employee merely does "what
he is supposed to do." Connick, 461 U.S. at
149. At bottom, after all, everything a
public employee does in the course of
carrying out the requirements of his or her
job ultimately is connected to the public
interest and relevant to citizens' "making
informed decisions about the operation of
their government," Coszalter, 320 F.3d at
973. Terrell, 792 F.2d at 1360[.]
Indeed, with Roth as precedent and now
Ceballos on the books, what federal or state
employment-based decision can possibly
evade intrusive federal constitutional
review? Suppose that, instead of retaining
private counsel as it has here, the County
had provided its own staff attorney
representation. Suppose further that the
deputy county counsel assigned to defend
this case had (just like the majority) quite
mistakenly, but also quite sincerely, come to
the conclusion that Ceballos indeed has a
viable First Amendment retaliation claim
and, consequently, went so far as to file a
brief in this court not only agreeing with the
claims made by Ceballos's counsel, but-
providing additional arguments to support
them. Could the County discipline its
counsel without fear of being hauled into
federal court to defend itself against
allegations of having committed a
constitutional violation? Evidently not-for
as the majority makes pellucid today, Roth
and its progeny would enable such counsel
plausibly to claim some personal stake in the
message conveyed by that brief. This is
precisely the kind of absurd result that
Connick sought to avoid by stressing the
distinction between employee and citizen
speech:
The repeated emphasis in
Pickering on the right of a
public employee 'as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of
public concern,' was not
accidental. This language,
reiterated in all of Pickering's
progeny, reflects both the
historical evolvement of the
rights of public employees, and
the common sense realization
that government offices could
not function if every
employment decision became a
constitutional matter.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
C
Finally, holding as Roth did that the First
Amendment protects speech offered by a
public employee in the course of carrying
out his or her ordinary job responsibilities
"creates a fundamental and unnecessary
schism" between the Supreme Court's
caselaw addressing speech by public
employees and its caselaw addressing
speech that otherwise is government-funded
or state-sponsored. Urofsky, 216 F3d at
408 n.6. . . . There simply is no plausible
basis for Roth's holding that the government
may not exercise control over its employees'
routine job-related speech, when it assuredly
may exercise precisely such control over the
speech it subsidizes through its funding
decisions.
D
The majority's response is long on policy,
but short on the law. Its argument is
seductively simple: Because whistleblowers
play an important role in rendering
government accountable, the First
Amendment must protect their
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whistleblowing activities. Maj. Op. at 3456-
58. How can anyone disagree with that
general principle? Those who "blow the
whistle" on government corruption or
mismanagement do deserve reasonable legal
protections, and such protections most
certainly play an important role in
discouraging official misfeasance by
facilitating wider public exposure of
improper conduct and the identities of
those miscreants responsible for it. Indeed,
were I member of Congress [or a state
legislator] charged with making laws that
promote sound public policy-and not
merely a federal judge charged with
interpreting the Constitution-I might well
have voted in favor of legislation [such as
the federal Civil Service Reform Act or
the California Whistleblower Protection
Act]. ...
How strange it must now be for the
hundreds, if not the thousands, of legislators
throughout this country who have voted to
enact or to retain such [whistleblower] laws
now to discover that their votes were
essentially meaningless-that the First
Amendment already provided public
employees with protections co-extensive
with, and in many respects even greater than
those purportedly conferred by, the
legislation they crafted and helped shepherd
through their state legislative processes.
This case-and the doctrine it ratifies-thus
implicates more than the too-common
tendency of well-intentioned jurists to
squeeze a policy-oriented square peg into a
round constitutional hole. For despite the
majority's paean "to the orderly functioning
of the democratic process," Maj. Op. at
3457, 1 fear that Roth and its progeny
actually pose something of a challenge to
the concept of representative democracy
itself. . . . In this case, of course, the
majority has not struck down an unwise
enactment; instead, it has rendered utterly
superfluous a bevy of wise ones. With such
Platonic Guardians, who needs elected
representatives at all?
E
Properly understood, Connick teaches that
although speech uttered by public
employees must address an issue of public
import in order to come within the
protective shelter of the First Amendment,
satisfaction of such a virtually necessary
condition is not by itself sufficient to trigger
constitutional constraints on governmental
action. Instead, employee speech solicits the
protection of the First Amendment only
when it also results from the employee's
decision to express his or her personal
opinions-that is, those views he or she
holds as a citizen and not as a public
employee. The First Amendment, in short,
does not protect public employees' routine
and required speech on behalf of the
government.
... [T]he Ninth Circuit now provides that a
public employee's speech will be given
some degree of First Amendment protection
even when it is not based in some personal
interest (as opposed to that of the
government itself) and even if it fails to
touch upon matters of public import (as
opposed to those that are purely private).
With this lethal combination, the twin pillars
of Pickering and Connick-that speech by
public employees must stem both from some
individual interest and address a matter of
public import in order to merit constitutional
protection-have been felled.
While the court quite properly applies Roth
as binding precedent in this case, the time
has come for us to reappraise our
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jurisprudence concerning the free speech
rights of the publicly-employed and the
scope of legitimate governmental regulation
in its capacity as employer. Because Roth is
inconsistent with Connick's careful
differentiation between public employees'
speech as citizens and speech in their role as
employees, I believe that Roth should be
overruled-if not by our court sitting en
banc, then, in due course, by the Supreme
Court, to steer this court's drifting First
Amendment jurisprudence back to its proper
moorings.
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"Court Will Decide Whistle-Blowers' Rights"
Los Angeles Times
March 1, 2005
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court said
Monday that it would take up the case of a
Los Angeles County prosecutor to decide
whether whistle-blowers in public agencies
have a free-speech right to voice complaints
of wrongdoing without suffering retaliation.
The case, to be heard in the fall, could affect
the rights of millions of public employees,
from police, prosecutors and teachers to
public hospital workers.
Managers of such public agencies in
California said they were concerned that a
ruling might result in turning every internal
gripe into a federal case.
In the past, the high court has said public
employees have a First Amendment right to
speak out on "matters of public concern." In
other decisions, they ruled that internal
disputes within an agency should stay as
internal matters.
The tension between those rulings has led to
conflicts in the lower courts, and the justices
said they would hear the case of then-
District Attorney Gil Garcetti v. Richard
Ceballos to clarify the law.
Five years ago, Ceballos was a deputy
district attorney in Pomona, Calif., when a
defense lawyer told him that a deputy sheriff
might have lied about evidence to obtain a
search warrant. Ceballos said he looked into
the matter and went to the crime scene.
He concluded that the sheriff might well
have exaggerated the evidence, and he
complained about the situation in a memo to
his supervisors. He advised the prosecutor's
office to dismiss the pending case because,
he said, the search warrant was invalid.
He also turned over his memo to the defense
lawyer in the case because the Constitution
requires prosecutors to disclose evidence
that might exonerate a crime suspect.
Despite the questions that had been raised, a
judge allowed the prosecution to go forward,
and Ceballos said he was demoted and
moved to another office in retaliation for his
actions. In his complaint, he described his
transfer as a form of "freeway therapy." He
sued his supervisors, including Garcetti,
alleging that he had been punished for
speaking out on a matter of public concern.
U.S. District Judge A. Howard Matz in Los
Angeles dismissed his claim, ruling that
there was no First Amendment issue
involved in the dispute.
Last year, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco revived the case in
a 2-1 decision. Judge Stephen Reinhardt
said it was crucial that public employees be
able to disclose wrongdoing in public
agencies.
"The right of public employees to speak
freely on matters of public concern is
important to the orderly functioning of the
democratic process. . . . Stripping them of
that right . . . would be particularly
detrimental to whistle-blowers, such as
Ceballos, who report official misconduct up
the chain of command," Reinhardt wrote.
But lawyers for Garcetti and the California
State Association of Counties urged the high
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court to take up their appeal. They said it
would have a "crippling effect on the
management" of all public agencies if every
internal dispute could be turned into a major
free-speech battle in the courts.
A top county prosecutor refused to
comment. "We don't comment on pending
litigation," said Roger Granbo, a senior
county counsel.
Humberto Guizar, a Montebello attorney,
has represented Ceballos, who still works as
a deputy district attorney for the county.
"This is a highly significant case. When
prosecutors encounter misconduct, they
have a duty to disclose it. He (Ceballos)
was one of the few who was willing to speak
out in the office against this public
wrongdoing," Guizar said.
The case will be heard by the Supreme
Court in the fall.
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"Freedom to Speak in the Line of Duty"
National Law Journal
April 19, 2004
Gary Young
When Los Angeles County Deputy District
Attorney Richard Ceballos learned that a
sheriffs deputy may have lied in an
application for a search warrant, he felt duty
bound to inform the defendant's lawyer and
to testify about his suspicions at a court
hearing.
His reward for speaking out was a demotion,
or so he claimed in a federal lawsuit
accusing his superiors of violating his free-
speech rights.
When the case reached the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, it sparked a debate
between judges Stephen Reinhardt and
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain over an issue that
has divided the circuits: whether public
employees enjoy any First Amendment
protection for statements made in the
ordinary course of carrying out their
employment duties. The case is Ceballos v.
Garcetti, No. 02-55418, decided on March
22.
Writing for a 2-1 majority, Reinhardt
reaffirmed the 9th Circuit's position, first
enunciated in 1988, that as long as a public
employee's speech touches on a matter of
public concern, it comes within the ambit of
the First Amendment [although whether the
employee will actually be protected against
retaliation depends on an additional test that
balances his interests against those of the
employer].
Being bound by that 1988 precedent,
O'Scannlain concurred in the majority's
result, but urged the en banc 9th Circuit-or,
if necessary, the U.S. Supreme Court-to re-
examine the issue.
O'Scannlain argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
[1982], affords First Amendment protection
only when a public employee speaks "as a
citizen expressing his or her personal views
on disputed matters of public import," not
when "carrying out his or her ordinary
employment duties."
A murky lineup
O'Scannlain followed closely the reasoning
of the en bane 4th Circuit in 2000's Urofsky
v. Gilmore, 216 F3d 401, which upheld a
Virginia statute prohibiting professors at
state universities from viewing obscene
materials on their office computers.
The position of the other circuits is a bit
murkier. O'Scannlain pointed to panel
decisions by the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th
circuits suggesting that speech in the course
of employment is beyond the protection of
the First Amendment. But he conceded
Reinhardt's point that subsequent panels in
those circuits have said that speech dictated
by one's employment may be of sufficient
public interest to merit protection under
Connick.
Reinhardt counted the 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th,
10th and 11th circuits in his camp. Notably,
he did not claim the 8th Circuit, perhaps
because it gave little explanation for what
appears to be a change of course in a 2003
decision.
O'Scannlain said that the citizen/employee
divide is justified by the fact that public
employees like Ceballos are speaking not for
themselves but for the government, and "the
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Government has no First Amendment
rights." Also, he said that Reinhardt's
position is on a collision course with
Supreme Court decisions giving the federal
government authority to dictate the content
of speech that it has affirmatively sponsored.
Reinhardt disputed his colleague's reading of
Supreme Court precedent, but also rested his
argument on the incongruity between
protecting someone like Ceballos if as a
citizen he were to take his suspicions to the
press, while giving him no protection for
being a good employee and trying to remedy
the problem within the system.
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"Soft on Crime Fighters"
LA Weekly
December 22, 2000
Jim Crogan
A relaxed but determined Richard Ceballos
sips his java inside a Pasadena coffeehouse
and reflects on life as a whistle blower.
An 11-year veteran of the L.A. County
District Attorney's Office, Ceballos has
earned a reputation as a tough, ethical
prosecutor. Now he is suing two of his
supervisors and former D.A. Gil Garcetti in
federal court, claiming they retaliated
against him after he alleged that L.A.
County Sheriffs deputies made up
information to obtain a search warrant in an
auto-parts theft case. No trial date for
Ceballos' civil action has been set.
The suit alleges a "historical custom and
practice in the D.A.'s Office" to protect and
cover up police officers who engage in
misconduct, and encourage law-enforcement
agencies to "enforce the police officer code
of silence."
"I believe my supervisors, Pomona Head
Deputy Frank Sundstedt and Assistant Head
Deputy Carol Najera, set aside their ethical
obligations to satisfy a request for
prosecution made by Sheriffs officers,"
Ceballos said in an interview.
Ceballos' transformation into whistle blower
began in late February, when a defense
attorney claimed that Sheriffs deputies
Daniel Spitulski, Murray Simpkins and
Detective Keith Wall had lied on a search-
warrant affidavit. The warrant, signed by
Magistrate Thomas Falls, a former deputy
district attorney, led to the arrests of Randy
Longoria, Michael Cuskey and Douglas
Ojala in August 1999.
Ceballos said he was skeptical when he
began his investigation. As calendar deputy
for that office, his duties included
supervision of all ongoing prosecutions. He
reviewed the file, talked with Detective
Wall, who has since been promoted to
detective sergeant, and visited the scene of
the arrests.
Ceballos discovered that Sheriffs deputies
had actually been looking for stolen auto
parts and had ended up arresting the three
men on weapons and methamphetamine
charges. Ceballos also learned that deputies
had brought along a narcotics-sniffing dog
to assist in their auto-parts search.
However, no auto parts were ever identified
as stolen.
Cuskey's property was a veritable auto
junkyard, and Ceballos learned that it had
been targeted by a joint county-Sheriffs
Department zoning/abatement team for
cleanup. Deputies Simpkins and Spitulski,
he discovered, had gone to the property
several times, and Cuskey had responded to
the pressure by filing a federal lawsuit
charging harassment. The case was
eventually dismissed, but the battle lines
between Cuskey and the deputies had been
drawn.
Ceballos told the Weekly that he found
factual discrepancies in the affidavit.
Deputies claimed they followed truck-tire
tracks to a "driveway" that led directly to
Cuskey's house. However, Ceballos said,
the so-called "driveway" was actually an
access road shared by all the residents on the
street. The road, he continued, was a
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mixture of asphalt, gravel and dirt, making it
impossible for anyone to follow tracks along
its surface.
In addition, an abandoned truck was found
about 400 feet away from Cuskey's property,
not the 30 feet later claimed in court by
these deputies during the hearing to dismiss
the search warrant.
They also got the address wrong on the
search warrant. Wall wrote that the deputies
found a stripped-down pickup parked across
from "214 3rd Street in Bassett," an
unincorporated area of the county. The
correct address was 241 Third Street.
Spitulski and Simpkins said they
inadvertently transposed the number.
"I believe the deputies' real purpose was
always to look for narcotics, and they used
the abandoned truck as a red herring to
disguise their intention," Ceballos said.
In March, Ceballos gave Frank Sundstedt a
memo accusing the deputies of making
statements or omissions of fact that were
"deliberately false, or in reckless disregard
of the truth."
Ceballos wanted to quash the search warrant
and dismiss the cases against Cuskey,
Longoria and Ojala.' He then gave Sundstedt
a second memo, charging that Wall had
asked him to change a word on the already
served search warrant. Ceballos refused to
replace the word tracks with gouges. "That
change would have created a more
believable scenario," he said, since it was
impossible to follow tracks on the driveway.
Ceballos added that his office problems
began in March with a "confrontational"
meeting with his supervisors-Sundstedt
and Najera-and Sheriffs representatives.
"The Sheriffs people verbally attacked me.
They demanded I be removed from the case
because I was acting like a defense
attorney," he recalled. "And Captain Robert
Binkley said the department was concerned
the arrestees would file a lawsuit if we
dismissed the case." Ceballos had no
intention of backing down, but almost
immediately thereafter, his supervisors
directed him to end all involvement with the
case.
Ceballos said he accused Sundstedt and
Najera of "kowtowing" to the Sheriffs
Department's fear of civil litigation. The
only positive development, he said, was that
Sundstedt agreed to free Ojala before his
sentence was finished, Ojala had previously
accepted a plea bargain of six months in
County Jail, said Ceballos.
His problems, he said, intensified when the
defense subpoenaed him as a witness at a
hearing held to examine the legality of the
search warrant. Ceballos said Najera tried to
"dissuade" him from testifying, a criminal
violation that she denies. They also argued,
he said, over his "factual conclusions" and
the D.A.'s "Brady obligation" to give his
memo to the defense. (This refers to the
1963 federal case Brady vs. Maryland, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
prosecutors must turn over exculpatory
evidence to the defense.)
"Carol ordered me to prepare a new memo,
which would contain only the deputies'
statements and omit my factual
determinations," he said. "I told her that
would be unethical and refused to do it."
Ultimately, a version with some information
crossed out was turned over. Pomona Judge
David Milton, another former deputy district
attorney, eventually denied the defense's
motion to dismiss the warrant. Cuskey was
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ultimately convicted; then Longoria
accepted a plea bargain. Like Ojala, Cuskey
and Longoria got a six-month sentence with
the option of either doing Caltrans roadwork
or reporting to the county's tree farm,
Ceballos said.
Ceballos claims he was then demoted from
calendar deputy to trial deputy, had a murder
case pulled from him, was forcibly
transferred to El Monte, and was denied a
promotion even though he had scored in the
top rank of tested deputies and received a
100 percent evaluation from Sundstedt.
(Ceballos also received glowing evaluations
from Sundstedt in 1998 and 1999.)
The D.A.'s Office and Captain Binkley
declined comment on Ceballos' federal
lawsuit. Sergeant Wall said he won't
comment on the specifics of Ceballos'
allegations.
However, an L.A. County Sheriffs
Department Media Relations spokesperson
said, "Upon receiving information from
DDA Ceballos, about the alleged
misconduct by personnel from the Industry
Station, a full investigation by Internal
Affairs into the actions of these deputies and
supervisors was initiated."
The Sheriffs Department submitted a case
involving Wall, the author of the search-
warrant affidavit, to the D.A.'s Special
Investigations Division (SID). The case was
rejected for prosecution on November 3
because of "insufficient evidence." Deputy
District Attorney Jim Cosper, who rejected
the case, said he had no doubt that Ceballos
was well-intentioned: "However, I reviewed
the complete file and didn't find any
evidence to suggest or prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that criminal misconduct
had occurred."
Cosper also denied that there was any
conflict of interest in having the D.A.'s
Office review this matter since Ceballos has
filed suit against the department. "That is
why SID is an isolated unit," he said. "I had
no idea that Ceballos had filed suit when the
case was brought to me for review.
However, Mr. Ceballos is certainly free to
ask the state Attorney General's Office to
review the matter if that is a concern to
him."
An angry Sundstedt called Ceballos a
"goddamn liar."
"His lawsuit is an assault on the integrity of
this office, and that of the Sheriffs
Department," continued Sundstedt. "It's
nothing more than a thinly veiled, politically
motivated attempt to affect the outcome of
the election for D.A."
Ceballos filed his lawsuit on October 18, a
month before voters ousted Gil Garcetti.
Newly elected D.A. Steve Cooley, the
alleged beneficiary of Ceballos' suit, told the
L.A. Weekly, "I don't know Ceballos. I have
never talked to him about anything, and he
was not a contributor to my campaign."
Sundstedt adamantly denies that Ceballos
was ever demoted, and claims that Ceballos
sued only because he didn't get his
promotion.
"Ceballos was never dissuaded from
testifying at the search-warrant hearing, or
threatened with retaliation. Nor did he ever
accuse me and Carol of 'kowtowing' to the
Sheriffs Department. Those are just more
of his lies," reiterated Sundstedt.
When Ceballos gave him his first memo,
said Sundstedt, he told him that his concerns
would be investigated. "And that's what we
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did. Ceballos was alleging these deputies
had committed crimes. But no one ever
elected him judge and jury."
Najera said she was shocked and saddened
by Ceballos' charges. "It is totally untrue
that I tried to dissuade Richard from
testifying at the hearing. That is just
ridiculous. I never told him he would be in
trouble for testifying or expressing his
opinions. He's just making things up
because he didn't get promoted."
Najera also insists she told Ceballos to write
a second report only because she believed
his first memo included work product,
which the D.A.'s Office is not required to
turn over to the defense. Although Najera
acknowledged that Sheriffs personnel
discussed the litigious nature of these
defendants, "They never said, 'Please,
please, file this case or we will get sued,"'
she said.
Ceballos' federal lawsuit has fueled ongoing
charges from defense attorneys that the
D.A.'s Office regularly withholds
exculpatory evidence, in violation of the
Brady decision. His misconduct allegations
against Sheriffs personnel have also focused
renewed attention on another criminal case
involving these same deputies.
Last June, defense attorney Luis Carrillo
filed a complaint with Sundstedt, Ceballos'
former boss, claiming that deputies
Simpkins and Spitulski had falsified
probable cause, conducted an illegal search
and engaged in racial profiling in an April
arrest of his former client Annese Ramirez
on a drug charge. Ramirez ultimately
accepted a plea-bargain agreement.
Carrillo said Sundstedt never responded to
his complaint. "Nor did I, or the court-
appointed attorney who took over the case,
ever receive Ceballos' memos, as required
by federal case law," he said.
Sundstedt acknowledged receipt of Carrillo's
letter, but contends that his office had no
obligation to turn over Ceballos' memos. "A
judge had previously rejected defense
claims, in the Cuskey case, that these
deputies had falsified probable cause,"
Sundstedt said.
However, Gigi Gordon, chairwoman of the
Indigent Criminal Defense Appointments
Panel of the L.A. County Bar Association
and court-appointed defense attorney in the
Rampart investigation, emphatically
disagrees. "Regardless of who is right or
wrong, once Ceballos committed his
conclusions of officer misconduct to paper,
it became Brady material. The D.A. was
then required to turn it over." She added,
"After that, it was up to the defense to
decide what to do with it."
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Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
(04-1084)
Ruling Below: (0 Centro Espirita v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 1846, 161 L. Ed. 2d 723, 73 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2005) (No. 04-1084)).
Uniao do Vegetal is a religion incorporating a mix of Christian theology and indigineous South
American beliefs. It was founded in Brazil in 1961. Hoasca is a tea made from plants found in the
Amazon rainforest that is used as a sacrament at periodic church services. One of the plants used in
hoasca contains a substance that creates a hallucinogenic effect. Church officials export the tea
from Brazil to the United States. One of those shipments was seized in 1999 and the Government
has threatened prosecution. The church and several members filed suit, claiming a violation of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Government from prohibiting or penalizing
the sacramental use by the church under either the Controlled Substances Act or the United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The Government appealed. A panel of the Tenth Circuit
upheld the injunction. The government then sought this en banc review. The en banc court
affirmed the injunction in this case. Even though a majority voted to maintain a heightened
standard for granting a preliminary injunction cases that 1) alter the status quo, 2) are mandatory, or
3) provide the movant with all the relief that could be recovered at the conclusion of a trial on the
merits, a different majority concluded that the church's claim merited the granting of a preliminary
injunction.
Question Presented: Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb
et seq., requires the federal government to permit the importation, distribution, possession, and use
of a Schedule I hallucinogenic controlled substance, where Congress has found that the substance
has a high potential for abuse, it is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and its
importation and distribution would violate an international treaty.
0 CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICIENTE UNIAO DO VEGETAL,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
Decided November 12, 2004
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted]
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ON REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM:
I.
This matter is before the en banc court to
review issues emanating from the panel
opinion in 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d
1170 (10th Cir. 2003). The panel affirmed a
preliminary injunction, granted under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), which enjoined the United States
from relying on the Controlled Substances
Act ("CSA") and the United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances
("Convention") to prohibit the sacramental
use of hoasca by Uniao do Vegetal and its
members (collectively "UDV"). This court
granted rehearing to review the different
standards by which we evaluate the grant of
preliminary injunctions, and to decide how
those standards should be applied in this
case.
II.
. . . UDV invoked RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1, to obtain declaratory and
injunctive relief which would prevent the
government from prohibiting UDV's
importation, possession, and use of hoasca
for religious purposes and from attempting
to seize the substance or prosecute
individual UDV members. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court
granted UDV's motion for a preliminary
injunction pending a decision on the merits.
The government appealed that decision, the
panel affirmed, and we granted the en banc
petition.
II.
The en banc court is divided over the
outcome of this case. Nevertheless. a
majority of the court has voted to maintain a
heightened standard for granting any of the
three historically disfavored preliminary
injunctions. A different majority has voted
to affirm the district court's entry of a
preliminary injunction in this case.
A. Standards for Granting Disfavored
Preliminary Injunctions
In SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., this
court identified the following three types of
specifically disfavored preliminary
injunctions and concluded that a movant
must "satisfy an even heavier burden of
showing that the four [preliminary
injunction] factors . . . weigh heavily and
compellingly in movant's favor before such
an injunction may be issued": (1)
preliminary injunctions that alter the status
quo; (2) mandatory preliminary injunctions;
and (3) preliminary injunctions that afford
the movant all the relief that it could recover
at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits.
936 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1991).
With one important alteration, a majority of
the en banc court has voted to affirm the
core holding of SCFC ILC. Thus, if a
movant seeks a preliminary injunction that
falls into one of the three categories
identified in SCFC ILC, the movant must
satisfy a heightened burden. The en banc
court does, however, jettison that part of
SCFC ILC which describes the showing the
movant must make in such situations as
"heavily and compellingly." SCFC ILC, 936
F.2d at 1098. Instead, the en banc court
holds that courts in this Circuit must
recognize that any preliminary injunction
fitting within one of the disfavored
categories must be more closely scrutinized
to assure that the exigencies of the case
support the granting of a remedy that is
extraordinary even in the normal course.
Furthermore, because a historically
disfavored preliminary injunction operates
outside of the normal parameters for interim
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relief, movants seeking such an injunction
are not entitled to rely on this Circuit's
modified likelihood-of-success-on-the-
merits standard. Instead, a party seeking
such an injunction must make a strong
showing both with regard to the likelihood
of success on the merits and with regard to
the balance of harms, and may not rely on
our modified likelihood-of-success-on-the-
merits standard.
B. Grant of Preliminary Injunction in this
Case
Although the reasons vary, a majority of the
en banc court is of the view that the district
court's entry of a preliminary injunction in
this case should be affirmed.
IV.
The decision of the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico to
grant UDV's request for a preliminary
injunction is hereby AFFIRMED. The
temporary stay of the district court's
preliminary injunction issued by this court
pending resolution of this appeal is vacated.
CONCUR: SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined in full by TACHA, Chief Judge,
PORFILIO, HENRY, BRISCOE, and
LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and in Part II by
McCONNELL and TYMKOVICH,
Circuit Judges.
Like a majority of my colleagues, I am
persuaded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the
preliminary injunction in this case. I
respectfully dissent, however, from the
majority's conclusion that the movant for a
preliminary injunction must satisfy a
heightened burden when the proposed
injunction will alter the status quo but the
injunction is not also mandatory.
A.
We appear to be the only court which
has adopted the specific approach of carving
out three distinct categories of disfavored
injunctions. Other courts have limited to
two categories those preliminary injunctions
deserving special scrutiny: injunctions
which are mandatory or which provide the
moving party with all the relief it seeks from
a full trial on the merits. . . . In order to
bring our jurisprudence in closer accord with
these other circuits, and because I am
convinced it will cause less confusion to the
parties and the district court, I would limit
our heightened standard to those two
categories of preliminary injunctions.
. . . Given the essential role prevention of
irreparable harm plays in the grant of
preliminary injunctive relief, district courts
should consider the question of altered status
quo in light of how it impacts the balance of
harms between the parties and the public
interest, as well as considering what
attendant institutional costs may accompany
the grant of such relief. As the Fifth Circuit
has said, "if the currently existing status quo
itself is causing one of the parties irreparable
injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so
as to prevent the injury." Canal Auth. Of the
State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F. 2d 567,
576 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted)....
II
Turning to the question of whether the
district court properly granted the
preliminary injunction to the UDV [pending
a decision on the merits], our court reviews
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the district court's grant of injunctive relief
for abuse of discretion and "examines
whether the district court committed error of
law\ or relied on clearly erroneous fact
findings." Talmer v. US. Dep't of Defense,
52 F 3d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1995)....
The district court focused the majority of its
analysis on whether the UDV could satisfy
the likelihood of success on the merits prong
of the preliminary injunction test. See
Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 955 (listing elements
of preliminary injunction test). Because the
government did not dispute for the purpose
of the injunctive proceeding that its
enforcement of the CSA and the United
Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances (Convention or treaty) imposed a
substantial burden on the UDV's sincere
exercise of religion, the UDV established a
prima facie case of a RFRA violation. See
id. at 960. To undercut this showing of
likelihood of success, the government had
the burden of establishing that "the
challenged regulation furthers a compelling
interest in the least restrictive manner." See
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b); United States v.
Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1482 (10th Cir.
1996).
The government proffered three compelling
interests-risks to the health of the UDV
members by the use of hoasca, risk of
diversion of hoasca for non-religious
purposes, and compliance with the
Convention. "Believing the Government's
strongest arguments for prohibiting Uniao
do Vegetal's hoasca use to be health and
diversion risks, the district court did not ask
the parties to present evidence on the
Convention at the hearing." 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v.
Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 1170, 1183 (10th Cir.
2003). After examining the parties'
evidence on the first two issues, the court
found the evidence to be in equipoise for
each. The court also decided the treaty does
not cover hoasca. The court therefore
concluded the government had "failed to
carry its heavy burden of showing a
compelling interest in protecting the health
of the UDV members using hoasca or in
preventing the diversion of hoasca to illicit
use." 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao
Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F Supp. 2d
1236, 1269 (D.N.M 2002). Hence, the court
ruled the UDV had demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the
merits.
The district court then turned to the
remaining preliminary injunction factors and
determined the UDV satisfied each. The
court found the UDV established irreparable
injury because its right to the free exercise
of religion was being impaired. With
respect to harm to the government and the
balance of harms, the court held that in
balancing the government's concerns against
the injury suffered by the Plaintiffs when
they are unable to consume hoasca in their
religious ceremonies, the Court concludes
that, in light of the closeness of the parties'
evidence regarding the safety of hoasca use
and its potential for diversion, the scale tips
in the [church's] favor.
The government contends that the
preliminary injunction granted by the district
court is mandatory and changes the status
quo, and that the district court erred in
failing to require the UDV to make a
stronger showing to succeed. I disagree....
I am not persuaded the injunction here is
mandatory. Rather, it temporarily prohibits
the government from treating the UDV's
sacramental use of hoasca as unlawful under
the CSA or the treaty. It also orders the
government not to intercept or cause to be
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intercepted shipments of hoasca imported by
the UDV for religious use, prosecute or
threaten to prosecute the UDV, its members,
or bona fide participants in UDV ceremonies
for religious use of hoasca, or otherwise
interfere with the religious use of hoasca by
the UDV, its members, or bona fide
participants in UDV ceremonies....
The government contends the injunction is
mandatory because it includes "36 separate
provisions requiring specific affirmative
action by the government to facilitate the
UDV's use of hoasca." Aplt. Supp. En Banc
br. at 20. In so arguing, the government
fails to acknowledge that the additional
provisions were added to the injunction by
the district court in response to the
government's insistence that the UDV be
subject to some form of governmental
oversight in its importation and use of
hoasca. . . .
Similarly, while some of the injunction's
provisions mandate that the parties take
specific actions, the order is nonetheless
properly characterized as prohibitory. Read
as a whole, the additional terms in the order
mandate that the UDV comply with specific
drug importation laws, while the provisions
conversely permit the government to
perform its regulatory functions with respect
to the importation of controlled substances,
up to but not including barring the UDV's
use of hoasca for sacramental purposes.
However, the overall effect of the injunction
is to prohibit the government from enforcing
the CSA and the treaty against the UDV.
There is no doubt that determining whether
an injunction is mandatory as opposed to
prohibitory can be vexing....
With respect to the question of status quo, it
is generally described as "the last peaceable
uncontested status existing between the
parties before the dispute developed." 11 A
WRIGHT & MILLER § 2948, at 136 n.14
(listing cases). . . . Here, however, we are
faced with a conflict between two federal
statutes, RFRA and the CSA, plus an
international treaty, which collectively
generate important competing status quos.
The status quo for the UDV was that it was
practicing its religion through its
importation and use of hoasca at religious
ceremonies. . . . Status quo for the
government immediately prior to this
litigation was its enforcement of the drug
laws against the UDV in accordance with
the CSA and the Convention, which
occurred after the government discovered
the UDV was importing hoasca for religious
purposes and exercised its prosecutorial
discretion to stop that importation.
We are thus presented with two plausible
status quos, each of them important.
Moreover, since both parties contest the
validity of the other's actions, it is difficult
to describe either position as "the last
peaceable, uncontested status existing
between the parties." . . .
Turning to the district court's review of the
four preliminary injunction factors and
giving due deference to its weighing of the
evidence, I am convinced for all of the
reasons described by the district court, see
supra at 13-15, and set forth in the panel
opinion, 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at 1179-87,
that the court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding the UDV has established the first
preliminary injunction factor, a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of the
case. Id. at 1187. With respect to
irreparable harm, the district court,
acknowledging its jurisdiction was founded
upon RFRA, correctly recognized that the
violation of one's right to the free exercise of
religion necessarily constitutes irreparable
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harm. The harm to the UDV from being
denied the right to the use of a sacrament in
its religious services is indisputably
irreparable.
The district court then balanced the
irreparable harm to the UDV against the
harm the government would suffer from a
preliminary injunction prohibiting its
enforcement of the CSA against the
church's religious use of a controlled
substance, and from its compliance with the
Convention. . . . In RFRA, Congress
determined that the balance of equities and
public interest should weigh in favor of the
free exercise of religion and that this settled
balance should only be disrupted when the
government can prove, by specific evidence,
that its interests are compelling and its
burdening of religious freedom is as limited
as possible. See 42 US.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-
(b).
Certainly the interests of the government as
well as the more general public are harmed
if the government is enjoined from enforcing
the CSA against the general importation and
sale of street drugs, or from complying with
the treaty in this regard. But this case is not
about enjoining enforcement of the criminal
laws against the use and importation of
street drugs. Rather, it is about importing
and using small quantities of a controlled
substance in the structured atmosphere of a
bona fide religious ceremony. In short, this
case is about RFRA and the free exercise of
religion, a right protected by the First
Amendment to our Constitution. In this
context, what must be assessed is not the
more general harm which would arise if the
government were enjoined from prosecuting
the importation and sale of street drugs, but
rather the harm resulting from a temporary
injunction against prohibiting the controlled
use of hoasca by the UDV in its religious
ceremonies while the district court decides
the issues at a full trial on the merits.
As asserted by the government, the relevant
harms in this context are the risk of
diversion of hoasca to non-religious uses
and the health risks to the UDV members
who ingest the tea. As the panel opinion
explained, however, the district court found
that the parties' evidence regarding health
risks to the UDV members from using
hoasca as a sacrament in their religious
services was "in equipoise," and the
evidence regarding the risk of diversion to
non-ceremonial users was "virtually
balanced" or "may even . . . tip the scale
slightly in favor of Plaintiffs' position." See
O Centro, 342 F.3d at 1179-83 (citing
district court and reviewing evidence).
I disagree with Judge Murphy's assertion
that because plaintiffs have the burden of
proof on the preliminary injunction factors
they necessarily lose if the evidence is in
equipoise on the question of harm to the
government's asserted interests. See
Murphy, J., opin. at 39-40. As Judge
Murphy recognizes, a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction has the burden of
showing that the harm to it outweighs any
harm to the party to be enjoined or to the
public interest. See Kikumura, 242 F.3d at
955. Here the harm to the UDV from being
denied the right to freely exercise its
religion, which under anyone's measure
carries significant weight and is actually
occurring, must be measured against the
potential risks of diversion of hoasca to
non-religious uses and harm to the health of
church members consuming the hoasca. . . .
Likewise, the harm resulting to the
government from a violation of the
Convention in this context is similar to the
harm suffered as a result of the government's
temporary inability to enforce the CSA
against the church. As with the CSA, the
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treaty must be read in light of RFRA and the
religious use of the controlled substance
here. While the general intent of the
Convention was to prevent the illicit use and
trafficking of psychotropic substances, it
recognized that plants containing such
substances were often used for legitimate
religious purposes. It therefore permitted
signatory nations to seek an exemption from
the treaty for indigenous plants containing
prohibited substances "traditionally used by
certain small, clearly determined groups in
magical or religious rites." See 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances,
Art. 32(4), 32 U.S.T. 543. Indeed, the
United States obtained such an exemption
for peyote. See 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at
1175-76.
With respect to harm to the public interest,
there is an important public interest in both
the enforcement of our criminal drug laws
and in compliance with our treaty
commitments. But there is an equally strong
public interest in a citizen's free exercise of
religion, a public interest clearly recognized
by Congress when it enacted RFRA and by
the signatories to the Convention when they
authorized exemptions for religious use of
otherwise prohibited substances. It cannot
go without comment that Congress, in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990), enacted RFRA to overturn the
holding in that case. As noted by the panel,
the Supreme Court held in Smith that the
"Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment did not require the State of
Oregon to exempt from its criminal drug
laws the sacramental ingestion of peyote by
members of the Native American Church." .
. . Thus, pursuant to RFRA, there is a strong
public interest in the free exercise of religion
even where that interest may conflict with
the CSA.
For all the reasons stated above, even under
the heightened standard affirmed by a
majority of this court, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in granting the
injunction to the church....
McCONNELL, J., joined by
TYMKOVICH, J., concurring, and joined
by HARTZ, J., and O'BRIEN, J., as to Part
I [that heightened standard should apply to
preliminary injunctions that disturb the
status quo].
... I write separately to explain why [courts
should disfavor preliminary injunctions that
disturb the status quo and why a preliminary
injunction should be issued against the
possession and use of hoasca.
II. Does this Preliminary Injunction Satisfy
the Heightened Standard?
In cases where federal law "substantially
burdens" the exercise of religion, RFRA
requires courts to determine whether
"application of the burden" to a specific
"person" is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.
42 US.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added).
That cannot be done without a case-by-case
evaluation. "Thus, under RFRA, a court
does not consider the . . . regulation in its
general application, but rather considers
whether there is a compelling government
reason, advanced in the least restrictive
means, to apply the . . . regulation to the
individual claimant." Kikumura v. Hurley,
242 F.3d 950, 962 (10th Cir. 2001)
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(Murphy, J.). Accordingly, contrary to the
dissent, Congress's general conclusion that
DMT is dangerous in the abstract does not
establish that the government has a
compelling interest in prohibiting the
consumption of hoasca under the conditions
presented in this case.
The dissent's notion that the drug laws are
impliedly exempt from RFRA scrutiny is
especially surprising in light of the fact that
the impetus for enactment of RFRA was the
Supreme Court's decision in a case
involving the sacramental use of a controlled
substance....
Even assuming RFRA's compelling interest
test applies, the dissent takes the position
that "the government need turn only to
express congressional findings concerning
Schedule I drugs" to satisfy RFRA scrutiny.
Opinion of Murphy, J., at 18. The dissent
cites no authority for such an approach, and
there is none. Congressional findings are
entitled to respect, but they cannot be
conclusive. RFRA requires the government
to "demonstrate[]" that application of a
challenged federal law to religious exercise
satisfies strict scrutiny under RFRA. . . .
Obviously, Congress contemplated the
introduction of "evidence" pertaining to the
justification of "application" of the law in
the particular instance. If such a burden of
proof could be satisfied by citing
congressional finding in the preambles to
statutes, without additional evidence, RFRA
challenges would rarely succeed;
congressional findings invariably tout the
importance of the laws to which they are
appended.
If Congress or the executive branch had
investigated the religious use of hoasca and
had come to an informed conclusion that the
health risks or possibility of diversion are
sufficient to outweigh free exercise concerns
in this case, that conclusion would be
entitled to great weight. But neither branch
has done that. The two findings on which
the dissent relies address the broad question
of the dangers of all controlled substances,
or all Schedule I substances, in the general
run of cases. Such generalized statements
are of very limited utility in evaluating the
specific dangers of this substance under
these circumstances, because the dangers
associated with a substance may vary
considerably from context to context.
Congress itself recognized this and gave the
Attorney General authority to make
exemptions from many of the CSA's
requirements:
The Attorney General may, by
regulation, waive the requirement
for registration of certain
manufacturers, distributors, or
dispensers if he finds it consistent
with the public health and safety.
21 U.S.C. § 822(d) (emphasis added).
Thus, the CSA itself recognizes that, despite
Congress's general findings about Schedule I
substances, it may sometimes be "consistent
with the public health and safety" to exempt
certain people from its requirements.
Indeed, the government evidently believed
this to be true with respect to the Native
American Church's peyote use, since it
relied primarily on § 822(d) to authorize its
regulation exempting the Native American
Church from the CSA. See 21 C.F.R. §
1307.31 ...
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[With regard to hoasca,] there was some
evidence at the hearing that the resulting
doses [when taken orally] are considerably
smaller than typical intravenous or inhaled
doses, and there has been very little study of
the effects of orally ingested DMT.
Furthermore, the fact that hoasca is a
relatively uncommon substance used almost
exclusively as part of a well-defined
religious service makes an exemption for
bona fide religious purposes less subject to
abuse than if the religion required its
constant consumption, or if the drug were a
more widely used substance like marijuana
or methamphetamine....
. . . Of course it is true that in theory, at
least, it is possible to have the same
religious interest in shooting heroin as in
drinking hoasca. But one's rights under
RFRA depend not only on the nature of the
religious interest but also on the strength of
the government's opposed interest. Here,
the government's professed interests include
avoiding diversion to nonreligious use and
ensuring that a multitude of spurious free
exercise claims do not hamstring its
enforcement efforts. Given those concerns, I
do not see why Judge Murphy finds it
surprising that the extent of nonreligious use
is relevant to the analysis. Indeed, it would
be far more surprising if the differences
between street drugs and more "esoteric"
ones were irrelevant.
[T]he government utterly failed to carry its
statutory burden (42 US. C. § 2000bb-
I(b)(2)) of demonstrating that complete
prohibition of hoasca is the "least restrictive
means" of furthering its interest in
compliance with the [UN] Convention, even
assuming the Convention applies. Contrary
to the dissent, neither the Convention's terms
nor the practice of its interpretation is
without flexibility when religious and other
constitutional countervailing interests are
implicated....
The Convention allows signatory states at
the time of signature, ratification, or
accession to make a reservation for
indigenous plants traditionally used by
"small, clearly determined groups in magical
or religious rites." Article 32(4). To
interpret the Convention rigidly, as having
no possibility of accommodation for new
religious groups (or groups newly arriving in
the United States), for which no reservation
was sought at the time, raises troubling
constitutional concerns of denominational
discrimination....
In the case of peyote, as the district court
pointed out, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1268, the
United States permits the exportation of the
substance to Native American Church
groups in Canada, despite the fact that
exportation of a Schedule I substance for
other than scientific or medical purposes
would appear to violate the Convention.
This suggests that, in practice, there is room
for accommodation of the legitimate needs
of religious minority groups.
All told, this is the unusual case in which the
plaintiff not only prevails on each of the four
preliminary injunction factors, but does so
with sufficient clarity that a preliminary
injunction is warranted even though it would
disturb the status quo.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
[Opinion omitted]
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, joined in full by
EBEL, KELLY, and O'BRIEN, Circuit
Judges, and as to Part I by HARTZ,
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McCONNELL, and TYMKOVICH,
Circuit Judges, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I agree with the per curiam opinion that a
movant for a preliminary injunction must
make a heightened showing when the
requested injunction will alter the status quo.
As set out more fully below, such an
approach is completely consistent with the
historic purpose of the preliminary
injunction. Accordingly, I join parts I, II,
and III.A of the per curiam opinion. I must
respectfully dissent, however, from the
conclusion that 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal ("UDV") has
sufficiently shown its entitlement to a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the
United States from enforcing the Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA"), 21 US.C. § 801 et
seq. As a direct result of the preliminary
injunction embraced by the majority, the
United States is placed in violation of the
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 US.T. 543
(hereinafter the "Convention"). I thus
dissent from parts Ill.B and IV of the per
curiam opinion.
I.
A. A Heightened Showing is Appropriate
When the Requested Preliminary Injunction
Would Alter the Status Quo
The Supreme Court has observed "that a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear
showing, carries the burden of persuasion."
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 US. 968, 972,
138 L. Ed 2d 162, 117 S. Ct. 1865 (1997)
(per curiam) (quotation omitted). . . . The
Supreme Court has further indicated that the
"limited purpose" of a preliminary
injunction "is merely to preserve the relative
positions of the parties until a trial on the
merits can be held." Univ. of Tex. v.
Camenisch, 451 US. 390, 395, 68 L Ed 2d
175, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981). Accordingly,
courts should be hesitant to grant the
extraordinary interim relief of a preliminary
injunction in any particular case, but
especially so when such an injunction would
alter the status quo prior to a trial on the
merits.
Any injury resulting from a preliminary
injunction that merely preserves the status
quo is not a judicially inflicted injury.
Instead, such injury occurs at the hands of a
party or other extrajudicial influence. By
contrast, an injury resulting from a
preliminary injunction that disturbs the
status quo by changing the relationship of
the parties is a judicially inflicted injury. It
is injury that would not have occurred but
for the court's intervention and one inflicted
before a resolution of the merits. Because
the issuing court bears extra responsibility
should such injury occur, it should
correspondingly be particularly hesitant to
grant an injunction altering the status quo
unless the movant makes an appropriate
showing that the exigencies of the case
require extraordinary interim relief. It may
be small consolation should the issuing court
ultimately resolve the merits in favor of the
non-moving party; at that point the non-
moving party has often incurred significant
costs as a result of abiding by the
improvident preliminary injunction. A
plaintiff who was willing to live with the
status quo before filing its complaint should
meet a higher standard in order to have the
court intervene with an injunction that alters
the status quo. Judge Seymour's approach,
which seeks to elevate the importance of
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irreparable harm at the expense of the status
quo, is inconsistent with the historic
underpinnings of the preliminary injunction.
enforcement of the CSA.
II.
B. The Status Quo in This Case is the
Enforcement of the CSA and Compliance
with the Convention
The status quo in fact in this case is the
enforcement of the CSA and compliance
with the Convention. The record is clear
that both UDV itself and the United States
recognized that the importation and
consumption of hoasca violated the CSA.
UDV made a concerted effort to keep secret
its importation and use of hoasa.
Accordingly, although UDV eventually
sought a preliminary injunction after the
seizure of the hoasca, at all times leading up
to that event the record reveals that the
status quo was the enforcement of the CSA.
Where one party, here UDV, intentionally
precludes a contest by concealing material
information, the status quo must be
determined as of the time all parties knew or
should have known all material information.
... It simply cannot be the case that a party
can establish the status quo in a given case
through secretive or clandestine activity.
There is enough natural incentive to
manipulation in events preceding litigation,
and in litigation itself, without providing
judicial endorsement of surreptitious
conduct by wrapping it in a cloak of "status
quo." The "last peaceable uncontested
status existing between the parties before the
dispute developed," 11 A Wright & Miller §
2948, at 136, is most surely the open and
notorious actions of the parties before the
dispute. Here, it is uncontested that the open
and notorious actions of UDV were a facade
of compliance with the CSA. Thus, the
status quo in this case is the government's
Based heavily on the conclusion that UDV
has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, a majority of the en
banc court resolves that the district court did
not err in granting UDV a preliminary
injunction. In contrast to the conclusions of
the majority, however, UDV has not
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits. First, RFRA was
intended to restore the compelling interest
test that existed before Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 108 L. Ed.
2d 876, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(b)(1). Employing that test, courts
routinely rejected religious exemptions from
laws regulating controlled substances and
have continued to do so with RFRA.
Second, one only need look to the
congressional findings set out in the CSA to
see that the United States carried its burden
of demonstrating that the prohibition against
importing or consuming hoasca furthers its
compelling interests in protecting the health
of UDV members and preventing diversion
of hoasca to non-religious uses. Finally,
compliance with the Convention, which
results in international cooperation in
curtailing illicit drug trafficking, is certainly
a compelling interest. The record further
indicates that absent strict compliance with
the Convention, the United States' efforts in
this regard would be hampered.
Quite aside from the question of whether
UDV has demonstrated it is substantially
likely to prevail on the merits, UDV has not
demonstrated its entitlement to a preliminary
injunction. In connection with the risk to
the health of UDV members and the risk to
the public from diversion of hoasca, the
179
district court found the evidence
respectively "in equipoise" and "virtually
balanced." The district court did not
proceed to even address the harm to the
government and the public interest resulting
from violations of the Convention
necessitated by its injunction. With the
evidence in this state, UDV has not carried
its burden of demonstrating that the third
and fourth preliminary injunction factors-
that the threatened injury to it outweighs the
injury to the United States under the
preliminary injunction and that the
injunction is not adverse to the public
interest--weigh in its favor thereby justifying
even a preliminary injunction that does not
alter the status quo. Superimposing the
more appropriate heightened scrutiny for a
disfavored injunction altering the status quo
upon the evidence in this case renders the
preliminary injunction even more decidedly
erroneous.
A. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the
Merits
1. Controlled Substances Act
To the extent that RFRA requires the
government to prove a compelling
governmental interest and least restrictive
means concerning the ban on DMT, see 42
US.C. § 2000bb-1(b), the government need
turn only to express congressional findings
concerning Schedule I drugs. Congress
specifically found that these drugs have a
high potential for abuse, have no currently
accepted medical use, and are not safe for
use under any circumstances. As to the
specific drug at issue here, DMT, Congress
has found that it has high potential for abuse
and is not safe to consume even under the
supervision of medical personnel. These
congressional findings speak to a need for
uniformity in administration given the
serious problem of drug abuse in the United
States. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 905
(O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v.
Israel, 317 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 2003)...
Judge McConnell's view of how RFRA
operates seems to overlook events leading
up to the passage of RFRA. . . . Judge
McConnell is wrong to imply . . . that
Congress intended to alter the ultimate
outcome of that case (states may, consistent
with the constitution, prohibit all uses, both
religious and non-religious, of peyote), as
opposed to altering the analytical model set
out in that case (no right in the Free
Exercise Clause to avoid neutral laws of
general application). Opinion of
McConnell, J., at 21-23. A review of the
findings accompanying RFRA makes clear
that Congress was concerned with the latter,
not the former....
Equally unconvincing is Judge McConnell's
attempt to minimize the government's
interest in the uniform enforcement of the
CSA. Unlike compulsory education for an
additional two years, the interest in
enforcement of the nation's drug laws as
prescribed by Congress is one of the highest
order....
Judge McConnell is likewise wrong to assert
that the Attorney General has the raw power
to grant religious exemptions from the
Controlled Substances Act under the guise
that it "is consistent with public health and
safety." ....
The CSA envisions careful scheduling of
substances. It also envisions medical and
scientific uses of controlled substances in
the public interest and consistent with public
health and safety; "neither manufacturing,
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distribution or dispensing contemplates the
possession of controlled substances for other
than legitimate medical or research
purposes." Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1466 app.
(DEA Final Order).
The careful approach of the CSA should be
contrasted with that of this court. Although
this court recognizes that "the interests of
the government as well as the more general
public are harmed if the government is
enjoined from enforcing the CSA against the
general importation and sale of street drugs,
or from complying with the treaty," it then
characterizes this case as one "about
importing and using small quantities of a
controlled substance in the structured
atmosphere of a bona fide religious
ceremony." Opinion of Seymour, J., at 22-
23. Can the free exercise of religion under
RFRA really turn on whether the adherent
has a religious affinity for street drugs or
more esoteric ones?
2. United Nations Convention on
Psychotropic Substances
The United States argues convincingly that a
preliminary injunction requiring it to violate
the Convention could seriously impede its
abifity to gain the cooperation of other
nations in controlling the international flow
of illegal drugs. ...
[I]t [is] [in]appropriate to fault the
government for failing to demonstrate that
strictly prohibiting the importation and
consumption of DMT, in the form of
hoasca, is the least restrictive way to further
the government's interest in complying with
the Convention. Opinion of McConnell, J.,
at 30. The problem, of course, is that the
district court short-circuited the
government's ability to present evidence on
this particular question when it concluded
that the Convention did not apply to hoasca.
Under these circumstances, it seems strange
to punish the government for this purported
evidentiary deficiency....
In response, Judge McConnell envisions an
elaborate process whereby, to demonstrate
narrow tailoring, the government is
obligated to request that DMT be removed
from the schedule of drugs covered by the
Convention. Opinion of McConnell, J., at
30-31. That is, until the government seeks
to have DMT removed from coverage by the
Convention, it cannot demonstrate that
"strict" prohibitions against the import of
DMT are the least restrictive means of
advancing its interest in complying with the
Convention. It is worth noting at the outset
that this argument is not advanced on appeal
by UDV. In any event, Congress has
specifically found that DMT is a highly
dangerous and addictive substance. It is
difficult to see how asking that DMT be
removed from the schedule of drugs covered
by the Convention advances the
government's interests in any way. ...
Judge Seymour does not endorse the district
court's conclusion that the Convention does
not apply to hoasca. Instead, she asserts that
the availability of the exemption in Article
32 of the Convention demonstrates that no
significant harm will flow to the government
from the injunction. Opinion of Seymour,
J., at 24-25. What Judges Seymour and
McConnell fail to acknowledge, however, is
that the exemption set out in Article 32(4)
allows signatory nations to make a
reservation as to all of the provisions of
Article 7, except for the provisions ofArticle
7 prohibiting the international trafficking of
psychotropic substances. ...
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B. Balance of Harms and Public Interest
For those reasons set out above, UDV has
not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of its RFRA claim.
This is especially true in light of the
heightened burden on UDV to demonstrate
its entitlement to a preliminary injunction
that upends the status quo. Independent of
the question of likelihood of success on the
merits, however, UDV has not demonstrated
that its harm outweighs the harm flowing to
the government as a result of the preliminary
injunction or that the preliminary injunction
is not adverse to the public interest.
RFRA provides that once a person proves
that a law substantially burdens the exercise
of religion, the government has the burden
of going forward and of persuasion in
proving that the law furthers a compelling
governmental interest and that the law as
applied is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental
interest. 42 US.C. § 2000bb-](a),
2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2), 2000bb-2(3). Though
this is a demanding test, see City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 US. 507, 534, 138 L. Ed. 2d
624, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), it seems
particularly appropriate to insist that a
movant meet all elements of the preliminary
injunction test because RFRA goes beyond
the protections offered by the First
Amendment. In other words, RFRA is not
the First Amendment and UDV has no valid
claim that its First Amendment rights are
being violated given that the CSA is a
neutral law of general applicability. See
Smith, 494 US. at 885; United States v.
Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir.
1996). Given evenly balanced evidence
concerning the health risks of DMT usage
and its potential diversion, UDV cannot
satisfy its burden of showing that its injury
outweighs any injury to the government and
that an injunction would not be adverse to
the public interest.
1. Controlled Substances Act
First and foremost, as set out above,
Congress has specifically found that the
importation and consumption of controlled
substances is adverse to the public interest.
21 US.C. § § 801(2), 801a(1). Congress
has specifically found that the drug at issue
here, DMT, has high potential for abuse and
is not safe to consume even under the
supervision of medical personnel. Id. §
812(b)(1), (c), sched. I(c)(6).
. . . At these stages, it is UDV that must
demonstrate the requested preliminary
injunction is not adverse to the public
interest and its harm outweighs any harm to
the government. Furthermore, because the
preliminary injunction UDV is requesting
would upset the status quo, it must show that
the exigencies of the case entitle it to this
extraordinary interim relief and that the
balance of harms favors the issuance of an
otherwise disfavored interim remedy. In
light of the congressional findings noted
above and the equipoised nature of the
parties' evidentiary submissions, UDV has
not met its burden.
The United States suffers irreparable injury
when it is enjoined from enforcing its
criminal laws. This injury to the United
States, which when coupled with UDV's
failure of proof on the questions of diversion
and danger to UDV members prevents UDV
from meeting its burden under the third and
fourth preliminary injunction factors, is
exacerbated by the burdensome and constant
official supervision and oversight of UDV's
handling and use of hoasca affirmatively
required by the injunction in this case. . ..
* * *
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2. United Nations Convention on
Psychotropic Substances
As noted above, a preliminary injunction
requiring the United States to violate the
Convention could seriously impede the
government's ability to gain the cooperation
of other nations in controlling the
international flow of illegal drugs. 21 US.C.
§ 80]a(1)....
I would reverse the district court's entry of a
preliminary injunction. Because a majority
of the court concludes otherwise, I
respectfully dissent from parts III.B and IV
of the per curiam opinion.
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"Supreme Court to Decide Whether Church
Can Import Drug"
Washington Post
April 19, 2005
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court accepted a Bush
administration request to rule on a clash
between religious freedom and drug-control
law yesterday, announcing that it will
review a lower court's ruling that blocked
enforcement of a federal ban on a church's
importation of hallucinogens.
The court said it will hear the government's
appeal of a 2002 injunction issued by a New
Mexico federal judge giving an
Albuquerque group, 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), the
right to import hoasca, a psychedelic
substance brewed in herbal tea, for use in
certain rituals.
The judge's ruling, which was upheld last
year by a sharply divided Denver-based U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, cited
the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). The law says the government may
not "substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion" unless it uses carefully limited
means to achieve a "compelling goal."
Congress enacted RFRA to counter
Employment Division v. Smith, a 1990
Supreme Court ruling that upheld the denial
of employment benefits to two men fired for
using peyote in a religious ritual.
"[A]n individual's religious beliefs [do not]
excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate," Justice Antonin
Scalia -wrote in the opinion for the court in
that case,
In enacting the RFRA, a bipartisan majority
in Congress expressed the view that this
standard was too restrictive of religious
practice.
But in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that
the RFRA could not be applied to the states.
The case granted yesterday, Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal, No. 04-1084, arises in the context
of federal law enforcement because UDV's
hoasca supply was intercepted at the border.
Hoasca, which contains the hallucinogen
dimethyltryptamine, comes from Brazil.
The Bush administration argues that
importing hoasca would defeat the purpose
of drug-control laws and violate the 1971
U.N. Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, which binds the United States to
battle international trafficking in
hallucinogens.
The court, however, has denied a Bush
administration request to restore the ban on
imports pending the conclusion of this case.
"The members of the UDV believe that
hoasca is sacred, and that their sacramental
use of hoasca connects them to God," the
150-member group's attorneys argued in
their brief.
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"Supreme Court to Hear Case of Dispute Over
Religious Group's Use of Banned Drug"
New York Times
April 19, 2005
Correction Appended
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court added an important new
religion case to its docket on Monday,
agreeing to decide whether the government
can ban the importation of a hallucinogenic
tea that is central to the religious rituals of a
small Brazil-based church.
The case raises the broader question of how
the court will interpret, in the context of an
illegal drug, a law that ordinarily requires
the federal government to refrain to the
maximum extent possible from interfering
with religious practices.
The tea, known as hoasca, is made from
plants that grow in the Amazon region and
that produce a chemical listed by both the
federal government and an international
narcotics trafficking treaty as a controlled
substance. The chemical,
dimethyltryptamine, usually known as
DMT, can also be produced in a laboratory,
but followers of the Uniao Do Vegetal
religion use only the naturally occurring
version, which does not grow in the United
States.
The case is an appeal by the Bush
administration of a federal court injunction
won by the 130 members of the church's
American branch, who brought a lawsuit
five years ago to prohibit the government
from invoking the Controlled Substances
Act to block the importation of their tea and
from seizing the sacred drink. The church,
which combines elements of Christianity
and indigenous Brazilian religion, opened its
American branch in Santa Fe, N.M., in
1993.
The Federal District Court in Albuquerque,
ruling before trial, issued a preliminary
injunction against the government. The
order was subsequently affirmed by a three-
judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in Denver, and
last November was affirmed again by the
full appeals court by a vote of 8 to 5.
A trial has still not taken place, a fact that
would ordinarily pose an obstacle to
Supreme Court review. In fact, on Dec. 10
of last year, the justices denied the
administration's request for a stay of the
Court of Appeals order until the solicitor
general's office could prepare a formal
petition for Supreme Court review. The
denial of a request for a stay in those
circumstances is usually a strong signal that
the Supreme Court will not consider the
eventual appeal to be worthy of its attention.
But in this case, Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal,
No. 04-1084, the justices might have been
persuaded, at least to let the administration
have its say, by the strongly worded appeal
filed by Paul D. Clement, the acting solicitor
general.
Denouncing the lower courts' handling of
the case as "contrary to all precedent," Mr.
Clement said that "no court has ever ordered
the United States to permit a religious
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exemption to Schedule I of the Controlled
Substances Act." Schedule I, on which
DMT is listed, along with marijuana and
other illicit drugs, is reserved for substances
that the government considers to be
particularly unsafe and to have no valid
medical use.
Both the executive branch and Congress,
however, have granted a religious exemption
for another Schedule I drug, peyote, which
is used in religious ceremonies by the Native
American Church.
In an opinion concurring in the 10th
Circuit's decision to uphold the injunction,
Judge Michael W. McConnell cited the
peyote exemption as evidence that the
government was free to exercise discretion
in such matters.
Rejecting the argument that the district court
should have deferred to the other two
branches, Judge McConnell said: "If
Congress or the executive branch had
investigated the religious use of hoasca and
had come to an informed conclusion that the
health risks or possibility of diversion are
sufficient to outweigh the free exercise
concerns in this case, that conclusion would
be entitled to great weight. But neither
branch has done that."
Instead, he said, the government had simply
invoked the general principle that controlled
substances are dangerous.
Judge McConnell, a leading scholar on
questions concerning the free exercise of
religion before he became a judge, is widely
seen as a possible Bush administration
choice for a future Supreme Court vacancy.
In its Supreme Court appeal, the
administration is also arguing that the
injunction is forcing the government to
violate a 1971 international treaty, the
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, which obliges the 160 nations
that have signed it to combat international
traffic in illicit drugs. The question of
whether the convention applies to hoasca is
disputed, because Brazil, an original
signatory to the treaty, has exempted the tea,
and a recent appellate court ruling in France
exempted its religious use.
The lower courts based their ruling on the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a 1993
federal law that forbids the government to
enforce laws in a way that interferes with
religious practice unless the interference is
justified by a "compelling interest." The
Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that Congress
lacked authority to apply the law to the
states, but the statute remains in effect for
the federal government.
The hoasca tea case, which will be argued in
the fall, is the third case on the Supreme
Court docket that deals with federal drug
policy. The court is expected to announce a
decision soon in a case argued in November
on whether the federal government can
block enforcement of California's medical
marijuana initiative. And the court recently
agreed to hear the Bush administration's
challenge to the Oregon law permitting
doctors to prescribe lethal doses of federally
regulated drugs to assist terminally ill
patients in committing suicide.
Correction: An article on Tuesday about the
Supreme Court's agreement to decide
whether the government can ban the
importing of a hallucinogenic tea that is
central to the rituals of a Brazil-based
church misstated the number of nations that
have signed a 1971 international treaty that
the Bush administration says obliges it to
combat international traffic in illicit drugs.
It is 175 nations, not 160.
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"The RFRA H1oasca Tea Case"
SCOTUS Blog
April 18, 2005
Marty Lederman
[On November 12, 2004], the en banc U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld a preliminary injunction that would
prevent the U.S. government from enforcing
the Controlled Substances Act with respect
to the importation, possession and
distribution of hoasca (a tea containing
dimethyltryptamine, or DMT, a substance
regulated under Schedule I of the Act) for
use in religious ceremonies of a church
known as 0 Centro Espirita Beneficients
Uniao Do Vegetal, or "UDV." The court of
appeals' mandate issued on Tuesday.
The injunction is based upon the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which
requires the United States to grant an
exemption to one of its laws when the law
substantially burdens the exercise of
religion, unless denial of the religious
exemption would be a narrowly tailored way
of advancing a compelling governmental
interest. (The Court in Boerne invalidated
RFRA as applied to the States; but it
remains constitutional as applied to the
federal government.) The Government
claims that there are two compelling
interests that support denial of the RFRA
exemption here: (i) preventing the risks of
danger caused by ingestion of the tea and/or
its possible diversion to nonreligious uses;
and (ii) ensuring that the U.S. remains in
strict compliance with the United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic substances,
which generally requires signatories
(including the U.S.) to prohibit almost all
use of certain psychotropic substances,
including DMT. The second argument is
not that strict treaty compliance is a
"compelling interest" in and of itself, but
instead that if the U.S. violates the
Convention in any respect, it will undermine
U.S. efforts to secure worldwide cooperation
in the international fight to control
psychotropic substances.
In his concurring opinion in the en bane
proceeding, Tenth Circuit Judge Michael
McConnell identified what will probably be
one of the principal issues in the case as it is
argued in the Supreme Court: Judge
McConnell contends that the U.S. will be
hard-pressed to demonstrate that something
is a "compelling interest" under RFRA if the
government allows other exemptions that
also undermine that interest in analogous
ways. (The Bush Administration has
generally agreed with this understanding of
the "compelling interest" test in RFRA and
related contexts. See, e.g., its explanation
for why RFRA would dictate an exemption
for religious organizations to a statutory
requirement that recipients of certain social-
service funds not discriminate on the basis
of religion in employment decisions: 67 Fed.
Reg. 77,351-52 (Dec. 17, 2002).) Judge
McConnell points, in particular, to a statute
that permits members of recognized Native
American tribes to use peyote, a Schedule I
substance, in religious ceremonies. 42
U.S.C. 1996a. He argues that this peyote
exemption demonstrates that "concerns for
religious freedom can sometimes outweigh
risks that otherwise justify prohibiting
Schedule I substances," shows that
"[n]either Congress nor the Executive has
treated the CSA's general findings about
Schedule I substances as precluding a
particularized assessment of the risks
involved in a specific sacramental use," and
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"indicates Congress's belief that at least
some use of substances controlled by the
Act are 'consistent with the public health and
safety,' despite the generalized congressional
finding that any Schedule I substance is not
safe to consume even under the supervision
of medical personnel." The Government, in
response to such arguments, has argued that
the health and diversion risks created by the
plaintiffs' use of DMT would be greater than
the risks created when Native Americans use
peyote. There are factual disputes on this
question between the parties.
The plaintiffs and Judge McConnell also
argue that the peyote exception
demonstrates either that the U.N.
Convention permits limited religious
exemptions, and/or that the U.S. does not
suffer serious damage to its efforts to ensure
international drug interdiction when it
permits such minor exemptions, even if they
might be technical violations of the treaty.
The U.S. has argued in response that
whereas the congressionally sanctioned
peyote exemption does not violate the
Convention (because the U.S. took a timely
reservation to the treaty that covered such an
exemption), a RFRA exemption for hoasca
would be a treaty violation, and would be
understood as such by our treaty partners
from whom we seek cooperation. Judge
McConnell notes that "the United States
permits the exportation of [peyote] to Native
American Church groups in Canada, despite
the fact that exportation of a Schedule I
substance for other than scientific or medical
purposes would appear to violate the
Convention," and that "[t]his suggests that,
in practice, there is room for
accommodation [under the Convention] of
the legitimate needs of religious minority
groups. . . . This case . . . raises the question
of why an accommodation analogous to that
extended to the Native American Church
cannot be provided to other religious
believers with similar needs. As the panel
majority noted, the apparent workability of
the accommodation for Native American
Church peyote use strongly suggests that a
similar exception would adequately protect
the government's interests here." The
United States contends, however, that it does
not "permit" the export of peyote to Canada.
DISCLOSURE: While I was employed at
DOJ (OLC), I worked on the case in 2000-
2002, when the Government was
considering whether RFRA required an
exemption and when the ensuing litigation
began in district court. Nothing in this or
other posts should be understood as
necessarily representing the views of the
United States, or of OLC, either then or
now.
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"Court Affirms Church Tea OK"
Albuquerque Journal
November 16, 2004
Scott Sandlin
A federal court has ruled for the third time
that the Santa Fe-based affiliate of a
Brazilian religious sect should get back the
hallucinogenic tea its practitioners take as a
sacrament.
The U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Denver ruled 8-5 for the small religious
group, 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao
do Vegetal, or UDV, which has waged a 4
1/2-year legal battle for return of the tea.
In a convoluted, lengthy and often esoteric
discussion of legal issues, the appeals court
upheld the ruling two years ago by Senior
U.S. District Judge James A. Parker.
Parker ordered federal authorities to permit
the group to import the tea and said they
could not bar bona fide church members
from using the hallucinogen according to
their own strict internal guidelines.
But he delayed the effective date of the
order pending appeal-a situation in effect
until the appeals court's decision was handed
down late Friday.
The 10th Circuit sat en banc-meaning all
13 judges-to reconsider a 2003 ruling by a
three-judge panel.
"The court of appeals has once again
affirmed the right of the UDV and its
practitioners to practice their religion. We
hope they will be able to do that as quickly
as possible," said Nancy Hollander, who
filed suit on behalf of Jeffrey Bronfman of
Tesuque. the religion's North American
leader, and other members of the group in
2000.
"Now we have won in two courts and in
three decisions," she said.
Hollander late Monday asked for emergency
relief from Parker in light of the 10th Circuit
ruling. Noting UDV members "have been
effectively prohibited from practicing their
religion since May 1999," she said the court
should require the government to issue a
permit for the importation and distribution
of the tea.
U.S. Attorney David Iglesias said he is
consulting with attorneys in his office and
with the regional solicitor to decide on the
government's next step.
The government could seek review by the
U.S. Supreme Court, but that would require
permission from the solicitor's office,
Iglesias said.
The U.S. Customs Service seized 30 gallons
of the tea, known as ayahuasca or simply
hoasca, from Bronfman's home in 1999.
Bronfman, who was first exposed to the
religion during trips to Brazil for a nonprofit
board on which he sat, began importing the
tea for ceremonies for a growing but small
North American membership. The tea is a
blend of two Amazon rain-forest plants and
is legal in Brazil.
Government lawyers have taken the position
that hoasca is regulated by the Controlled
Substances Act, from which the UDV is not
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exempt. They also have said international
treaties governing narcotics will be breached
by permitting its use.
"This case is unique in many respects
because it involves a clash between two
federal statutes, one based in the First
Amendment to the Constitution and
protecting an individual's free exercise of
religion and the other serving the important
governmental and public interests of
protecting society against the importation
and sale of illegal drugs," wrote 10th Circuit
Judge Stephanie K. Seymour in one of the
majority opinions.
Seymour said the government's claim of
harm if it can't enforce an international
treaty on psychotropic drugs was
undermined by exemptions permitted for
plants traditionally used by certain small
clearly defined groups. And she noted
Congress reiterated the importance of the
free exercise of religion when it enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In a separate, concurring opinion, Judge
Michael W. McConnell noted that the
district court's order worked as a
compromise, permitting the government
some control over importation, storage and
use of hoasca while permitting the UDV to
continue its religious activity.
"This case . . . raises the question of why an
accommodation analogous to that extended
to the Native American Church cannot be
provided to other religious believers with
similar needs," he wrote.
The Native American Church is allowed to
use peyote as a sacrament.
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"Santa Fe Church Gets Permit for Tea"
Albuquerque Journal
December 11, 2004
Scott Sandlin
The Santa Fe-based affiliate of a South
American religion late Friday got what it has
been waging a court battle for five years to
obtain: A government permit to import
hoasca, the tea it uses as a sacrament.
The permit for the tea, a potent blend of
rainforest plants with hallucinogenic
properties, was issued by the Drug
Enforcement Administration after the U.S.
Supreme Court rebuffed a temporary delay
in implementing a lower court ruling, said
Nancy Hollander, who represents the group.
Jeffrey Bronfman of Santa Fe, the North
American president of 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, said he was
"delighted and grateful."
"We're going to look forward as soon as we
can to be able realize our ceremonies, and
particularly to enjoy the Christmas season
with the right to practice our religion," he
said in a phone interview.
U.S. Department of Justice spokesman
Charles Miller in Washington, D.C.,
declined comment on behalf of the
government. The DOJ hasn't decided what
the next step will be, he said.
The DOJ has argued unsuccessfully at the
district court level and twice before the U.S.
10th Circuit Court of Appeals the UDV
should not be able to import hoasca while
the issue is pending. It contends there is
potential harm to government interests from
illegal diversion of the tea and from the
violation of an international drug
enforcement treaty.
The UDV has found strange bedfellows in
its religious freedom battles. A coalition of
conservative Christian groups, including the
Christian Legal Society and the National
Association of Evangelicals, filed friend-of-
the-court briefs when the case was argued
before a three-judge panel of the 10th
Circuit and again when it was argued before
13 of the 19 appellate judges.
Banning the importation of hoasca and
threatening church members with criminal
prosecution is "tantamount to banning the
wine served at a Roman Catholic mass,"
their brief said. "The government should
have to make a very strong showing of
public necessity before (the law)
countenances such a severe burden on
religious practice."
The government has until mid-January to
ask the Supreme Court for a review.
Bronfman hopes that doesn't happen.
"I would hope they would recognize the
seriousness of the harm they've already done
and move forward in cooperation rather than
with the harshness and intolerance we've
been dealing with for several years,"
Bronfman said.
He noted the group had been importing the
tea for about 11 years without any issue of
diversion before U.S. Customs agents seized
a shipment from his home in May 1999.
The seizure prompted Bronfman, a member
of the family that owns Seagram's, to file
suit in 2000 to recover the tea or the ability
to import it.
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After a hearing on the group's request for a
preliminary injunction forcing the
government to issue a permit, U.S. District
Judge James A. Parker ruled in their favor
and issued an order in 2001 specifying
procedural safeguards to prevent diversion,
Because the tea is a sacrament, the UDV's
adherents-about 140 total in North
America-have to make sure it gets used for
its intended purpose, Bronfman said.
"In addition, there's now regulations and a
degree of supervision that DEA asked of us
that are part of the order that we're going to
comply with that will make it even less
likely that there would be any question of it
being used by anyone else," he said.
Practitioners ingest the tea in controlled
settings that may bring on a dreamlike state,
according to previous testimony.
"You're very aware that what you're
perceiving is natural," Bronfman said
Friday. "It's perhaps an insight into your
own self. But it's not a hallucination in the
sense of your seeing something that isn't
there."
Bronfman testified at the Santa Fe hearing
four years ago and said again Friday the
government's action has harmed the
congregation.
"What I've seen is marriages that have come
under great stress, health challenges that
have been very, very difficult and we
couldn't minister to them. And then just the
sense of living in a country where we
couldn't exercise the most basic and
fundamental rights," he said. "The harm has
been profound."
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"Inmate Gets Second Chance For Religious Bias Suit"
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
November 20, 2003
James G. Sotos
Religious Freedom Restoration Act requires
federal prisons to reasonably accommodate
prisoner's religious beliefs and practices.
The First Amendment generally prohibits
the government from prohibiting the free
exercise of religion. For instance, in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 US. 872
(1990), the Supreme Court held that the free
exercise clause was not violated by the State
of Oregon's refusal to pay unemployment
compensation to employees who were fired
because they ingested peyote for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their
Native American church.
The court reasoned that since peyote use
violated Oregon's criminal laws, the mere
fact that compliance with that state law
incidentally forbids the performance of an
act that a person's religious belief requires
does not violate the First Amendment so
long as the law is not specifically directed at
religious practice.
In response, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which generally
prohibits the government from interfering
with the free exercise of religion even if the
interference results from a neutral rule of
general applicability. Subsequently, in
Boerne v, Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
Supreme Court held that Congress lacked
the power under the 14th Amendment to
apply the RFRA to the various states.
Today's column reviews a recent 7th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals decision that
considered whether the RFRA remains
viable as applied to federal agencies.
O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, et al., No. 02-
4012, (7th Cir., Nov. 10).
Kerry Devin O'Bryan, who is currently
incarcerated in a federal prison, purports to
believe in Wicca, a polytheistic faith based
on beliefs that prevailed in both the Old
World and the New World before
Christianity. As part of his faith, O'Bryan
claims that he is required to indulge in
herbal magic and benign witchcraft.
O'Bryan's religious activities have been
curtailed, however, by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, which has a policy that forbids the
"casting of spells and curses."
O'Bryan sued the Bureau of Prisons in
federal court, alleging that the policy's
restrictions on the casting of spells and
curses violated his rights under the RFRA,
which provides:
(a) Government shall not
substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
(b) Government may substantially
burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the
person-(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
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U.S. District Judge Michael J. Reagan of the
Southern District of Illinois dismissed
O'Bryan's lawsuit, citing Boerne v. Flores
for the proposition that the RFRA has been
struck down as unconstitutional. O'Bryan
appealed.
The 7th Circuit reversed. Writing for the
court, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook initially
explained that Boerne was not as broad as
the district judge believed:
The Boerne court did not say that
the RFRA violates any substantive
limitation. It held, rather, that the
RFRA could not be deemed an
exercise of the power granted by
section 5 of the 14th Amendment
to "enforce" that amendment's
other provisions. According to
Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), the First
Amendment, applied to the states
by section 1 of the 14th, does not
require government to
accommodate religious beliefs
adversely affected by laws and
practices that are neutral with
respect to matters of faith. Boerne
declined to overrule Smith; it
followed that the RFRA, which
requires accommodation rather
than neutrality, does not 'enforce'
the First Amendment.
Easterbrook explained that the federal
government independently possesses the
constitutional power to apply the RFRA to
federal, as opposed to state, agencies:
Legislation affecting the internal
operations of the national
government does not depend on
section 5; it rests securely on
Article 1, section 8, clause 18,
which authorizes Congress "to
make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying
into execution . . . all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States,
or in any department or officer
thereof." This permits Congress to
determine how the national
government will conduct its own
affairs. No one doubts that the
Bureau of Prisons itself could
choose to accommodate religious
practices. By and large, what the
executive branch may elect, the
legislative branch may require. (It
would not be tenable to argue that
prison management is a subject
constitutionally committed to the
president to the exclusion of the
Congress.)
The 7th Circuit explained that its decision to
apply the RFRA to the conduct of federal
officers and agencies was consistent with the
view expressed by other circuits:
Every appellate court that has
squarely addressed the question
has held that the RFRA governs
the activities of federal officers and
agencies. See Guam v. Guerrero,
290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir.
2002); Henderson v. Kennedy, 265
F.3d 1072, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F. 3d 950,
958 (10th Cir. 2001); Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church,
141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998).
Although Justice John Paul
Stevens believes that
accommodation of religious
practices offends the establishment
clause of the First Amendment, see
Boerne, 521 US. at 536-37
(concurring opinion), a view as
applicable to federal agencies as it
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is to states, none of the other
justices has questioned the
constitutionality of statutory
accommodation requirements that
rest on provisions other than
section 5 of the 14th Amendment.
We have in the past left open the
question whether the RFRA may
be applied to the internal
operations of the national
government. . . . Today we join
the other circuits and hold that it
may be so applied.
Against that backdrop, the appeals court
reversed the dismissal of O'Bryan's civil
rights lawsuit but explained that the
government could prevail on remand by
demonstrating that its prohibition on the
casting of spells and curses was the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling
government interest:
Defendants concede that Wicca is a
religion for purposes of the RFRA.
Although the District Court did not
evaluate O'Bryan's contentions (or
his religious practices) under the
RFRA, defendants contend that we
need not remand for that purpose
because it is "self-evident why PS
5360.08 states that casting spells is
never authorized. If an inmate
were to cast a spell on another
inmate, for example, and the other
inmate were to find out about it, a
fight or other serious disruption
could easily occur." This is not as
self-evident as the Bureau of
Prisons may believe; relying on
other inmates' reactions to a
religious practice is a form of
hecklers' veto.
The RFRA does not allow
governments to defeat claims so
easily. A governmental body that
imposes a "substantial" burden on
a religious practice must
demonstrate, and not just assert,
that the rule at issue is the least
restrictive means of achieving a
compelling governmental interest.
We cannot tell whether a limit on
casting spells would
"substantially" burden O'Bryan's
religious activities, nor can we tell
on this empty record whether
"spells" cast by Wiccans would
cause problems. Wicca follows the
principle that adherents must not
harm others, which implies that
they cast no curses or hex-like
incantations "on" others that might
frighten or offend them.
Thus it is premature to apply the
RFRA's standard to O'Bryan's
claims; that is a task for the District
Court in the first instance, and on a
suitable record.
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"Court: Congress Strikes Right Religious-Protection Balance"
First Amendment Center
June 1, 2005
Tony Mauro
WASHINGTON-A 15-year dialogue of
sorts between the Supreme Court and
Congress over how to protect religious
practices from excessive government
regulation culminated yesterday in a
decision in which the justices said Congress
had finally struck the right balance.
Ruling unanimously in Cutter v. Wilkinson,
the Court upheld a section of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act-or RLUIPA that bars prison officials
from restricting inmates' exercise of religion
unless they have a "compelling
governmental interest" to do so.
A group of Ohio inmates who belong to
"cnon-mainstream" religions sued the state
under the federal law, complaining that their
religions' dietary, dress and ceremonial
requirements were being unfairly restricted,
in violation of the First Amendment's free-
exercise clause. The 6th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected their claim and struck
down the law, ruling that it violated the First
Amendment's establishment clause by
giving primacy to religious rights over other
rights.
But Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that
by accommodating the religious needs of
inmates while still deferring to the security
concerns of prison officials, Congress had
navigated appropriately between the
sometimes conflicting demands of the
religion clauses.
"Our decisions recognize that 'there is room
for play in the joints' between the Clauses
[and] some space for legislative action
neither compelled by the Free Exercise
Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment
Clause," wrote Ginsburg. "We hold that
Section 3 of RLUIPA fits within the corridor
between the Religion Clauses: On its face,
the Act qualifies as a permissible legislative
accommodation of religion that is not barred
by the Establishment Clause."
Ginsburg said that if the high court adopted
the 6th Circuit's hard line, "all manner of
religious accommodations would fall,"
including prison chaplains for mainstream
religions.
The "corridor" between the two religion
clauses that Ginsburg spoke of has been
under construction, so to speak, for years in
the Court's jurisprudence. But its formal
recognition in the context of RLUIPA won
applause yesterday from religious and civil
liberties organizations, including some that
are usually on opposite sides of church-state
debates.
"There's a strong argument to be made that
the anti-accommodation reading of the
establishment clause has been dead for a
long time, but today's unanimous decision
removes any lingering doubt," Anthony
Picarello, president of the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, said yesterday. "Cutter is
a win for religious exercise in prison, but
more importantly, it is a thumping victory
for religion-only accommodations
nationwide."
"This is a sensible decision that affirms the
value of religious freedom while giving
correctional institutions the ability to meet
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their security needs," said the Rev. Barry
Lynn, executive director of Americans
United for Separation of Church and State.
The inter-branch dialogue began in 1990
when the Court ruled, in Employment
Division v. Smith (II), that generally
applicable laws-in that case anti-drug
laws-may restrict religious practices
without running afoul of the free-exercise
clause. Congress responded in 1993 with
passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act-or RFRA-which barred
government from burdening religions
without a compelling interest, and dictated
to the courts what standard to use in
reviewing government restrictions.
The high court made the next move, striking
down RFRA as applied to the states on the
grounds that Congress had overstepped its
authority and had developed no record to
back up its legislation.
Congress went back to the drawing board
and passed RLUIPA in 2000, a more
narrowly targeted law rooted in its spending-
and commerce-clause powers. The
spending-clause rationale governs the prison
section of the law; in other words, the
requirement that prisons accommodate
inmates' religions is written as a condition
for the receipt of federal funds (and all states
receive federal funds for their prisons).
Another section-not ruled on yesterday-
restricts governments' ability to burden
religious institutions through land-use or
zoning regulations, and is based on the
power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
The Court yesterday, while giving its
blessing to the law's fealty to the religion
clauses, specifically avoided the question of
whether the spending or commerce
rationales are valid. Other cases testing
those theories are before the lower courts,
and Ohio could still challenge RLUIPA on
that basis. In his concurrence, Justice
Clarence Thomas said the law "may well
exceed the spending power," though the
argument is "undercut" by the fact that Ohio
has accepted federal funds for its prisons.
In published comments after the decision,
Ohio Solicitor General Douglas Cole
indicated Ohio would continue to challenge
the validity of RLUIPA on other grounds,
and would still deny inmates' requests in
individual cases if their religious practices
posed security risks.
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Schaffer v. Weast
(04-0698)
Ruling Below: (Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. Md., 2004), cert granted 125 S. Ct.
1300; 161 L. Ed. 2d 104; 73 U.S.L.W. 3494).
The parents of a middle school student with learning disabilities challenged the adequacy of the
individualized education program ("IEP") provided by their local public school under the federal
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The IDEA is silent on the question of
whether the schools or the parents carry the burden of proof in arguing the adequacy of an IEP.
The Fourth Circuit reversed a Maryland federal district judge's ruling that the school carried the
burden. Although schools have a natural advantage in such proceedings due to their greater
resources and institutional knowledge of special education programs, the Fourth Circuit held that
Congress created adequate procedural safeguards in the IDEA to protect parents and ensure their
full participation in the IEP process. Consequently, there is no reason for an exception to the
general rule that the party seeking relief (here, the parents) should carry the burden of proof.
Question Presented: Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, when parents of a
disabled child and their local school reach an impasse over the child's individualized education
program, either side has a right to bring the dispute to an administrative hearing officer for
resolution. At the hearing, which side has the burden of proof-the parents or the school
district?
Jerry WEAST,
Superintendent of Montgomery County Public Schools,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Brian SCHAFFER, a minor,
by his parents and next friends, Jocelyn and Martin Schaffer,
Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Decided July 29, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge: enforce this right, the IDEA requires every
public school system receiving federal funds
The Individuals with Disabilities Education to develop and implement an Individualized
Act (IDEA) gives every disabled child the Education Program (IEP) for each disabled
right to a "free appropriate public education" child in its jurisdiction. When the parents
tailored to meet his or her unique needs. To believe their disabled child's IEP is
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inadequate, they may initiate an
administrative proceeding (called a due
process hearing) to challenge the IEP. The
parents of Brian Schaffer initiated a due
process hearing to challenge the IEP
developed for him by Maryland's
Montgomery County Public School System
(MCPS). The issue in this appeal is whether
the district court was correct in assigning the
burden of proof to the school system in that
proceeding. The IDEA is silent on burden
of proof. Because we have no valid reason
to depart from the general rule that the party
initiating a proceeding has the burden of
proof, we reverse and remand.
I.
[The court discussed Brian Schaffer's
history of educational troubles and diagnosis
with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder and other learning disabilities.]
. .[I]n November 1997, Brian's mother
contacted the Herbert Hoover Middle
School, an MCPS school, and requested that
Brian be evaluated to determine his
eligibility for special education services for
the 1998-1999 school year.. .. On February
26, 1998, the MCPS . . . Admission,
Review, and Dismissal (ARD) Committee..
. held its first meeting to discuss Brian's
educational needs with his parents, their
lawyer, and Herbert Hoover school officials.
. . . The ARD Committee held its second
meeting in early April 1998, found Brian
eligible for special education, and offered an
IEP for the next (1998-1999) school year.
The proposed IEP specified that Brian
would receive 15.3 hours of special
education and 45 minutes of speech therapy
each week at his "home" school, Herbert
Hoover Middle School. After the parents
expressed concern about class size at
Herbert Hoover, the MCPS offered to
provide the same IEP services at the Robert
Frost Middle School, a school ten minutes
from Brian's home, where he could receive
more of his instruction in smaller classes.
Shortly thereafter, in May 1998, the parents
informed MCPS that the proposed IEP was
inadequate and that Brian would attend
private school. . . . At the same time, the
parents requested a due process hearing
pursuant to the IDEA, claiming that the
proposed IEP denied Brian a free
appropriate education; they sought
reimbursement of the tuition and other
expenses for Brian's private school
attendance. (The IDEA requires the school
system to arrange for an impartial due
process hearing, and the hearing cannot be
conducted by a system employee or an
employee of the state educational agency.
In Maryland the due process hearing is
conducted by an administrative law judge
(ALJ) in the state's Office of Administrative
Hearings.
At the original due process hearing in
Brian's case, the ALJ assigned the burden of
proof to the parents. The parents challenged
the substance of the IEP, not the process by
which it was developed, and the ALJ
explained that deference is owed to
education professionals in the substantive
design of an IEP. The parents were
therefore required to prove that the IEP was
inadequate, specifically, that it was not
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits." Hendrick
Hudson Bd of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 207 (1982). Both sides submitted
extensive expert testimony, and the ALJ
considered the case to be close. He
commented that the "assignment of the
burden of proof [was] critical" to the
outcome. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded
that the parents had not met their burden.
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The AL's order upheld the IEP proposed by
the MCPS and denied the parents' request
for reimbursement for Brian's private school
expenses.
Brian's parents sued the MCPS . . . in district
court, claiming that the ALJ had erred in
assigning the burden of proof to them. The
district court, agreeing with the parents,
reallocated the burden of proof to the MCPS
and remanded the case to the ALJ for further
proceedings. Brian S. v. Vance (Schaffer I),
86 F Supp. 2d 538 (D. Md. 2000). The
MCPS appealed the district court's . . . order
to our court, but before we heard argument
the ALJ reconsidered the case pursuant to
the district court's remand order. After
reassigning the burden of proof to the
MCPS, the ALJ found that the MCPS had
failed to prove the adequacy of the IEP. The
AU ordered the MCPS to make partial
reimbursement to the parents for Brian's
tuition and expenses at private school for the
1998-1999 year. The MCPS then filed an
action (Schaffer II) in district court to
challenge the AL's reassignment of the
burden of proof. . . . [I]n Schaffer II the
district court, after reaffirming that the
MCPS had the burden of proof, concluded
that the ALJ had decided correctly on
reconsideration that the proposed IEP was
inadequate. The district court then set aside
the AL's decision on tuition and expenses,
awarding full reimbursement to the parents.
Weast v. Schaffer (Schaffer II), 240 F. Supp.
2d 396 (D. Md. 2002). The MCPS now
appeals the district court's decision in
Schaffer 11.
II.
A.
The IDEA is silent about which side bears
the burden of proof in a state administrative
proceeding brought by parents to challenge
the adequacy of an IEP. When a statute is
silent, the burden of proof is normally
allocated to the party initiating the
proceeding and seeking relief. Although
"the natural tendency is to place the burden
on the party desiring change" or seeking
relief, other factors such as policy
considerations, convenience, and fairness
may allow for a different allocation of the
burden of proof. McCormick on Evidence §
337 (5th1 ed. 1999).
Today our circuit must decide how to
allocate the burden of proof in one of these
IDEA-prescribed, state administrative
proceedings initiated by parents to challenge
an IEP. Other circuits are split-and
splintered in reasoning-on this question.
Three circuits assign the burden to the
parents, and four (perhaps five) assign it to
the school system. The Sixth Circuit holds
to "the traditional burden of proof' and
requires the parents challenging an IEP to
establish both its procedural and substantive
deficiencies. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits
also assign the burden of proof to the
parents, but for a different reason.
According to these circuits, because the
statute relies on the expertise of education
professionals in local school systems, their
decisions about the substantive terms of an
IEP are owed deference; as a result, the
parents bear the burden of proving why an
IEP is deficient.
On the other side the Third Circuit assigns
the burden of proof to school systems when
their IEPs are challenged by parents in
administrative proceedings. . . . [It held
that] when an administrative decision
upholding an IEP is challenged in district
court, the school district has the burden of
proof because of its expertise and access to
information and witnesses. Three other
circuits, the Second, Eighth, and Ninth, have
announced without explanation that the
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school system has the burden of proving the
adequacy of the IEP at the administrative
hearing. ...
Because the decisions assigning the burden
of proof at the administrative hearing to the
school system offer little or no analysis, they
do not persuade us to depart from the normal
rule of allocating the burden to the party
seeking relief. We will therefore proceed to
consider the main arguments advanced by
Brian's parents for assigning the burden to
the school system.
B.
The parents argue that because the IDEA is
a remedial statute that places the obligation
on a school system to provide a free
appropriate public education for disabled
children, the school system should bear the
burden of proving that its IEP meets that
obligation. This brings to mind other
remedial federal statutes such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. These
statutes impose on employers (or others) the
obligation not to discriminate against an
individual because of characteristics such as
race, sex, disability, or age. Like the IDEA,
these statutes are silent about burden of
proof, yet we assign it to the plaintiff who
seeks the statutory protection or benefit; the
burden is not assigned to the party with the
statutory obligation. We do not believe,
then, that a school system should have the
burden of proof in an IEP challenge just
because it has the statutory obligation to
propose an adequate educational program
for the disabled child....
C.
Because school systems have a natural
advantage in IEP disputes by reason of their
greater expertise and resources, they should
have the burden of proof, according to
Brian's parents. Specifically, the argument
goes, the school system understands the
requirements of the IDEA, has greater
educational expertise than parents, and has
better access to information and witnesses,
This persuaded the district court in Brian's
case to assign the burden at the
administrative level to the school system
(the MCPS).
We do not automatically assign the burden
of proof to the side with the bigger guns.
And "very often [a party] must plead and
prove matters as to which his adversary has
superior access to the proof." McCormick
on Evidence § 337. In IDEA administrative
disputes Congress has taken steps, short of
allocating the burden of proof to school
systems, that level the playing field. As the
Supreme Court observed, Congress
recognized "that in any [IDEA] disputes the
school officials would have a natural
advantage," so it therefore "incorporated an
elaborate set of what it labeled 'procedural
safeguards"to insure the full participation of
the parents and proper resolution of
substantive disagreements." School Comm.
of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471
U.S. 359, 368 (1985).
These procedural safeguards and other
provisions in the IDEA are all designed to
inform parents and to involve them in the
development of the IEP for their child. The
Act involves parents at all stages, making
them members of their child's IEP team and
enabling them to advocate for their position
if a dispute arises. Parents have the right to
examine all records, materials, assessments,
and other information the school system
uses to develop an IEP, and they have the
right to participate fully in meetings relating
to the IEP and the evaluation of their child.
Parents have the right to request an
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independent evaluation of their child at
school system expense. The school system
must give parents written notice of their
rights at key intervals: when their child is
initially referred for evaluation, when they
are notified about each IEP meeting, when
their child is reevaluated, and when they
register any complaint about the school
system's effort to provide a free appropriate
public education for their child. The notice
of the parents' rights must be written in "an
easily understandable manner." Finally, the
statute authorizes "parent training and
information centers" . . . designed to "meet
the . . . needs of parents of children with
disabilities" and to "assist parents to
understand the availability of, and how to
effectively use" the protections of the IDEA.
If the parents request an administrative
hearing, additional services and protections
become available. Voluntary mediation
conducted by an impartial mediator, with the
school system bearing the costs, must be
made available before the case proceeds to
hearing. The school system must also
advise the parents "of any free or low-cost
legal and other relevant services available in
the area." There are also discovery
requirements that give parents advance
notice of the evidence they will encounter at
a hearing. A party may not introduce
evidence that is not disclosed at least five
business days before the hearing. Likewise,
at least five business days prior to the
hearing, "each party shall disclose to all
other parties all evaluations completed by
that date and recommendations based on the
offering party's evaluations that the party
intends to use at the hearing." Finally, if the
parents prevail in their challenge, they may
be awarded reasonable legal fees.
The IDEA and its implementing regulations
require an open process that makes relevant
information and special services, such as the
independent evaluation, available to parents.
By the time the IEP is finally developed,
parents have been provided with substantial
information about their child's educational
situation and prospects. They have
continuing access to information and
anticipated evidence once a hearing is
requested. In sum, Congress has taken into
account the natural advantage a school
system might have in the IEP process,
including the administrative hearing, by
providing the explicit protections we have
outlined. As a result, the school system has
no unfair information or resource advantage
that compels us to reassign the burden of
proof to the school system when the parents
initiate the proceeding.
D.
Although Brian's parents recognize that the
IDEA is silent as to burden of proof, they
argue that "inherent in the [Act] is the
principle that school systems bear the
burden of proof." The parents refer to two
cases, Mills v. Board of Education of
Washington, D.C., 348 F Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972), and Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth
(PARC), 343 F Supp. 279 (ED. Pa. 1972),
that Congress apparently used as the
blueprint for the Education of the
Ilandicapped Act, now the IDEA.
The Supreme Court in Rowley pointed out
the similarities between PARC and Mills and
what is now the IDEA. ...
... The parents argue that because the Act
specifically incorporated a number of .
major principles from PARC and Mills, "it
stands to reason that Congress intended for
the IDEA to echo their assignments of
burden of proof." The circumstances
compel the opposite conclusion, we believe.
Congress took a number of the procedural
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safeguards from PARC and Mills and wrote
them directly into the Act. Congress thus
knows how to borrow ideas and incorporate
them into legislation. For the Act here, it
borrowed some ideas and specifically
ignored others. We cannot conclude from
this that Congress intended to adopt the
ideas that it failed to write into the text of
the statute. For whatever reason Congress
did not assign the burden of proof, and
Congress has not signaled by its silence that
we should depart from the general rule.
E.
The dissent argues that in light of the
affirmative (IDEA-mandated) obligation a
school system has to provide an appropriate
educational program for each disabled child,
"the most reasonable, though by no means
irrebuttable presumption, is that the school
[system] should bear the burden of proof in
the due process hearings." As we have
already pointed out, however, the general
rule is quite the opposite: a party who
initiates a proceeding to obtain relief based
on a statutory obligation bears the burden of
proof. The general rule is sometimes stated
in a slightly different way that is instructive
here: the burden of proof is on the party who
should lose if no evidence is offered by
either side. We believe that when parents
challenge the* adequacy of an IEP, they
should lose if no evidence is presented. To
say that the school system should lose is to
say that every challenged IEP is
presumptively inadequate. A presumption
of inadequacy would go against a basic
policy of the IDEA, which is to rely upon
the professional expertise of local educators.
Congress enacted the IDEA with the clear
intention of deferring to local school
authorities for the development of
educational plans for disabled children. And
while Congress "entrusts a [disabled] child's
education to state and local agencies" under
the IDEA, it "protects individual children by
providing for parental involvement [and for
certain assistance to parents] . . . in the
formulation of [a] child's [IEP]." Rowley,
458 US. at 208. Under this statutory
arrangement, it is reasonable to require
parents attacking the terms of an IEP to bear
the burden of showing why it is deficient.
The dissent would assign the burden of
proof to the school system because of its
"distinct, inherent advantage" over parents
when it comes to proposing and evaluating
educational plans for disabled children.
Parents, the dissent says, "lack the
comprehensive understanding . . . (and]
means to assess the likely benefit of
available alternatives." Again, when
Congress designed and passed the IDEA, it
was keenly aware that school systems have
professional expertise and . . . parents do
not. It was for this very reason that
Congress imposed statutory safeguards to
assist parents in becoming substantively
informed. If Congress considered burden of
proof at all, it no doubt recognized that
allocating the burden to school systems is
not the kind of help parents really need in
challenging IEPs. For regardless of which
side has the burden of proof in an
administrative hearing, parents will have to
offer expert testimony to show that the
proposed IEP is inadequate. Shifting the
burden of proof, in other words, will not
enable parents by themselves to mount a
serious, substantive challenge to an IEP.
Congress recognized that parents need
professional assistance, and the IDEA
therefore allows parents who prevail in due
process hearings to recover their fees for
hiring lawyers. If experience shows that
parents do not have sufficient access to
substantive expertise under the current
statutory scheme, Congress should be called
upon to take further remedial steps. As far
as procedure is concerned, however, we
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have no convincing reason to depart from
the traditional burden of proof in IDEA due
process hearings.
III.
In sum, the IDEA does not allocate the
burden of proof, and we see no reason to
depart from the general rule that a party
initiating a proceeding bears that burden.
Congress was aware that school systems
might have an advantage in administrative
proceedings brought by parents to challenge
IEPs. To avoid this problem, Congress
provided a number of procedural safeguards
for parents, but assignment of the burden of
proof to school systems was not one of
them. Because Congress took care in
specifying specific procedural protections
necessary to implement the policy goals of
the Act, we decline to go further, at least
insofar as the burden of proof is concerned.
Accordingly, we hold that parents who
challenge an IEP have the burden of proof in
the administrative hearing. We reverse the
judgment of the district court and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I do not agree with the majority's holding
that the burden of proof in due process
hearings conducted pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) should be borne by a disabled
child's parents, rather than by the school
district that is charged with providing that
child a "free appropriate public education."
Not only does the school district have the
affirmative, statutory obligation under the
IDEA to develop a suitable education
program (IEP) for every disabled child, the
school district is also in a far better position
to demonstrate that it has fulfilled this
obligation than the disabled student's parents
are in to show that the school district has
failed to do so. Accordingly, I would hold
that the school district-and not the
comparatively uninformed parents of the
disabled child-must bear the burden of
proving that the disabled child has been
provided with the statutorily required
appropriate educational resources.
The majority concludes otherwise based on
the "normal rule of allocating the burden to
the party seeking relief." As even it admits,
however, this so-called "rule" is, in
actuality, merely a presumption and not a
very strong one at that. Relying on
McCormick on Evidence, the majority
explains that, "although 'the natural
tendency is to place the burden on the party
desiring change' or seeking relief, other
factors such as policy considerations,
convenience, and fairness may allow for
different allocation of the burden of proof."
Each of these "other factors"-policy,
convenience and fairness-weigh against
the assignment of the burden of proof to the
parents in this case. To begin with, the
policies behind the IDEA indisputably argue
in favor of placing the burden of proof with
the school district. As the Supreme Court
has explained,
the Act represents an ambitious
federal effort to promote the
education of handicapped
children, and was passed in
response to Congress'
perception that a majority of
handicapped children in the
United States "were either
totally excluded from schools or
[were] sitting idly in regular
classrooms awaiting the time
when they were old enough to
'drop out."'
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Bd. of Educ, of Hendrick Hudson Central
Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 US. 176, 179
(1983). In the service of this effort, the
IDEA obligates school districts to provide
every disabled child with an educational
program that is reasonably responsive to that
child's disability. The IDEA also requires
school districts to involve the parents of the
disabled child in the formulation of
educational plans made in response to the
child's particular disability and to receive
and consider the suggestions of parents in
the development of those plans. In light of
these affirmative obligations, the most
reasonable, though by no means irrebuttable,
presumption is that the school district should
bear the burden of proof in the due process
hearings required by the Act as well.
The majority suggests otherwise by
comparing the obligation of school districts
under the IDEA to that of defendants in civil
rights claims. . . . The analogy is not apt.
Unlike the civil rights statutes referenced by
the majority, the IDEA does not merely seek
to remedy discrimination against disabled
students, it imposes an affirmative
obligation on the nation's school systems to
provide disabled students with an enhanced
level of attention. . . . [I]t is this affirmative
obligation . . . that weighs most heavily in
favor of placing the burden of proof in due
process hearings on the school district.
Turning next to the interests of convenience
and fairness, it is apparent that the school
district possesses a distinct, inherent
advantage over the parents of disabled
children in assessing the feasibility and the
likely benefit of alternative educational
arrangements. While individual parents may
have insight into the educational
development of their own children, they lack
the comprehensive understanding of the
educational alternatives available to [their]
children . . . that [school] officials . . .
possess. And, even more importantly, the
parents lack the means to assess the likely
benefit of available alternatives. Parents
simply do not have, and cannot easily
acquire, the cumulative, institutional
knowledge gained by representatives of the
school district from their experiences with
other, similarly disabled children.
The majority recites, at length, the services
and protections provided to parents under
the IDEA, but the mere recitation of these
provisions does nothing more than highlight
Congress' awareness that parents of disabled
children operate at a disadvantage when they
seek to contest the [IEP] developed by their
school district. It certainly does not show
that Congress has "leveled the playing field"
between the school district and the parents. .
. . [E]ven in the rosiest of scenarios, the
provision of such remedial protections and
services would not begin to impart to the
average parent the level of expertise or
knowledge that the school district possesses
as a matter of course.
The majority may well be correct that the
assignment of the burden of proof to the
party with the "bigger guns" is not
"automatic." However, with only a faint,
general presumption in favor of placing the
burden of proof on the complainant on the
other side of the equation, the fact that the
party with the "bigger guns" also has better
access to information, greater expertise, and
an affirmative obligation to provide the
contested services can hardly be ignored.
Indeed, in my judgment, the collective
weight of each of these considerations is
dispositive.
I fear that, in reaching the contrary
conclusion, the majority has been unduly
influenced by the fact that the parents of the
disabled student in this case have proven to
be knowledgeable about the educational
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resources available to their son and
sophisticated (if yet unsuccessful) in their
pursuit of these resources. If so, it is
regrettable. These parents are not typical,
and any choice regarding the burden of
proof should not be made in the belief that
they are. For the vast majority of parents
whose children require the benefits and
protections provided in the IDEA, the
specialized language and technical
educational analysis with which they must
familiarize themselves as a consequence of
their child's disability will likely be obscure,
if not bewildering. By the same token, most
of these parents will find the educational
program proposed by the school district
resistant to challenge: the school district will
have better information about the resources
available to it, as well as the benefit of its
experience with other disabled children.
With the full mix of parents in mind, I
believe that the proper course is to assign the
burden of proof in due process hearings to
the school district.
I respectfully dissent.
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"High Court to Hear Maryland
Special-Ed Case"
Washington Post
February 23, 2005
Tim Craig and Miranda Spivack
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to hear
the case of a Montgomery County couple
who contend that school officials, if
challenged, must prove they are meeting
their legal obligations to special education
students.
The justices will try to decide whether lower
courts should place the burden of proof on
schools or the plaintiff-presumably the
parents-when a party sues under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
The law requires that public schools grant
every disabled child a "free appropriate
special education" tailored to the child's
specific needs.
The case, which has taken a tortuous, seven-
year path through the educational and legal
systems, could have a major impact on
millions of parents and their children with
special needs. It involves Brian Schaffer,
who in 1997 was a seventh-grader with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
was attending a private school that offered
no special education programs.
When Jocelyn Schaffer, Brian's mother,
sought to enroll him at Herbert Hoover
Middle School, the county offered a
specially designed curriculum for Brian
called an Individual Education Program. It
called for 15.3 hours of special education
and 45 minutes of speech therapy each
week.
After the parents expressed concern about
that school's fairly large classes, according
to court filings, the system offered the same
individualized program at Robert Frost
Middle School, where classes were smaller.
The parents rejected both offers as
inadequate and instead enrolled Brian in the
McLean School of Maryland, a private
school in Potomac. They subsequently
requested a due process hearing, available
under the disabilities act, during which they
sought reimbursement for school tuition.
An administrative law judge ruled that the
Schaffers had to prove that the school
system's plan for their son was lacking. The
parents then filed suit in U.S. District Court,
which ruled that the burden of proof rested
with the schools. The case was returned to
the administrative law judge, who ordered
the school system to reimburse the parents
for part of their son's private school tuition.
The Montgomery County school system
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit, which ruled that the burden
rests with whatever party is filing the suit,
effectively ruling against the Schaffers, who
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The case is being closely watched by school
systems and special education advocates.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act offers no clear standard for how such
cases should be resolved. Various appellate
courts have come down on different sides of
the question.
"We regard this as an important civil rights
case," said William H. Hurd, the Schaffers's
attorney. "We believe the implications are
very large."
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Jerry D. Weast, superintendent of
Montgomery County schools, said the case
"demonstrates the overwhelming litigious
nature that has evolved under special
education in which school systems have
been presumed at fault until proven
otherwise."
Weast said most school districts settle
similar cases to avoid litigation.
Montgomery County, which has about
15,000 students enrolled in Individual
Education Programs, is contesting the issue,
he said, because "educational services
should be decided in an appropriate way
based on the educational needs of the
student, not the whim of a lawyer."
Last year, 26 Montgomery cases were sent
to an administrative law judge for
mediation, according to the State
Department of Education.
The National School Boards Association,
which represents the nation's 15,000 school
systems, backs Montgomery's' position that
the burden should not rest with the schools if
a parent brings a suit.
"The bottom line is that there are plenty of
protections in the law, and you should
follow the general rule that the challenging
party has the burden of proof," said Naomi
Gittins, a staff attorney for the association.
Attorneys for the Schaffer family argue that
it is the school system's responsibility to
prove that it is adhering to federal law.
"This is a case where the school district has
an affirmative obligation to develop a plan
for the child," Hurd said. "It ought to be
willing to step up to the plate and explain
why it believes it has met its obligation."
As the case was winding its way to the
Supreme Court, the U.S. Department of
Justice under the Clinton administration
filed a brief supporting the Schaffers. Hurd
said he was hopeful that the Bush
administration would maintain that position
at the high court....
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"High Court to Decide Who Must Prove
Case in Special Ed Disputes"
Education Week
March 2, 2005
Caroline Hendrie
When it comes to the legal fight over special
education that they have waged for the past
seven years, Joceyln S. and Martin P.
Schaffer and their Maryland school district
don't agree on much.
But the two sides do see eye to eye on this:
With the U.S. Supreme Court's decision last
week to review the Schaffers' case, the
dispute suddenly has the potential to shape
the outcome of clashes over special
education between parents and public
schools across the nation for years to come.
At issue before the high court in Schaffer v.
Weast (Case No. 04-698) is which side bears
the legal burden of proof when parents and
school districts disagree over the services or
placement that children with disabilities
require. With the federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act silent on that
question, judges in federal and state courts
repeatedly have come down on opposite
sides.
"I never imagined it would go this far," Ms.
Schaffer said after the Supreme Court
agreed on Feb. 22 to consider the family's
appeal of a lower-court decision in favor of
the Montgomery County, Md., school
system. But she and her husband aim to see
the case through even though the boy at the
center of the case graduated from high
school in 2003.
"It really isn't about Brian right now," Ms.
Schaffer said of her son, who was in 7th
grade when the conflict began over what
setting was appropriate to accommodate his
learning disabilities and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder.
"What this is about is providing a child who
has special needs with the services he needs.
It's the principle."
Officials with the 139,000-student district
say they too are pursuing the case because of
the principles at stake.
"We have chosen to defend the public's
interest," Jerry D. Weast, the superintendent
of the suburban Washington district, said in
a statement. "Educational services should
be decided in an appropriate way based on
the educational needs of the student, not the
whim of a lawyer."
Under the IDEA, parents and school
officials must be included on teams that
craft individualized education programs for
children with disabilities. But the law does
not specify which side should bear the
burden for proving its claims in an
administrative hearing when they disagree
over the specifics of those federally required
plans, known as IEPS.
All but a few of the federal appeals courts
around the country have weighed in on the
subject. For example, the appellate courts
based in New York City, Philadelphia, St.
Louis, San Francisco, and the District of
Columbia have held or recognized that
school districts bear the burden of proof.
But the appeals courts based in New
Orleans, Cincinnati, Denver, and Richmond,
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Va., have held that parents bear the burden
of proof when they are the parties
challenging IEPs, which is the case in the
vast majority of such disputes.
The Schaffers appealed a ruling by that
Richmond-based court, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 4th Circuit. In a 2-1
decision last July, a panel of the court held
that the burden of proof fell on whichever
party challenged an IEP, which in this case
was the Schaffers.
In papers filed with the Supreme Court, the
family says the 6.5 million children who
receive special education services under the
IDEA deserve national uniformity. "Simply
put, children and parents in some states have
fewer or less effectual rights than their
counterparts in other states, even though all
were intended to be beneficiaries of the
same national law," their brief argues.
William H. Hurd, a former state solicitor
general for Virginia who now represents the
family as a private lawyer, said he hoped the
high court would eliminate those disparities.
"We believe that the court took this case in
order to establish a uniform national rule on
what we regard as an important civil rights
issue," he said. "When parents sit down and
negotiate the terms of a child's educational
plan, it is very important to know who will
have the burden of proof when they come to
an impasse."
But the Montgomery County district takes
the stance that national uniformity is
unnecessary. In court papers urging the high
court to let the 4th Circuit court's decision
stand, the district notes that Congress did not
address the burden-of-proof issue when it
reauthorized the IDEA late last year. That
was the case even though that legislation
included provisions aimed at reducing legal
conflicts between parents and districts.
"Instead, Congress elected to allow the
states to decide how the burden of proof
should be allocated in administrative
hearings," the district's brief to the Supreme
Court says. "Accordingly, it would be
improper for this court to usurp the states'
authority by imposing a blanket rule in this
matter."
But imposing a blanket rule is exactly what
13 states asked the high court to do in a
friend-of-the-court brief supporting the
Schaffers' bid for Supreme Court review.
The states do hot express an opinion on how
the justices should resolve the confusion
among the courts, just that they should do
so.
Arguing that the inconsistency "has
enormous practical consequences," the brief
says that complying with the IDEA, "both
financially and otherwise," may be easier for
states in some federal judicial circuits than
others. The issue affects not only the
estimated 3,000 administrative hearings held
each year under the IDEA, the states argue,
but also the process of Grafting the IEPS
that are at the center of those disputes.
"Knowledge that parents will bear the
burden of proof, if no agreement can be
reached, gives school districts in some
circuits a more advantageous posture than
their counterparts in circuits where the
school districts must bear that burden," the
states' brief says. It was submitted by
Virginia, along with the attorneys general of
Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Ohio, Utah, and West
Virginia.
In addition to discrepancies between federal
courts, the states say, the lack of national
uniformity means that state and federal
courts within the same states may take
opposite stances on which side bears the
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burden of proof in conflicts over special
education.
Going further than the states, the Clinton
administration weighed in on the dispute in
2000 to urge a ruling that school districts
bear the burden of proof.
That makes sense, the Department of
Justice's friend-of-the-court brief argued,
given that districts are assumed under the
IDEA to take the lead in drafting
educational plans for children with
disabilities. Requiring districts to defend
those plans gives school officials "an
additional incentive" to propose good plans,
argued that brief, which was filed during the
first of the case's two stops before the 4th
Circuit court.
The executive branch has not participated in
the case since President Bush took office in
2001. But lawyers for the Schaffers said
they have received no indication that the
government's position has changed.
In their own brief to the Supreme Court, the
Schaffers say many parents find the process
of pursuing administrative hearings "too
daunting and simply capitulate." They cite a
2003 report from the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, the audit arm of
Congress, that said that more than 11,000
hearings were requested in 2000, but that
only 3,000 were held.
"Placing the burden on the parents
significantly strengthens the hand of often-
intransigent school district bureaucracies,"
the parents' brief says.
But the district says people who sue under
federal statutes that prohibit discrimination
based on race, sex, and age must bear the
burden of proof, and it is reasonable for
parents of children with disabilities to meet
a similar legal standard.
"It is highly unlikely that a parent who
believes that his or her child is not receiving
sufficient services will forgo a challenge
merely because of an evidentiary rule that is
common to most litigants," the district's
brief says.
The Montgomery County district also rejects
the family's arguments that low-income
parents are especially harmed by having to
bear the legal burden of proof. Under the
IDEA, the district says, school systems are
required to inform parents of any free or
low-cost legal services available in their
local areas.
In its July ruling, the 4th Circuit panel
majority said Congress recognized that
districts have advantages over parents in
resources and expertise. The majority said
the IDEA contains many procedural
safeguards designed to offset those
advantages.
But the judge who dissented in the 4th
Circuit ruling argued that districts should
have to prove that the plans they propose are
appropriate: "Parents simply do not have,
and cannot easily acquire, the cumulative,
institutional knowledge gained by
representatives of the school district from
their experiences with other, similarly
disabled children."
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in
the Montgomery County case in its 2005-06
term, which begins in October.
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"14 th Circuit Puts Burden on Parents
Under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act"
Daily Record (Baltimore, MD)
August 3, 2004
Alisa Bralove
A disabled child's parents, not the school
system, have the burden of proof in due
process hearings under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, the 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals has held.
Reversing a federal judge in Greenbelt, the
decision is a matter of first impression on an
issue that has divided other federal circuits.
"Certainly this is a huge decision for the 4th
Circuit because we never, prior to this
decision, had any guidance on the burden of
proof in special education cases," said Zvi
Greismann, the attorney representing
Montgomery County Public Schools in the
case. "The court stating that this is akin to
any civil action was very groundbreaking."
But Selene Almazan, director of advocacy
services for the Maryland Coalition for
Inclusive Education, said the decision will
make it much more difficult for parents
trying to challenge the Individualized
Education Program, or IEP, designed for
their disabled child.
"The fact of the matter is the playing field is
not level for families," she said. "Families
have to spend thousands of dollars to litigate
these issues and there are not many
attorneys who can do these hearings and do
them well."
While disappointed with the court's
decision, another advocate for children with
disabilities doubts its impact here.
"I'm not sure that it's going to make that
much difference in Maryland," said Catriona
Johnson, director of public policy initiatives
for the Maryland Developmental Disabilities
Council, noting that parents have little luck
at due process hearings anyway. "If you
look at due process hearings in Maryland,
you will find that parents typically lose due
process hearings much more often than
school systems do."
At the center of the dispute is Brian
Schaffer, who has attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and, through
seventh grade, attended a private school
with no special education program.
In 1997 his parents contacted Herbert
Hoover Middle School, part of the
Montgomery County Public School system.
In the meantime, Brian attended another
private school for his eighth grade year.
The school system's Admission, Review,
and Dismissal Committee found Brian
eligible for special education and offered an
IEP at a local public school.
Soon thereafter, Brian's parents told the
school system that its plan was inadequate
and said Brian would continue to attend
private school. They also requested a due
process hearing seeking reimbursement for
the cost of his tuition.
At the first due process hearing, the
administrative law judge said Brian's parents
had the burden of proving that the IEP was
inadequate and denied them reimbursement.
They then sued the school board in the U.S.
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District Court in Greenbelt, where Judge
Peter J. Messitte remanded the case back to
the ALJ, saying the school system had the
burden of proof.
On remand, the ALJ said the school system
had not proven the adequacy of Brian's
educational plan and ordered it to make
partial reimbursement.
The school system then filed its own action
in federal court to challenge the burden
reassignment.
Meanwhile, the 4th Circuit vacated
Messitte's order so the two actions could be
consolidated.
In the second case, the district court once
again held that the school system had the
burden of proof and found the
accommodations to be insufficient,
awarding Brian's parents full
reimbursement.
The school board again appealed to the 4th
Circuit.
On appeal, Brian's parents argued that
because the IDEA is a remedial statute and
Montgomery County Public Schools have
greater resources than individual parents, the
school system should bear the burden of
proof.
But the court said it does not "automatically
assign the burden of proof to the side with
the bigger guns," noting that the IEP process
is open to parents and requires their input.
"As a result, the school system has no unfair
information or resource advantage that
compels us to reassign the burden of proof
to the school system when the parents
initiate the proceeding," Judge M. Blane
Michael wrote for the 2-1 majority.
But in a strong dissent, Judge J. Michael
Luttig said that the school system should
have the burden.
"Parents simply do not have, and cannot
easily acquire, the cumulative, institutional
knowledge gained by representatives of the
school district," he wrote.
Michael J. Eig, who represented Brian's
parents, could not be reached for comment.
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"Schaffer v. Weast"
Medill News Service
Febru
Nu
Brian Schaffer attended the Green Acres
private school since pre-Kindergarten, but
during the first semester of the seventh
grade the school informed his parents they
would have to look elsewhere for their son's
education.
Schaffer has Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder and other learning disabilities.
Green Acres did not have a special
education program and he struggled
academically throughout his years at the
school. When he began the seventh grade,
the school placed him on probation and in
October told his mother to take him to
another school that had the resources to
teach him properly.
In November 1997, Schaffer's parents
contacted Herbert Hoover Middle School, a
part of the Maryland Montgomery County
Public School System, and requested they
perform an evaluation for eligibility for
special education. In the meantime, they
submitted an application for their son to
attend the McLean, a private school.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) gives every disabled child the
right to a "free appropriate public
education." Every public school receiving
federal funds has to develop and implement
an individual educational program (IEP) for
each child in its jurisdiction.
In February 1998, a school system
committee held its first meeting to discuss
Schaffer's educational needs with his
parents, their lawyer and school officials
(Northwestern University)
ary 22, 2005
shin Huq
from Hoover Middle School. Under the
IDEA, parents are to be involved in every
step of the process and all records are open
to them.
A month later Schaffer was admitted to the
McLean school and his parents paid the
enrollment fee to reserve his spot for the
eighth grade. In April the committee met
again and determined that Schaffer had a
special educational need and proposed an
IEP for him.
The proposed IEP specified that Schaffer
would receive 15.3 hours of special
education and 45 minutes a week of speech
therapy at Hoover Middle School. When his
parents expressed concern about the large
class sizes, the district offered to provide the
same program at Robert Frost Middle
School, which was ten minutes away from
Schaffer's home and had smaller classes.
The IDEA allows parents to initiate an
administration hearing called a due process
hearing if they are dissatisfied with the IEP.
In May, Schaffer's parents informed the
school system that the IEP was inadequate
and Schaffer would attend McLean school in
the fall. They requested a due process
hearing, claiming they were denied a free
appropriate IEP and requested a
reimbursement for tuition and other private
school expenses.
The IDEA requires that due partial hearings
be impartial and cannot be conducted by a
system or state education employee. In
Maryland due process hearings are
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conducted by an administrative law judge.
At the beginning of the hearing the judge
placed the burden of proof on Schaffer's
parents. They had to prove the school
system did not provide an adequate IEP.
The parents challenged the substance of the
IEP, not the process. Both sides submitted
extensive expert testimony and the judge
considered the case to be close. Ultimately,
he commented that "the assignment of the
burden of proof [was] critical" to the
outcome. The judge upheld the IEP and
denied the parents' request for tuition
reimbursement.
"In my experience, it's rare for a case to be
so close that burden of proof would
determine who won the case," said Sue
Young, a New York attorney who
exclusively represents parents in IDEA
cases. In New York, the burden of proof is
on the school board.
One importance of burden of proof,
according to Young, is it determines who
presents their case first. So in New York,
for example, the school board presents its
case first. Then the parents can put holes in
their case. Sometimes this is enough to win,
but if not the parents then have an
opportunity to present their case.
"This is important because in my
experience, parents don't have as many
resources as the school districts," Young
said. "In fact, many parents unable to get a
lawyer represent themselves. So meeting
that burden of proof would be impossible no
matter how strong their case was."
Young explained that though the IDEA
requires the school district to pay for the
parents' legal fees if the parents win, cases
can be drawn out. Most lawyers don't
represent parents in IDEA cases unless
they're given a retainer fee. Therefore,
many parents represent themselves and are
at a disadvantage.
The Schaffers sued the Montgomery County
Board of Education in federal court in
Maryland, stating the judge had erred in
assigning them the burden of proof. The
district court agreed and reallocated the
burden of proof to the school system. It then
sent the case back to the judge for further
proceedings. After the reassignment, the
judge found the school district had failed to
prove the adequacy of the IEP and ordered a
partial reimbursement of tuition costs.
The school appealed to the district court,
which not only upheld the judge's decision
but also ordered a full, not partial,
reimbursement of tuition costs for the 1998-
1999 school year.
"I believe that all children should have
access to appropriate education," said retired
New Jersey State Judge Milton Gezler. "But
there are limited funds the school board has
to spend on educating all the children in the
district.
Gezler was a school board attorney for over
thirty years. He said, for example, one of
the local school districts in New York has
about 2,000 children who have learning
disabilities. If the school district had to pay
for a private school education (which he
estimated at $40,000) for each child plus the
parents' legal cost, it would be a huge
burden on the school system.
"It's important to give each child a good
education, and IDEA works to do that,"
Gezler said. "Is it fair for taxpayers to pay
for the education of a small number of
children, and take money away from other
programs? Someone is always going to
lose."
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The school system appealed. In July 2004,
six years after Schaffer was in the eighth
grade, a divided 4th Circuit Court of
Appeals panel reversed, holding that the
burden of proof in IDEA cases should
follow the general rule that "a party
initiating a proceeding bears that burden."
The majority conceded that the federal
circuits are divided on the issue with the
majority placing the burden of proof on the
schools. But the majority reasoned that
Congress was aware that school systems
might have the advantage, yet it did not
assign the burden to the schools.
Writing for the majority, Judge M. Blane
Michael pointed to other federal laws, such
as the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, all of
which place the burden of proof on the
individual trying to prove that someone,
often an employer, discriminated.
"We do not automatically assign the burden
of proof to the side with the bigger guns,"
Michael added.
Judge J. Michael Luttig dissented. "The
analogy is not apt. Unlike the civil rights
statutes referenced by the majority, the
IDEA does not merely seek to remedy
discrimination against disabled students; it
imposes an affirmative obligation on the
nation's school systems to provide disabled
students with an enhanced level of attention
and services."
He also wrote that policy, fairness and
convenience all weigh against assigning the
burden to parents in IDEA cases. "The
majority may well be correct that the
assignment of the burden of proof to the
party with the 'bigger guns' is not
'automatic."' Luttig retorted. However,
with only "a faint, general presumption" in
favor of dong it the other way, "the fact that
the party with the 'bigger guns' also has
better access to information, greater
expertise, and an affirmative obligation to
provide the contested services can hardly be
ignored."
On Feb. 22, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court
accepted review in the case.
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"Let's Talk: Individuals with Disabilities Education Act"
American Speech-Language-Hearing Association
2002 (accessed June 24, 2005)
Sue Ann Goldman
The Individuals with Disabilities Act
(IDEA) ensures that all eligible children
with disabilities have a right to a free,
appropriate public education (FAPE) in the
least restrictive environment (LRE), and that
the rights of these children and their parents
are protected. IDEA mandates the provision
of special education and related services for
children from birth through age 21 and
ensures the effectiveness of these services.
IDEA is the landmark law that provides
federal funding for all children with
disabilities.
IDEA provides minimum requirements that
states must satisfy to receive federal funds.
States may exceed these requirements. For
laws specific to a particular state, contact the
local state department of education, office of
special education programs.
Who is Eligible?
Students ages 5 to 21 with disabilities in the
following areas and in need of special
education and related services are eligible
for services under IDEA: hearing
impairment, deafness, speech or language
impairments, mental retardation, visual
impairments, blindness, serious emotional
disturbance, orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, specific learning disabilities,
deaf-blindness, or multiple disabilities.
No one criterion may be used to determine
eligibility. If a student scores higher than a
particular state's mandated criterion for
testing, but is shown through obsenation
and other functional measures to have a
disability, services cannot be denied.
Although a student's disability must
adversely affect educational performance, an
eligible student may be performing at grade
level. There are three domains in which
educational impact may be demonstrated:
academic (ability to benefit from the
curriculum), social (ability to interact with
peers and adults), and vocational (ability to
participate in career-related activities). A
student with a speech deficit in the area of
articulation, voice, or fluency may manifest
educational impact through hesitancy to
speak in front of peers, frustration when
speaking, or unintelligible speech.
Preschool children between the ages of 3
and 5 who present with disabilities and who
are in need of special education and related
services also may be eligible for services
under IDEA. Parents who feel that their
preschool child may be at risk
developmentally or because of a
documented disorder should contact their
local education agency to request a
preschool evaluation. Infants and toddlers
under 3 years of age who would be at risk of
experiencing a substantial delay may be
eligible for early intervention services under
IDEA.
How Are Services Obtained?
An initial evaluation must be completed in
order to determine if a child is eligible for
services under IDEA. A request for an
evaluation can be made by a parent or
guardian by writing to the director of special
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education services or the principal of the
local school.
Whether to evaluate and, if so, the nature of
the proposed evaluations, is determined at
this pre-evaluation meeting. A team of
professionals representing all areas relative
to a suspected disability attend the meeting
and determine, along with the parents, which
evaluations should be completed. It is
important for parents to voice their concerns
at this meeting and to provide any
information that may be pertinent to a
student's education and ability to learn. In
order for school personnel to evaluate a
child, parents must give written, informed
consent. If a parent refuses to allow a child
to be evaluated, procedures are in place by
which a school district can challenge and
possibly override the parent's refusal in
order to move forward with an evaluation.
What Happens After the Evaluation?
After all elements of the evaluation are
completed, a meeting is arranged with the
parents to discuss the results of the
evaluation and to determine eligibility. The
team of professionals and the parents review
the reports, which must be sent to the
parents in advance of the meeting. If it is
determined that a child has a disability that
fits one of the eligibility categories due to
adverse effect on educational performance
and need for special education and related
services, that child is designated as eligible.
Parents who do not agree with the results of
an evaluation retain the right to have
independent evaluations completed. Results
of such evaluations must be considered by
the team, but the district officials may
decide that the district evaluation is more
appropriate.
At any point in the process, parents may ask
for mediation if they do not agree to
procedures followed by a school district. If
mediation does not solve the problem,
parents may begin a due process hearing by
hiring an attorney.
Because no one test or procedure can be
used as a determination of eligibility or
ineligibility, parents who feel that a district
is following testing criteria too stringently,
to the extent of disregarding other findings,
may challenge the team recommendations of
ineligibility. This scenario could occur in
the case of a language disorder in states
where mandated test scores are in place. If
such considerations as teacher input,
observation in a classroom setting, and other
informal measures show deficits in the area
of language, that individual could be found
eligible for services.
What is the IEP?
Once a student is found eligible for services,
an Individualized Education Program (IEP)
is developed. The written IEP explicitly
defines the educational program a school
district will provide to address the individual
needs of a student. It contains measurable
annual goals and objectives to help a student
succeed in school.
All decisions concerning this document
must be the determination of the IEP team,
which includes the parents, one or more
professionals who evaluated the child, a
regular education teacher, a special
education teacher, the related service
provider, and other professionals at the
discretion of the parent. Decisions may not
be made by district administrators who are
not familiar with the child and who do not
attend the meeting. Services that the IEP
team finds to be necessary cannot be denied
because of cost or lack of resources.
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Once goals and objectives are written,
placement should be discussed. Students
must be placed in the least restrictive
environment.
A statement of transition services for
students over the age of 14 must be included
in the IEP. Such services can include
vocational training, post-secondary
education, continuing and adult education,
and independent community living.
The IEP must be reviewed annually,
although changes at the request of the parent
or district may be considered at any time.
What Is Provided?
Special education services designed to meet
students' individual needs, including the
related services of audiology, speech-
language pathology, physical or
occupational services, and counseling are
provided to children with disabilities. The
purpose of related services is to help a child
benefit from special education services.
Decisions on related services and their
frequency and duration must be made by the
IEP team and must be based solely on the
needs of the child.
A parent can question decisions that seem to
be based on availability of staff or
administrative convenience. For example, it
is against the tenets of IDEA for a district to
have uniform group sizes and time duration.
Decisions must be made on an individual
basis.
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Rice v. Collins
(No. 04-52)
Case Below: (Collins v. Rice, 365 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted 125 S. Ct. 2989, 73
U.S.L.W. 3753 (U.S. June 28, 2005) (No. 04-52)).
Petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to 25 years to life
under California's three strikes law. He challenges the prosecutor's peremptory strike against an
African-American woman during jury selection for his trial. The trial court rejected the
challenge and the appeals court affirmed, concluding that the prosecutor had offered acceptable
race-neutral explanations. The United States District Court for the Central District of California
dismissed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the
state appellate court's determination that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful
discrimination was unreasonable in light of the evidence.
Question Presented: Does 28 U.S.C. § 2254 allow a federal habeas corpus court to reject the
presumption of correctness for state fact-finding, and condemn a state-court adjudication as an
unreasonable determination of the facts, where a rational fact-finder could have determined the
facts as did the state court?
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OPINION:
AMENDED OPINION
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
Steven Collins appeals the district court's
order denying his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. During jury
selection prior to his state court trial for
possession of a controlled substance,
Collins, an African-American male, alleged
that race motivated the prosecutor's
peremptory strikes against two African-
American women in the jury venire in
violation of People v. Wheeler, but the state
trial court rejected Collins' Wheeler motion.
The jury found him guilty of the possession
charge and also found that Collins had been
convicted of robbery and forcible rape in
1982. Accordingly, with three felony
convictions, the court sentenced him to a
three strikes term of twenty-five years to life
in state prison. The California Court of
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Appeal affirmed his conviction and
sentence, and the California Supreme Court
denied both Collins' petition for review and
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C.
2253, and we conclude that the California
Court of Appeal's decision that the
prosecutor did not engage in purposeful
discrimination during jury selection
represents (1) an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented
at trial, and (2) an objectively unreasonable
application of clearly established law.
Accordingly, we reverse with instructions to
grant the petition.
BACKGROUND
After Collins was discovered in possession
of 0.10 grams of powder cocaine in March
1996, the State of California charged him
with possession of a controlled substance in
violation of California Health and Safety
Code section 11350(a). When jury selection
began, the trial court excused ten of the
original thirty-three members of the venire.
Of the remaining twenty-three, three
appeared to be African-American.
During voir dire, Juror 016, one of two
African-American women in the venire,
stated that she lived in Inglewood,
California, was single, had no children, no
prior jury experience, no prior employment
experience in law enforcement, and worked
as an automations clerk for the Federal
Aviation Administration. She also stated
that no one close to her had ever been
accused of a drug-related offense, nor had
anyone close to her had a problem with
alcohol or drugs, and that she had no reason
to believe that drug dealers operated in her
neighborhood. When asked whether she
thought that possession of rock cocaine
ought to be against the law, she answered
"yes." Juror 016 also told the court that
there was nothing about the nature of the
charge of possession of rock cocaine that
might make it difficult for her to sit on a
case involving drug charges. The prosecutor
exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse
Juror 016.
Juror 019, the other African-American
woman in the venire, told the court that she
lived in Inglewood, California, was single
with seven grown children, and was
currently a retired nurse. She also stated
that she had no relatives or close friends in
law enforcement and had never had an
experience with a police officer that was
"particularly positive or particularly
negative." At one time, her youngest
daughter had a problem with drugs. Juror
019 had no idea what kind of drugs but
thought that it might have been cocaine.
Juror 019 stated that she "was involved in"
her daughter's struggle with addiction and
"had to help her," but that she did not think
that anything about her relationship with her
daughter or the daughter's cocaine problem
would affect her ability to be fair and
impartial in Collins' case.
After the prosecutor exercised another
peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 019,
defense counsel made a motion pursuant to
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 583 P. 2d 748, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 alleging
that the prosecutor had improperly
dismissed Jurors 016 and 019 on the basis of
race. [The court noted: Wheeler is the
"California analogue" to Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct.
1712 (1986). Although aspects of Wheeler
differ from Batson, notably the requirements
for establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination, see Cooperwood v. Cambra,
245 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2001), the
state trial court's finding that Collins
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established a prima facie case is not in
dispute. Because the relevant aspects of the
two cases are the same, and because we are
reviewing Collins' petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, we
refer to Batson in analyzing his claims.]
The trial court determined that Collins had
established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination and thus asked the prosecutor
to justify her peremptory challenges. The
prosecutor responded:
Ms. 016 as well as Ms. 019 were
both young and I was concerned
with them being too tolerant of this
type of case. Also, Ms. 016 made a
remark when the judge made a
response to her comment "uh-huh,"
she turned away and rolled her
eyes. I don't think you asked her
specifically to give a yes or no, but
she went "yes," and rolled her eyes
and turned away from the court.
She and Mr. 006 were both single,
no ties.
. . . 019, she also had a daughter
having a drug problem and she
talked about not knowing much
about what drug it was, things like
that. She was not sufficiently
educated in some areas to decide a
case like this. But it is beyond any
of her experience.
The judge, outside the presence of the
prospective jurors, asked the prosecutor if
she had any additional justifications to offer
for striking the two African-American
female jurors. The following colloquoy
took place:
[Prosecutor]: I was the one to bring
to the court's attention that the two
African-American jurors that were
excused were both female and the
defendant is a male and there is a
male African-American on the jury
that has been on it since the
beginning, I believe, of this case,
of the jury panel that were seated,
And there is a second female juror
that is of African-American color,
black color, on the jury, still
seated. That is it, your honor, at
this point. Does the court need
cases for those types of reasons as
being upheld in other courts, age
and gender and inexperience with a
certain subject area?
The Court: I'll let you know.
[Defense counsel], would you like
to be heard?
[Defense counsel]: Yes.
[Prosecutor] has talked about
looking for more male/female
balance. I thought the court was
asking each of these potential
jurors if they could be fair. ...
[Prosecutor]: I don't have exact
citations here for the court, but
People v. Ortega, which also talks
about the jury being balanced
between young and old and men
and women.
The Court: I recall the United
States Supreme Court saying the
use of peremptory challenges
based on gender is improper. I
don't see, [Prosecutor], that you are
seeking to justify excusing people
of one ethnicity based on their
gender. I don't think that is going
to cut it.
[Prosecutor]: I think I tied that into
a lack of ties in the community
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with both of them; that that was
one factor that I considered, that is,
the manner in which I stated that
they could-that their youth was
important. It was not that I don't
want any young people on the jury.
There are, I believe, other young
people on the jury.
After considering these arguments, the court
denied the Wheeler motion. With regard to
Juror 019, the court stated that it was
"satisfied that at least one race and gender
neutral explanation was offered for the
exercise of that peremptory challenge, that
being Ms. 019's experiences with a family
member who had a drug problem." As to
Juror 016, the court stated that it, "frankly,
did not observe the demeanor of Ms. 016
that was complained of by the district
attorney. However, Ms. 016 was a youthful
person, as was 006. And one or more other
prospective jurors also. The court is
prepared to give the district attorney the
benefit of the doubt as to Ms. 016."
After sentencing, Collins appealed his
conviction and properly exhausted his
remedies in both the California Court of
Appeal and the California Supreme Court.
Collins challenged the trial court's denial of
his Wheeler motion only with respect to
Juror 016. On November 19, 1998, Collins
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2254. Ultimately, the district court
dismissed his petition. Noting that the trial
court had not observed Juror 016's
demeanor, the district court concluded that it
had to respect the trial court's decision to
give the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt
because Collins had not rebutted this
decision with "clear and convincing
evidence." The district court subsequently
granted Collins' request for a certificate of
appealability as to "whether the petitioner's
rights were violated under Batson v.
Kentucky . . . where the prosecution
exercised a peremptory challenge against an
African-American juror ostensibly on the
ground of the juror's age and demeanor."
I.
Because the California Supreme Court
denied Collins' petition for review without
comment, our analysis begins with the
decision of the California Court of Appeal,
an unpublished disposition. In affirming the
trial court's ruling, the state appellate court
adopted the reasons cited by the trial court;
thus, our analysis "will necessarily include
discussion of the trial court's decision as
well." Lewis, 321 F 3d at 829.
The California Court of Appeal determined
that "because the trial court did not observe
the prospective juror's demeanor, the trial
court permitted the prosecutor to exclude
prospective Juror No. 016 based solely on
her age." Citing both Wheeler and Batson,
the state appellate court further rejected
Collins' contention that age was an improper
basis upon which to justify a peremptory
challenge, noting that age groups are not a
cognizable class and that peremptory
challenges to "youthful and/or immature
prospective jurors repeatedly have been
upheld as proper." Even assuming that the
prosecutor's reliance on Juror 016's young
age was improper, the appellate court
alternatively concluded that the trial court
had engaged in a sincere and reasoned
attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's
justification, as "jurors may be excused on
'hunches' and even 'arbitrary' exclusion is
permissible, so long as the reasons are not
based on impermissible group bias." Noting
that "nothing in the present record, including
the trial court's decision to give the
prosecutor the benefit of the doubt as to
prospective Juror No. 016's demeanor,
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indicates that the trial court did not approach
its task appropriately," the appellate court
determined that the trial court's decision was
entitled to deference.
We review Collins' petition according to the
standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr.
24, 1996), as Collins filed his petition after
April 24, 1996. We may only reverse a
judgment of the state that was adjudicated
on the merits if the state's decision was
based on an objectively unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court
proceeding, 28 US.C. 2254(d)(2); Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029,
1041, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003), or if the
state court's decision was "contrary to, or
involves an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law" as
determined by "the governing legal principle
or principles set forth by the Supreme Court
at the time the state court renders its
decision," Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
155 L. Ed. 2d 144, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1172
(citations omitted). We further note that the
ultimate determination of whether the
prosecutor evidenced an intent to
discriminate in dismissing Juror 016 is a
question of fact, see Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 367, 114 L. Ed 2d 395, 111 S.
Ct. 1859 (1991), and that under section
2254, "a determination of a factual issue
made by a State court shall be presumed to
be correct. The applicant shall have the
burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing
evidence." 28 US.C. 2254(e)(1). Collins
therefore must prove that the state court's
decision was " 'objectively unreasonable' in
light of the record before the court." Miller-
El, 537 US. 322, 123 S. Ct. at 1045.
II.
The Equal Protection Clause forbids
prosecutors from exercising peremptory
challenges on the basis of race. Batson, 476
U.S. at 89. Where a defendant asserts that a
prosecutor's peremptory challenges were
racially-motivated, a court must apply a
three-step process for evaluating a Batson
claim. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-60.
First, the defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor exercised a
peremptory challenge on the basis of race.
Id. Once a prima facie case is established,
the burden shifts to the state to articulate a
race-neutral explanation for the challenge.
If the first two steps are satisfied, the court
must then determine whether the defendant
has carried his ultimate burden of proving
purposeful discrimination.
A.
Because the trial court determined that
Collins had established a prima facie case,
the prosecutor was required to articulate a
race-neutral explanation--an explanation
"based on something other than the race of
the juror." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. . . .
At this step, "the issue is the facial validity
of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered
will be deemed race-neutral." Stubbs v.
Gomez, 189 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the prosecutor must give a " 'clear
and reasonably specific' explanation of his
'legitimate' reasons" and "the reason must be
'related to the particular case to be tried,' "
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69 (quoting Batson,
476 U.S. at 98 & n.20), "it is not until the
third step that the persuasiveness of the
justifications becomes relevant." Id. at 768.
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For purposes of step 2, the prosecutor's
explanation need not be "persuasive, or even
plausible." Id.
The prosecutor offered five reasons for
excluding Juror 016: (1) her youth and the
possibility that she might be "too tolerant for
this type of case," (2) her demeanor, (3) her
marital status-"single" with "no ties, " (4)
her lack of ties to the community, and (5)
her gender. The trial court rejected the
prosecutor's attempt to justify her strike on
the basis of Juror 016's gender, but appeared
to credit the prosecutor's discussion of Juror
016's youthful age and her alleged demeanor
as race-neutral justifications. The California
Court of Appeal concluded that the trial
court properly accepted the prosecutor's
youthful age and demeanor justifications as
race-neutral.
Although Collins concedes that the
prosecutor's explanations for striking Juror
016 "may appear to be race-neutral on their
face," citing United States v. Bishop, 959
F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1992), he contends
that rolling of the eyes, lack of ties in the
community, and youthful age are not
characteristics that would affect a juror's
approach to a specific trial and therefore the
prosecutor's explanations were "transparent
proxies for racism." However, as Collins
acknowledges, "at this step of the inquiry,
the issue is the facial validity of the
prosecutor's explanation[.]". . . Further,
neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit
has held that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits a prosecutor from striking potential
jurors on account of age. United States v.
Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d
757, 762 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, the
California Court of Appeal's determination
that age was a race-neutral justification for
excusing Juror 016 is not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established law. Alternatively, if the
prosecutor had excluded Juror 016 because
of her demeanor, this justification would not
constitute a denial of equal protection, as
discriminatory intent is not inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation. Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 360. Because we find no error in the
California Court of Appeal's analysis at step
2, we proceed to step 3.
B.
In the third step of a Batson challenge, the
trial court has "the duty to determine
whether the defendant has established
purposeful discrimination," Batson, 476 US.
at 98, and therefore must evaluate the
''persuasiveness" of the prosecutor's
proffered reasons, see Purkett, 514 US. at
768. In determining whether the defendant
has carried this burden, the Supreme Court
provides that "a court must undertake 'a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.' " Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 US. 252, 266, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450,
97S. Ct. 555 (1977))[.]
In assessing the prosecutor's proffered
justifications for excluding Juror 016, the
state trial and appellate courts made
unreasonable factual determinations in light
of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding and unreasonably applied clearly
established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court. With a careful eye towards
"such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as [was] available" to the appellate
court, Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (internal
quotation marks omitted), we address each
of the justifications relied upon by the
California courts.
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1. Age
The state court of appeal determined that the
prosecutor had dismissed Juror 016 solely
on the basis of her age. The court explained
that because youth was not a cognizable
class for purposes of the cross-section rule
and because youth had been recognized as a
permissible justification for dismissal in the
past, Collins had failed to demonstrate
purposeful discrimination. However, the
appellate court's conclusion is troubling in
several respects.
First, although age has been upheld as a
proper basis for excusing a potential juror,
see Pichay, 986 F.2d at 1259, here, the
prosecution explained that Juror 016's
youthful age might make her "too tolerant
for this type of case." Thus, the prosecutor
attempted to equate her youthful age with a
possible bias favoring criminal defendants
facing drug charges. The prosecutor also
later explained that Juror 016's youthful age
was "important" because of her "lack of ties
in the community," stating, "I think I tied
that into a lack of ties in the community with
both [Juror 016 and 019]; that was one
factor that I considered, that is, the manner
in which I stated that they could-that their
youth was important."
According to the Supreme Court, Juror 016's
age must be "related to the particular case to
be tried," Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, and must
have some relevance to Juror 016's "possible
approach to a specific trial," Bishop, 959
F.2d at 825. Indeed, although the
prosecutor claimed that Juror 016's youthful
age was of concern, she later explained that
it was not the general presence of young
jurors on the jury that concerned her.
Rather, in referring to Jurors 016 and 019,
the prosecutor stated "it was not that I don't
want any young people on the jury. There
are, I believe, other young people on the
jury." Thus, in explaining that she was not
trying to exclude all young jurors from the
jury, the prosecutor clarified that her reason
for excluding Juror 016 was not her youthful
age at all. Instead, her reason for excluding
Juror 016 related to particular characteristics
that the prosecutor associated with her
youth-namely, the prosecutor's beliefs that
Juror 016 might be sympathetic to an
individual charged with drug possession and
that she lacked ties to the community.
The state court of appeal, however, glossed
over the prosecutor's clarification and found
that the sole basis upon which the trial court
had permitted the prosecutor to exclude
Juror 016 was her age. . . [But], the
evidence in the trial record is clear and
convincing that the prosecutor's proffered
justifications for striking Juror 016 on the
basis of her youthful age-possible
tolerance of drug use and lack of ties to the
community-were pretexts for purposeful
discrimination.
With regard to Juror 016's possible
tolerance, during voir dire, Juror 016
answered "yes" to the court's question
regarding whether she believed that
possession of cocaine should be against the
law, and she also told the court that there
was nothing about the nature of the charge
of possession of rock cocaine that might
make it difficult for her to sit on Collins'
case. There is no other evidence in the
record that remotely suggests that Juror 016
was otherwise sympathetic to or tolerant of
individuals involved with drug use or
possession. Juror 016 told the court that
neither she nor her family members or any
of her close friends had ever had a problem
with drugs or alcohol; nor had they ever
been accused of committing a crime
involving illegal drugs. No other
information regarding drug use, drug laws,
or criminal enforcement of drug laws was
solicited by the court or counsel, and Juror
016 never gave the court any information
226
regarding her age. The prosecutor's
clarification that Juror 016 might be "too
tolerant for this type of case" as a basis for
striking Juror 016 is therefore contrary to the
evidence in the record.
The prosecutor later attempted to explain
that Juror 016 was "single, no ties,"
presumably indicating that she was not
married and possibly had no children.
However, as we have already explained,
Batson is clear that the prosecutor's
proffered justifications must be reasonably
"related to the particular case to be tried."
476 U.S. at 98; see also Bishop, 959 F.2d at
825. The trial court record fails to establish
how Juror 016's marital or parental status
would have had any bearing on her ability to
serve as a juror in a case involving
prosecution for crack cocaine possession,
and the prosecutor failed to offer any such
explanation. Further, the record shows that
the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a
white juror who possessed the same
objective characteristics as Juror 016: both
were single, employed females with no
children who responded to the court's
questions in the same manner, thereby
revealing the pretextual nature of this
justification.
The prosecutor also claimed that Juror 016's
youth was "important" because of her "lack
of ties in the community[.]". . . Not only is
the prosecutor's statement that Juror 016 had
a "lack of ties in the community" not
sufficiently "clear and reasonably specific,"
Batson, 476 US. at 98 n.20, but it is also not
supported by the record and does not appear
to have any relation to Juror 016's ability to
serve as a juror in a criminal trial involving
possession of crack cocaine.
In sum, there was clear and convincing
evidence that the prosecutor's stated concern
over Juror 016's youthful age was a pretext
for discrimination, evidence that the state
appellate court did not address in
unreasonably concluding that the prosecutor
had dismissed Juror 016 on the basis of her
age. . . . However, because the appellate
court offered Juror 016's demeanor as an
alternative explanation, we must assess
whether the court unreasonably determined
that the trial court had properly accepted that
justification as nondiscriminatory before
determining the ultimate significance of the
appellate court's conclusion regarding Juror
016's age.
2. Demeanor
The state court of appeal also concluded that
even if the prosecutor's reliance on Juror
016's youthful age had been improper, the
''prosecutor reasonably could have
interpreted prospective [Juror 016's] body
language as indicative of hostility or
disrespect" and properly dismissed her on
that basis. . . . As the record reflects, the
state appellate court reasonably determined
that the trial court had not observed Juror
016's demeanor but nonetheless accepted
this alternate reason for striking Juror 016
on the basis of the prosecutor's credibility.
Because the trial court did not observe Juror
016's demeanor, the critical question here is
whether the appellate court's determination
that the trial court properly credited the
prosecutor's representation was
unreasonable. Notably, the basis for the
state appellate court's determination was its
conclusion that there was "nothing in the
present record" to indicate that the trial court
did not conduct a searching inquiry in giving
the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt or
should have questioned the prosecutor's
credibility. We conclude that this
determination was an unreasonable
determination of the facts because the
prosecutor failed to offer any credible
justification for striking Juror 016.
227
First, we note that the prosecutor
consistently identified Jurors 016 and 019 as
"both young." However, the record reveals
that Juror 019 was at least a middle-aged
grandmother. Indeed, Juror 019 informed
the court that she was a retired nurse with
seven grown children, the youngest of which
had five children of her own. A prosecutor
supplied with this information could not
credibly identify Juror 019 as young. This
incorrect factual statement supports Collins'
argument that the prosecutor was not
credible.
In addition, the trial court judge rejected the
prosecutor's justification for striking Jurors
016 and 019 on the basis of gender. This
too supports the argument that the
prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 on the basis
of her race....
The prosecutor's objectively unreasonable
statements regarding Juror 019's age, and
her attempt to use gender as a race-neutral
basis for excluding Jurors 016 and 019,
combined with her pretextual justifications
for dismissing Juror 016 on the basis of her
alleged lack of community ties, her marital
status, and her purported tolerance, and the
fact that nothing in the record corroborated
her allegations regarding Juror 016's
demeanor, provide "clear and convincing
evidence" that the prosecutor did not dismiss
Juror 016 on the basis of her demeanor. In
light of the evidence in the record, the
appellate court's determination that the
prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 because of
her demeanor was an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Because this
determination provided the basis for the
appellate court's conclusion that the trial
court had not clearly erred in accepting the
prosecutor's justification as race-neutral, this
determination also was objectively
unreasonable.
C.
The state court of appeal held that Collins
had failed to establish purposeful
discrimination on the basis of its objectively
unreasonable determination that the
prosecutor properly dismissed Juror 016
because of her age. The appellate court's
alternative ruling-that the trial court
properly credited the prosecutor's assertion
that Juror 016 had rolled her eyes and turned
away from the court when asked a question
during voir dire, and that her dismissal based
on Juror 016's demeanor did not provide any
evidence of purposeful discrimination-is
also unsupported by the record. Thus, clear
and convincing evidence demonstrates that
there was no credible basis for dismissing
Juror 016 on the basis of her age or
demeanor.
There is, however, substantial evidence
supporting Collins' contention that the
prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 because of
her race-evidence that the appellate court
failed to address. The trial record
demonstrates that the prosecutor's
justifications for dismissing Juror 016 on the
basis of her age were contrary to the record
(likely tolerance of drug offenders), were
unrelated to her ability to serve as a juror in
Collins' case (lack of community ties), and
were not applied equally to white jurors
(single with no children). The record also
shows that one of her justifications was
patently discriminatory (gender), while one
of her justifications for dismissing Juror 019
was contrary to the record (age). In sum, the
record demonstrates that the prosecutor's
proffered reasons for dismissing Juror 016
were wholly implausible, unpersuasive, and
a pretext for discrimination on the basis of
her race.
In order to secure habeas relief, however,
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Collins "must demonstrate that [the] state
court's finding of the absence of purposeful
discrimination was incorrect by clear and
convincing evidence, 28 US.C. 2254(e)(1),
and that the corresponding factual
determination was 'objectively unreasonable'
in light of the record before the court."
Miller-El, 537 US. 322, 123 S. Ct. at 1045.
We conclude that Collins has met this heavy
burden.
IV.
Because the basis for the appellate court's
decision was its unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented
at the trial, and because it also unreasonably
applied clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court, we
conclude that the state trial appellate court
committed constitutional error that warrants
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus under
section 2254. We therefore reverse the
district court's judgment and remand with
instructions to grant the petition on
conditions it deems appropriate.
DISSENT: HALL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The state trial court determined that the
prosecutor's proffered race-neutral
justifications for striking Juror 016 were
credible. This conclusion is entitled to
"great deference," and may not be disturbed
on appeal unless clearly erroneous....
The majority does not defer to the California
Court of Appeal. According to the majority,
deference is unwarranted because the Court
of Appeal's decision rests upon the
"unreasonable factual determination" that
"there was 'nothing in the present record' to
indicate that the trial court did not conduct a
searching inquiry in giving the prosecutor
the benefit of the doubt or should have
questioned the prosecutor's credibility." In
point of fact, the Court of Appeal held only
that the trial court's ultimate decision to
credit the prosecutor was not clearly
erroneous, thereby adhering to the well-
established principle that "where there are
two permissible views of the evidence, the
fact-finder's choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous." Hernandez, 500 Us. at
369.
Having manufactured a reason to disregard
the California Court of Appeal's decision,
the majority essentially reviews the issue of
the prosecutor's credibility de novo,
concluding that the writ should issue
because, under the majority's view, "the
record belies" the conclusion that the trial
court assessed evidence which ostensibly
undermined the prosecutor's credibility. In
doing do, the majority disregards the
canonical rule that evaluation of a
prosecutor's credibility "lies peculiarly
within a trial judge's province," and is
entitled to "great deference." Id. at 366.
Viewing the record in its entirety, I am
firmly convinced that the California Court of
Appeal's decision was reasonable. I
respectfully dissent.
The majority identifies four considerations
potentially relevant to the prosecutor's
credibility. In order to reject the California
Court of Appeal's decision, we would have
to conclude that the Court of Appeal
unreasonably determined that, given these
four considerations, the trial court did not
clearly err by crediting the prosecutor's
race-neutral explanation. As the following
discussion illustrates, the majority falls far
short of making this requisite demonstration.
The majority argues that the trial court
should have questioned the prosecutor's
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credibility because she referred to another
prospective juror, Juror 019, as "young"
even though Juror 019 was a grandmother of
five. As the majority suggests, the
prosecutor may have either been entirely
incapable of judging a person's age or may
have intentionally misrepresented Juror
0 19's age to the court. A far more plausible
explanation, on the other hand, is that the
reference to Juror 019 as "young" was
purely accidental. . . . Indeed, defense
counsel also seemed confused about the
numerical designations, once mistakenly
referring to Juror 016 as "Ms. 019." Both
the trial judge and defense counsel clearly
indicated that they understood the
prosecutor's justification for striking Juror
019 to be her daughter's drug problem, and
the prosecutor's justification for striking
Juror 016 to be that, like Juror 006, she was
young, single, and potentially tolerant.
Under these circumstances, the majority's
focus on the prosecutor's misstatement, an
issue that was not briefed by the parties, is
nothing short of absurd.
The majority also argues that the trial judge
should have questioned the prosecutor's
credibility because the prosecutor cited a
desire to have "more male-female balance"
in the jury as a race-neutral basis for
excluding Juror 016. The majority places
undue emphasis on the prosecutor's arguably
improper reference to gender. The
prosecutor cited a variety of other race-
neutral justifications, including Juror 016's
demeanor, youth, marital status, and
possible tolerance. There is no indication in
Supreme Court precedent, or in cases from
our circuit for that matter, that a trial judge's
decision to reject one of the prosecutor's
race-neutral justifications compels the trial
judge to reject all of the other race-neutral
justifications offered by that prosecutor. In
the instant case, the trial judge rejected the
prosecutor's gender-balance justification, but
nonetheless chose to credit the prosecutor's
other race-neutral justifications for the
challenge. The majority highlights nothing
in the record to indicate that the California
Court of Appeal should have deemed this
decision clearly erroneous.
The third credibility issue raised by the
majority also relates to Juror 019 rather than
Juror 016. Making an argument not
presented by Collins either before this court
or before the California Court of Appeal, the
majority contends that the prosecution's
explanation that Juror 019 had a daughter
recently treated for cocaine addiction was
pretextual because a white juror passed by
the prosecution, Juror 030, also had a child
with a cocaine problem. There are several
fundamental problems with the majority's
analysis of this issue. The issue was not
briefed by the parties or discussed at oral
argument, and the record itself certainly
does not contain clear and convincing
evidence that Juror 019 and Juror 030 were,
as the majority terms them,
"indistinguishably similar." Moreover, even
if one accepts the majority's shaky premise
that Jurors 019 and 030 were
"indistinguishably similar," there is no
Supreme Court precedent indicating that a
race-neutral justification is necessarily
pretextual merely because it applies to
another member of the venire. Similarly,
there is a complete dearth of Supreme Court
precedent indicating that a trial judge may
not credit a prosecutor's race-neutral
justification if there is reason to believe that
the race-neutral justification given for
another juror was pretextual. For these
reasons, the prosecutor's conduct vis-a-vis
Juror 019 lends very little, if any, support to
the majority's conclusion that the trial judge
should have questioned the prosecutor's
explanation for striking Juror 016.
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Finally, the majority contends that the
prosecutor's explanation that Juror 016 was
a youthful single person, and therefore
potentially too tolerant, was not credible.
Noting that Juror 016 "believed possession
of crack cocaine should be illegal," the
majority concludes that the prosecutor's
concern that Juror 016 might be too tolerant
for this three strikes case was "patently
frivolous." The majority's conclusion is
simply untenable-the theory that young
persons, even those who believe crack
cocaine should be illegal and don't expressly
indicate any heightened tolerance for drug
offenders, may be less willing to impose
harsh sentences for drug possession than
their older counterparts in the venire can
hardly be considered unreasonable, much
less "implausible or fantastic."
Indeed, the majority's own analysis
demonstrates precisely why the Court of
Appeal properly deferred to the trial court's
judgment. The majority strains to find that
the credibility issues discussed above
constitute "clear and convincing" evidence
which not only undermines the prosecutor's
credibility, but makes clear that the
prosecutor's articulated rationales for her
peremptories were "wholly implausible."
Viewing the majority's credibility argument
generously, however, their conclusion is
merely that the trial court had several
potential reasons to question the prosecutor's
credibility. Presumably, the trial court also
had a variety of potential reasons to believe
that the prosecutor was credible, including
the prosecutor's ostensibly truthful
comparison between Juror 016 and Juror
006. Significantly, the trial judge also had
the ability to observe the prosecutor's
demeanor to determine whether she
appeared to be telling the truth, evidence
which would not be evident in the record,
Both the majority opinion and the record are
devoid of any basis for concluding that the
prosecutor's statements and demeanor left
the trial judge with no permissible
alternative but to reject the prosecutor's
race-neutral justifications.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm.
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